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Society and Politics in Saxony in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Reflections on Recent Research

I. SAXONY IN GERMAN HISTORY¹

Drawing a composite from the university faculty who appear in Stephen Potter's 1950s books on »One-Upmanship«, we find the professor who habitually places his research books around the house when he invites colleagues to dinner, so that his guests might have the opportunity to read his learned marginalia. This professor lacks the time and energy to inject original insight into each comment. However, he has discovered a line that suits every occasion: a phrase that conveys scholarly distance, even critical scepticism, but also breadth of knowledge. Thus a dinner guest who opens a book at random will come across the inevitable scribble: »Yes, *but not in the South!*«²

Viewing the larger canvas of modern German history, one is frequently tempted to exclaim: »Yes, *but not in Saxony!*« As Section II of this review will suggest, historians disagree about what makes Saxony special, peculiar, or unique. Depending on the time-frame, Saxony can seem interesting as a pioneer or as a late-comer. It can be seen as peripheral or central, typical or extreme. And it can be considered a model for what might have been, or a case study of what actually was. However, there is a danger inherent in pursuing any one of these arguments (let alone all at the same time). By concentrating too much on the particularity of the Saxon case, historians fail to appreciate how the study of one region – *any* region – can help us reassess larger questions. Has recent scholarship on Saxony prompted fundamental reassessments of German history? Going beyond the obvious point that Prussia no longer appears at the centre of things, is there something special about Saxony that undermines older paradigms and raises new questions? Or could the same questions be posed via other vehicles?

None of the books under review claims to offer a wholly new interpretation of German history. Yet on specific themes many of them put forward starkly revisionist viewpoints. Each of the sections below addresses one »bundle« of themes. Section III asks whether Saxony and Germany were perhaps scarred in similar ways by war and revolution. These themes provide useful pegs upon which to hang analyses of state legitimisation, crisis management, and other tests of political adaptability. Have the reforms

1 To avoid repetition I wish to thank here the many colleagues who made their work-in-progress available to me. I am also grateful to Celia Applegate for her comments on an earlier draft. I have weighted my citations heavily toward recent publications; for fuller references, readers are directed to *Karsten Rudolph/Iris Weuster*, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Demokratiebewegung in Mitteldeutschland (1789–1933)*, Weimar etc. 1997. In cases where I have not yet been able to consult a work that is of central importance to the field, I have noted this explicitly. For financial support I am grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the DAAD, the Connaught Committee, the University of Toronto, and the SSHRC of Canada.

2 *Stephen Potter*, *Some Notes on Lifemanship*, New York 1950, S. 25–28; *ders.*, *One-Upmanship*, London 1952, S. 78–81.

that followed war and revolution in Saxony exhibited unique discontinuities? If so, with what consequences? If not, why not?

Sections IV, V, and VI address questions that arise from the efforts of historians and political scientists to grapple with regional political cultures. Section IV considers the increasing complexity of Saxon class society, and Section V examines how that complexity affected political allegiances and conflicts. If social classes were becoming more finely layered over time, and if the interpenetration of working-class, lower-middle-class, and even middle-class groups in Saxon society was accelerating, why did ideological conflicts and polarised party blocs remain so static up to 1933? Does Saxon history provide a new answer to the question of who voted for Hitler?

Section VI addresses a question that has been of central concern to historians since at least 1914: What is the link, if any, between Germany's late-comer status among industrialised nations and its failure to follow a path toward parliamentary democracy? We might use the metaphor of a pair of open scissors to consider the distance that had opened up by 1914 – between Germany's rapid socio-economic development on the one hand, and its retarded political development on the other. Saxony would seem to lie at the widest point of the scissors' opening: emancipation was progressing on every front except the political front, where democracy remained a chimera. But is Saxony typical enough to illuminate the larger contours of German modernisation? Or does it represent nothing more than a worst-case scenario?

Section VII considers how these themes are refracted through the lenses of localism and regionalism. It also considers whether the works under review demand a critical appraisal of the practice of regional history. Most authors contend that the Saxon polity was more polarised than virtually any other region of Germany from the 1860s onward. However, they disagree about (at least) three issues: the socio-cultural factors that gave rise to this alleged polarisation; the analytical yardsticks used to measure it; and its long-term impact on German political culture.

Section VII addresses these issues by considering Germans' sense of place. Do the authors in question actually explore the interpenetration of local, regional, and national idioms? Or do they add to our knowledge in merely cumulative ways? Neither this section nor the next one, on scholarship in today's Saxony, can offer a comprehensive examination of paradigms dominating the practice of local and regional history. They ask instead where research may be headed on themes relating to local and regional identities, and they suggest what resources in Saxony have been under-utilised. Certainly Saxon historians are living up to their reputation for pioneering work. Yet to date the »new cultural history« has had only marginal impact on Saxon historiography. Few studies take the »culture« in political culture seriously, and even fewer undertake cross-cultural comparisons or interdisciplinary research systematically. Nevertheless, as we shall see, hopeful signs suggest that this deficit may soon be overcome.

II. PIONEER, LATE-COMER, OR MODEL FOR A »THIRD GERMANY«?

Saxony's status as a pioneer seems unshakeable. Well before 1871 Saxony was the most densely populated region of Germany (apart from the city states). It was the most urbanised. And measured by the proportion of the population that depended for its livelihood on mining and manufacturing — 59 per cent 1882 — it was the most industrialised. To be sure, Saxony's export-oriented economy was still dominated in the 1920s by small- and medium-scale enterprises. Hence it was susceptible to restricted trade and credit between the wars. Yet in the post-1945 period and since 1990, relative to the other regions of eastern Germany, Saxony's industry has prospered. Saxony's role as the

cradle of Social Democracy is equally well-known. After Ferdinand Lassalle founded the General German Workers' Association in Leipzig in 1863, August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht used the founding of the Saxon People's Party in 1866 to prepare the way for the Eisenach wing of German Social Democracy. In the 1870s socialists began to win elections to Saxon municipal councils, and the first socialist elected to a German state parliament entered the Saxon *Landtag* in 1877.³ In 1903 the SPD's victory in 22 of 23 Reichstag constituencies inaugurated the epithet »Red Saxony«. Leipzig's local SPD organisation provided a key bastion of support for left-wing radicalism in the national party up to the First World War and beyond.

To these better-known instances of Saxony's pioneering role one can add other instructive examples. Yet such examples frequently demonstrate the precariousness of regional innovation in the face of national trends. For instance: Saxony abolished the death penalty in the mid-nineteenth century, only to be forced to accede to its reintroduction under the North German Confederation. Saxony's School Reform of 1873/74 implemented the idea of compulsory continuing education for youths aged 14–17. Saxon schoolteachers, however, complained that the curricula in these schools initially did little more than repeat lessons conveyed previously.⁴

Saxony is also frequently cited as the model of political reaction and backwardness among German states. To some observers, Saxony's score on this count was worse than that of its northern neighbour. In 1828 the Berlin journalist-satirist Saphir was asked what he intended to do when the world came to an end. He replied that he would simply go to Dresden, where the apocalypse, like so much else, would occur thirty years later than in the rest of Germany.⁵ This witticism was not just a cruel joke. Even the loss of over half its territory to Prussia in the settlement of 1815 did not induce the Wettin dynasty to sanction anything more than minor administrative changes before 1830. If Saxony was a late arrival (1831) to Germany's family of constitutional monarchies, the Saxon *Landtag* in the reactionary 1850s was rightly described by contemporaries as an embarrassing self-parody. Forty years later the same perception prevailed. Saxony's reversion to a three-class suffrage in 1896 was a slap in the face of those who hoped that the Dresden regime might grant a measure of political democracy before Prussia.

The strength of political reaction in Saxony did not dissipate with the November 1918 revolution. Berlin's *Reichsexekution* (federal intervention by force) against Dresden's leftist regime in 1923 produced little popular resistance. Soon thereafter, the Nazis scored an early breakthrough in Saxony's 1926 *Landtag* elections. Between 1929 and 1932 the Nazis infiltrated Saxony's student councils, press, and institutions of local government. (Before 1930 Hitler devoted more attention to Saxony than to any other German state besides Bavaria.) »Zero hour« (*Stunde Null*) in 1945 changed the situation fundamentally. Saxony's »red« heritage was resurrected. But now the poles were inverted, so that Germans on both sides of the Wall in the 1980s disparaged Saxony as the bastion of Communist orthodoxy. Because the hills surrounding Dresden prevented western television signals from reaching its homes, inhabitants of the city were considered singularly unenlightened among GDR citizens before 1989.

Saxony, then, has long been seen as a jumble of contradictions: as the motor of economic progress, the heartland of Germany's democratic movement⁶, the model land of

3 Vgl. Hartmut Zwahr, Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung im Länder- und Territorienvergleich 1875, in: GG 13, 1987, S. 448–507.

4 Thomas Adam, Berufsschulbildung in Sachsen: Ein schulpolitischer Beitrag für die Moderne? (Ms.), unpublished paper delivered at a colloquium in Kiel, December 1997.

5 Cited in Karl Czok (Hrsg.), Geschichte Sachsens, Weimar 1989, S. 332.

6 Jürgen John sees a central German »Reformlandschaft«; vgl. Rudolph/Weuster, S. 9.

reaction⁷, and the testing ground (*Experimentierfeld*) of German bourgeois politics.⁸ Nor is the notion of Saxony as the model for a »Third Germany« particularly new either. In the 1860s Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust cherished the dream of leading Germany along a »third path« between Prussia and Austria; his dream perished somewhere between powerlessness and the grotesque.⁹ The concept of a Saxon »third way« hardly died out in the 1860s, however. In the early 1990s Hans Mommsen (Bochum) suggested that the study of Saxon history provides an alternative to the partisanship of the »German-German Prussian fever« of the 1970s – by which Mommsen meant the competition between historians in East and West Germany to appropriate the Prussian model for their own cause. Lest Mommsen's comments be deemed a residue of the Cold War, Simone Lässig (Dresden) and Karl Heinrich Pohl (Kiel) revisited this question in 1997. A »third,« Saxon path, they wrote, can be distinguished not only from the Prussian and the south-German paths, but also from the »apparently monolithic picture of a reactionary Prussian-Saxon German north-east.«¹⁰

Gerhard A. Ritter (Munich) has provided a more satisfactory metaphor by describing Saxon history as a special kind of mirror (*Brennspiegel*) that brings central problems of German historiography into focus in new ways.¹¹ Most scholars writing in the 1990s agree with Ritter that it is less fruitful to classify Saxony as either progressive or reactionary in any »classic« sense, than to consider how Saxon history reflects and refracts national patterns. No doubt it will remain important to ask whether socialists, liberals, or conservatives prevailed at a particular time and place. But other questions, too, await answers. Was Saxony deemed by its own citizens to be somehow more »reformable« than Prussia, south-west Germany, or the Empire as a whole? If so, how was political discourse in the state conditioned by confidence or pessimism about the future? Did Saxon governments win good grades from their citizens by managing crises successfully and ameliorating social conflict? Or were they always threatened with delegitimation and tottering on the brink of collapse? Did local administrators show a capacity for tolerance, for fairness, for learning from past mistakes? Or were they seen as enemies of the people? Did Saxon voters get the governments they »deserved«?

These questions could be multiplied further. But their common trajectory suggests that Saxon history can best be studied by scholars who are prepared to extrapolate in many directions at once: from the particular to the general, toward east and west, inward and outward, forward and backward in time.

III. WAR, REVOLUTION, REACTION, REFORM

Historians have not yet achieved consensus on how two factors, war and revolution, determined the prospects for reform in Saxon history. It is difficult even to say exactly what constituted years of war and years of peace in Saxon's past. The metaphor of class warfare is particularly applicable to the decade of the 1920s, squeezed between the November and Nazi revolutions. Yet Hartmut Zwahr (Leipzig) reminds us that the GDR

7 Simone Lässig, *Der »Terror der Straße« als Motor des Fortschritts? Zum Wandel der politischen Kultur im »Musterland der Reaktion«*, in: *dies./Karl Heinrich Pohl* (Hrsg.), *Sachsen im Kaiserreich. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Umbruch*, Weimar etc. 1997, S. 191–239; the obvious parallel is to Baden's frequent designation as the »Musterland des Liberalismus«.

8 Walter Fabian, *Klassenkampf um Sachsen. Ein Stück Geschichte 1918–1930*, Löbau 1930, S. 7 f.

9 Hartmut Zwahr, *Revolutionen in Sachsen. Beiträge zur Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte*, Böhlau Verlag, Weimar etc. 1996, 532 S., geb., 128 DM, hier: S. 21.

10 Simone Lässig/Karl Heinrich Pohl, *Vorwort*, in: *dies./ders.*, *Sachsen*, S. 8 f.

11 Gerhard A. Ritter, *Wahlen und Wahlpolitik im Königreich Sachsen 1867–1914*, in: *ebd.*, S. 29.

was also dominated by the legacy of war and the vision of socialist reform. Saxony between 1949 and 1989 epitomised the peacetime experience of »using no weapons to create ruins [*Ruinen schaffen ohne Waffen*]«. ¹² Whoever knows Saxony today can see the wounds left by decades of peace – in the factories, in the earth, in the mind. ¹³

Let us turn back the clock further, to consider how scholars have depicted Saxon reactions to war and revolution between 1763 and 1866. Currently, historians tend to emphasise two features of this age: the relative lack of direct state involvement in either fostering or impeding socio-economic change; and the remarkable diversity of experience within Saxony. A recent collection of essays has explored the historical »deviation between economy and administration on the one hand, and enlightenment, culture, and mentalities on the other«. ¹⁴ To this volume Karlheinz Blaschke (Dresden) has contributed an essay that stresses the continuities in this era. Blaschke portrays Leipzig and Dresden in 1830 as pockets of rebellion – decidedly not »revolution«. The relationship between these two cities and events in the hinterland was tenuous at best: »The two urban rebellions in Leipzig and Dresden in 1830«, writes Blaschke, »were very quickly channelled into paths of normal domestic politics by a clever government adept at crisis management, while the Dresden rebellion in May of 1849, despite stronger support in the countryside, remained an isolated occurrence that lasted only a few days and had no long-term impact.« ¹⁵

In stressing that revolutionary impulses in 1848/49 did not originate within Saxony, Blaschke seems to want Saxony to live up to its reputation for religious tolerance, royal circumspection, and good government. ¹⁶ This perspective reminds us that Saxon monarchs had a far less pernicious influence on state policy than did Prussian kings, of whom Wilhelm II was the most pathological. One is nevertheless prompted to ask whether Saxons found themselves on the barricades in 1848 and 1918 due only to pressures originating outside Saxony's borders, as Blaschke suggests when he writes that Saxony's revolution in 1848 was »nicht hausgemacht«. Nor can we uncritically accept a picture drawn in black-and-white contrasts. On the one hand we are told that Prussia's »permanent aggressiveness« was demonstrated by Frederick the Great's »lying in wait« to annex Saxony. On the other hand Saxon monarchs through the ages are described as having oriented their policy exclusively toward preserving »tradition, legality, and peace«. Such historiographical *Landespatriotismus* leads to the technically correct but one-sided observation that the attack on neutral Belgium in 1914 was a »Prussian« attack, not a German one (presumably still less a »Saxon« attack). ¹⁷

The most prolific of Blaschke's *Assistenten* at the Technical University Dresden, Simone Lässig, is more sceptical than her mentor about the rationality and high-mindedness of Saxon policy. Lässig emphatically disagrees with the view that enlightened absolutism after 1763 served as the midwife to economic takeoff and emancipation. Using

12 *Zwahr*, Revolutionen, S. 10 f.

13 Vgl. *Ulrich Heß u. a.*, Problemlandschaft/Kulturlandschaft Südraum Leipzig, Leipzig etc. 1994.

14 *Uwe Schirmer* (Hrsg.), Sachsen 1763–1832. Zwischen Rétablissement und bürgerlichen Reformen, Sax-Verlag, Beucha 1996, 232 S., geb., 58 DM, hier: S. 5.

15 *Karlheinz Blaschke*, Sachsen zwischen den Reformen 1763 bis 1831, in: ebd., S. 9–23, hier: S. 9. Vgl. auch *ders.*, Die sächsische Verfassung von 1831 als Epochengrenze, in: *Sächsische Heimatblätter* (SHbl) 37, 1991, S. 306–310.

16 Vgl. *Karlheinz Blaschke*, Grundzüge sächsischer Geschichte zwischen der Reichsgründung und dem Ersten Weltkrieg, in: *Lässig/Pohl*, S. 11–28, insb. S. 14 ff.; *ders.*, Hof und Hofgesellschaft im Königreich Sachsen während des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: *Karl Möckl* (Hrsg.), Hof und Hofgesellschaft in den deutschen Staaten im 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhundert, Boppard/Rh. 1990, S. 177–206.

17 *Blaschke*, Sachsen, S. 9, S. 17.

the criterion of state tolerance toward religious and ethnic minorities as her analytical yardstick, Lässig argues that the *Rétablissement* has been depicted as far more progressive than it actually was.¹⁸ Especially in its policies toward the Jews and the Sorbs¹⁹ – an ethnic minority clustered in the south-eastern corner of Saxony – the Saxon state was no more willing than any other German state to embrace the dynamic of social and institutional change. State policies may have been directed toward avoiding war and increasing the efficiency of administration in an era when virtual bankruptcy allowed the Saxon state no other course.²⁰ But the state did not endorse reform in any fundamental sense. Thus Saxony was still relatively backward in the last third of the eighteenth century. It remained so, more conspicuously, after Napoleon's defeat. Lässig's scepticism could hardly be more cutting: »An »enlightened absolutism« without any detectable trace of Enlightenment influence on policies of toleration? Saxony as the pioneer of free competition without any opportunity extended to achievement-oriented minorities?«

To understand how pressures for reform built up before 1830, historians of Saxony have traditionally focused on the rapid mechanisation of industrial production in these years. This approach shows no signs of disappearing.²¹ Historians still disagree about the socio-economic background of the men, women, and children who began to move into factory production during this period.²² And more work is needed on the changes in Saxon agriculture and the shifting influence of the Saxon nobility. Younger scholars are nevertheless turning to studies of the urban bourgeoisie for new clues to the causes and consequences of revolution. Let us consider four recent works in this genre.

Karlheinz Blaschke has not been alone in stressing the continuities that stretch across 1830/32. Rudolf Kötzschke argued long ago that Saxony experienced an »orderly transition« to a constitutional state. By contrast, Hartmut Zwahr has argued that Saxony experienced a true revolution in 1830. This was not »merely« a rebellion, and certainly not an »orderly transition«. Saxony's urban burghers are not the heroes of Zwahr's account. Driven socially and economically by the need to lead a »double existence«, those

18 Simone Lässig, Wie »aufgeklärt« war das *Rétablissement*? – Religiöse Toleranz als Gradmesser, in: Schirmer, Sachsen, S. 40–76, hier: S. 46; vgl. Josef Matzerath, Adelsrecht und Ständegesellschaft im Kursachsen des 18. Jahrhunderts, in: ebd., S. 24–39, insb. S. 39; and Stefi Jersch-Wenzel, Die Lage von Minderheiten als Indiz für den Stand der Emanzipation einer Gesellschaft, in: Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Hrsg.), Sozialgeschichte Heute, Göttingen 1974, S. 365–387. Lässig is appreciative but critical of Horst Schlechte (Hrsg.), Die Staatsreform in Kursachsen 1762–63, Berlin 1958; ders. (Hrsg.), Das geheime politische Tagebuch des Kurprinzen Friedrich Christian 1751 bis 1757, Weimar 1992.

19 Zwahr, Revolutionen; ders., Sorbische Volksbewegung. Dokumente zur antisorbischen Staatspolitik im preußisch-deutschen Reich 1872–1918, Bautzen 1968; Dietrich Scholze-Šolta, Eine schwierige Geschichte. Unterwegs zu einer Gesamtdarstellung der sorbischen Literatur, in: Uwe John/Josef Matzerath (Hrsg.), Landesgeschichte als Herausforderung und Programm. Karlheinz Blaschke zum 70. Geburtstag, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1997, XII + 863 S., geb., 148 DM, S. 791–798; Todd Huebner, Ethnicity Denied: Nazi Policy Towards the Lusatian Sorbs, in: German History 6, 1988, S. 250–277.

20 Vgl. Lawrence J. Flockertzie, State-Building and Nation-Building in the »Third Germany«: Saxony after the Congress of Vienna, in: CEH 24, 1991, S. 268–292; Erika Müller, Theorie und Praxis des Staatshaushaltsplans im 19. Jahrhundert am Beispiel von Preussen, Bayern, Sachsen und Württemberg, Opladen 1989.

21 Economic studies are conspicuously absent from Rainer Aurig/Steffen Herzog/Simone Lässig (Hrsg.), Landesgeschichte in Sachsen. Tradition und Innovation, Bielefeld 1997; but see John/Matzerath, darin insb. Hubert Kiesewetter, Vom Erz zur Kohle. Zum Wandel sächsischer Wirtschaftslandschaften unter dem Einfluß der Industrialisierung, S. 467–486.

22 Clear differences of interpretation are evident between Zwahr and Volkmar Weiss, Bevölkerung und soziale Mobilität. Sachsen 1550–1880, Berlin 1993, insb. S. 193 ff. Weiss objects to Zwahr's thesis that »ruined farmers« and »declassed persons« swelled the ranks of the urban proletariat.

burghers crawled into the worlds inhabited by the nobility, writes Zwahr, rather than stake their claim to emancipation. »It is surely appropriate,« Zwahr adds, »to speak of a deformation in the process whereby a bourgeois class is constituted when, as in the Saxon manner, it took an active part in its own feudal subjugation. These developments have barely been investigated.«²³ Yet when the opportunity arose »spontaneously« in September 1830 to throw off those fetters, the revolution was *constitutive* of a distinctive form and style of bourgeois politics in ways that the peasants' revolt of 1790 and the later revolutions of 1848/49 were not.

Michael Hammer (Lengenfeld) casts Zwahr's thesis in a new light. Although Hammer agrees with Zwahr that the events of 1830/31 are best considered as a *kleinstaatliche Revolution* or a *Revolution im kleinstaatlichen Rahmen*, he is not entirely consistent in applying the term »incomplete« (*unvollendet*). After describing the Saxon revolution as incomplete near the outset of his book, Hammer notes later that the passage of a new constitution on 4 September 1831 demonstrates that the revolution was completed after all. Nevertheless, Hammer advances a hypothesis that could not be published before the *Wende*. He argues that the period 1830-1848 represented the *second* phase of the bourgeois transformation in Saxony, whereas the years 1790-1830 constituted the first phase. For support, Hammer quotes Saxon premier Bernhard von Lindenau, who insisted at the time that he was acting in the interests of the bourgeoisie.²⁴ Not all readers will agree with Hammer's conclusions, but those conclusions arise logically from his dual approach. Hammer aimed, first, to shift the focus of historical study away from Leipzig and Dresden. He wanted to examine unrest in the smaller towns and villages of Saxony. Second, he discusses 1830/31 as a true »people's movement« (*Volksbewegung*), not as a revolution from above. All in all, Hammer succeeds with his plan of attack. He provides a nuanced discussion of lower and middle-level officials, their different viewpoints and actions during the revolution, and the populace's divergent opinions about their capacities. In this way he helps counter-balance an overemphasis in GDR historiography on the tyranny of the Saxon police and narrow concentration on government leaders and upper-level bureaucrats.

Similar concern for the patterns of local protest is evident in the work of Robert Beachy (Chicago), Volker Knüpfer (Chemnitz), and Gunda Ulbricht (Dresden)²⁵, among others. Robert Beachy has illuminated the growth of a vibrant associational culture in Leipzig and its impact on liberal reform in Saxony after 1830. Based on a study of 209 merchant and jurist councillors who held political office in Leipzig from 1680 to 1830, Beachy depicts the often tense relationship between this civic elite and the elector-kings in Dresden. He also explores the inner dynamics of associational life in Leipzig through the practices of disciplining errant members for gambling, intemperance, professional incompetence, and business failure. Beachy demonstrates how these practices contributed to setting the stage for the resignation of the Leipzig council in the wake of city riots in 1830. His conclusion is that the bourgeois ethic (*Bürgersinn*) of Leipzig's business elite

23 Hartmut Zwahr, Sachsen im Übergang zum Kapitalismus und im Revolutionsjahr 1830, in: *ders.*, Revolutionen, S. 34; vgl. auch ebd., S. 41.

24 Michael Hammer, Volksbewegung und Obrigkeiten. Revolution in Sachsen 1830/31, Böhlau Verlag, Weimar etc. 1997, 583 S., geb., 118 DM, hier: S. 15, S. 107, S. 117 ff.

25 Gunda Ulbricht, Die Reform der Einwohnervertretung durch die Allgemeine Städteordnung vom 2. Februar 1832 und die Landgemeindeordnung vom 7. November 1838, in: Schirmer, Sachsen, S. 206-221, insb. S. 218 f. on the significance of suffrage laws even at this date; Volker Ruhland, Sachsen in der Zerfallskrise des Feudalismus. Die Septemberunruhen von 1830, in: ebd., S. 183-205; Paul Reinhardt, Die sächsischen Unruhen der Jahre 1830-1831 und Sachsens Übergang zum Verfassungsstaat, Halle 1915; and SHBl 37, 1991, Themenheft: Sachsens Übergang zum bürgerlichen Verfassungsstaat, S. 193-256.

constituted a new type of social authority in Saxony, based squarely on the values of liberal professionals and merchants.²⁶

Volker Knüpfer has analysed how the liberal publicist Karl Richter and his journal, »Die Biene«, contributed to – and then interpreted – the revolutionary outburst in 1830.²⁷ Knüpfer's study also informs us about the causes and consequences of the liberals' gradual alienation from Lindenau's ministry in the winter of 1832/33. The merits of this study are many. Doubts intrude on a number of fronts, however. One problem is signalled in the book's title. It is notoriously difficult to pin down the shifting contemporary meanings of »bürgerlich«. Yet Knüpfer appears to conflate this mainly sociological term with the mainly political term »liberal«. Second, Knüpfer is entirely justified in excluding non-liberal journals from his study. Nevertheless, a conservative press *did* exist at this time²⁸; hence Knüpfer should have acknowledged that he is interested only in the liberal press *per se*, not the bourgeois press more broadly. Third, Knüpfer provides little evidence about the price of the journals he studies, and he is not entirely clear about which groups believed »Die Biene« represented »their« special interests. This circumstance prompts scepticism about whether these organs were actually read, as the author claims, by artisans and small farmers outside the big cities.

A few examples can illustrate the latter point. Richter was allegedly strongly in favour of a radical form of freedom of occupation (*Gewerbefreiheit*). Why, then, would his paper have been read eagerly by artisans who, like the majority of Saxons at this time, favoured retaining many of the traditional privileges and regulations of the guilds? Did readers willingly accept the fact that the journal at one time advocated the radical deregulation of the guilds, whereas later it argued for the gradual reform of the worst abuses only? Also: »Die Biene« supported Jewish emancipation on principle. Yet Knüpfer fails to enlighten us about why the journal adopted this position or how it remained steadfast in the face of government disapprobation. Was Richter even aware of the contending options for assimilation or acculturation at this time? »Die Biene« – lastly – is described as defending the interests of both small farmers and large estate owners; as wanting to bolster the power of both the municipal *Stadträte* and the *Stadtverordneten*; and as fighting a two-front war against both popular unrest and feudal counterattacks. Did readers see no contradiction in any of these editorial stands? Could they discern the general political orientation of Richter's journal at all? Even the assurance with which the author charts the gradual migration of »Die Biene« from Lindenau's camp to the opposition fails to explain fully how readers at the time might have reconciled these contradictions.²⁹ In the end, identifying these open questions should not suggest that

26 Robert Beachy, *The Soul of Commerce: Credit and the Politics of Public Debt in Leipzig, 1680–1830*, Diss. Chicago 1998; *ders.*, *German Freemasonry and the Mechanisms of Civil Society: The Leipzig Lodges, 1741–1830*, unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Seattle, January 1998.

27 Volker Knüpfer, *Presse und Liberalismus in Sachsen. Positionen der bürgerlichen Presse im frühen 19. Jahrhundert*, Böhlau Verlag, Weimar etc. 1996, 264 S., geb., 58 DM. Vgl. Michael Hammer, *Der Zwickauer Liberale Karl Ernst Richter und die Volksbewegung in der kleinstaatlichen Revolution 1830/31 in Sachsen*, in: *Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte* 128, 1992, S. 179–197; *ders.*, *Die »Septembererhebungen« des Jahres 1830 in Sachsen*, in: *Jahrbuch für Regionalgeschichte (JbRegG)* 11, 1984, S. 85–108; more generally: Werner Hanspach, *Die periodische Presse der Stadt Dresden in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Dresden 1939; Siegfried Schmidt, *Die Entwicklung der politischen Opposition im Königreich Sachsen zwischen 1830 und 1848*, Diss. Jena, 1953; Albert Wybranietz, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der sächsischen Parteipresse im 19. Jahrhundert*, in: *Zeitungswissenschaft* 8, 1933, S. 139–165, S. 300–304.

28 Vgl. Lothar Dittmer, *Beamtenkonservatismus und Modernisierung*, Stuttgart 1992, insb. Teil III.

29 Knüpfer, *Presse*, S. 26, S. 50, S. 54, S. 70 ff., S. 92, S. 95. Vgl. Rudolf Muhs, *Zwischen Staatsreform und politischem Protest. Liberalismus in Sachsen zur Zeit des Hambacher Festes*, in: *Wolf-*

Knüpfer's analysis lacks rigour. Knüpfer pays careful attention to the opposition's changing role over time. He makes explicit comparisons between Saxony and other states. And he differentiates judiciously among reformist groups in Leipzig, Dresden, Chemnitz, and other Saxon cities. In short, Knüpfer has contributed mightily to explaining how and why Saxony's liberal bourgeoisie was forced to rethink its most basic assumptions in an era of rapid change. We now know how close liberals came to fulfilling their public roles as »audience, observer, awakener, watchman, warning voice, and counsel«.³⁰

This review will later raise the question whether recent studies do not perhaps overvalue the high-mindedness of the Saxon bourgeoisie and downplay its willingness to subordinate itself to the authoritarian state. This question is relevant in the *Vormärz* too. For example, Hammer claims that from the late 1830s onward, the Saxon *Landtag* »could become an effective instrument of liberal and democratic aspirations«. One suspects that Hammer himself is unsure about what criteria to apply in order to measure the *Landtag's* »effectiveness«. Perhaps rather than stressing the progressive dimensions of the post-1831 constitutional system, Hammer should have abided by his observation that »the constitution combined estate-bound rights with modern provisions«.³¹

Yet even this appraisal may fly in the face of contemporary opinion. In 1839 an English visitor was emphatic that local government in Saxony was much more progressive than the new *Landtag*. The Chaplain to the Royal Hospital in Chelsea observed: »It is not easy to suppress a smile while contemplating all this parade of liberal institution among a people who not only do not value, but seem hardly to understand, the uses to which liberal institutions ought to be turned. The Chamber of Deputies, for example, presents as rare a spectacle of decorum and pliability as the heart of man need desire.«³² More than twenty years later, the constitutional expert Friedrich von Raumer identified local government as among the healthiest elements of Saxony's emerging political culture: »Virtually extinguished now is the opinion that a Reich constitution suffices to establish a high level of political activity; everywhere people are demanding attention to the rights of counties, municipalities, other territories, and co-operative associations, in order that the local and the universal be bound together and a balance be struck between smaller and larger units [of government].«³³ That balance between the »local« and the »universal«, it appears, could be struck perfectly well without considering the wishes of *Landtag* deputies at all.

The works considered to this point have implicitly addressed another intriguing question: Why did so many years pass after the end of wars in 1763 and 1815 before Saxony experienced violent revolution or meaningful reform? Moving toward the middle years of the nineteenth century, this question is addressed by two young Germans and an American: Andreas Neemann (Tübingen), Christian Jansen (Bochum), and Richard D. Skinner (Austin, Texas). Skinner's study of artisan rhetoric in Saxony in 1848/49 uses linguistic theory to analyse the changing vocabulary of revolutionary discourse during

gang Schieder (Hrsg.), *Liberalismus in der Gesellschaft des deutschen Vormärz*, Göttingen 1983, S. 194–238. The standard work has been *Gerhard Schmidt*, *Die Staatsreform in Sachsen in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Weimar 1966. *Stephanie Vogel*, *Die liberale Bewegung in Sachsen von 1830–1849* (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des politischen Zentrums Leipzig), Diss. Bonn 1993, remains within familiar party-political channels, but it nevertheless provides a handy overview.

30 *Knüpfer*, *Presse*, S. 91.

31 *Hammer*, *Volksbewegung*, S. 111 ff.

32 *Reverend G. R. Gleig*, *Germany, Bohemia, and Hungary, Visited in 1837*, London 1839, S. 191.

33 *Friedrich von Raumer*, *Über die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Begriffe von Recht, Staat und Politik*, 3. Aufl., Leipzig 1861 (ND Aalen 1971), S. 306.

the revolutionary crisis.³⁴ Neemann and Jansen, by contrast, integrate the legacies and perceptions of 1848 into a longer story. They ask why former 1848ers accepted the strategy of breaking two historical log-jams – the national and the democratic – through military means in the wars of German unification (1864–71). In very different ways, these three studies fill large gaps in the literature.³⁵ But they also carry forward important themes found in previously-discussed works on 1830/32. Skinner demonstrates the way meanings and perceptions were constructed by language during the 1848/49 revolution, just as the journals studied by Knüpfer determined how readers perceived earlier upheavals. Neemann's study shows the same sensitivity toward local peculiarities found in Hammer's research. And Jansen's account, like Knüpfer's, illustrates why liberals in Saxony ceased their opposition to the government after only piece-meal reform had been achieved. In 1850 and 1868, no less than in 1832/34, Saxon liberals showed unseemly haste in shifting from an oppositional stance to one that advocated organic development. Thus they hoped for the gradual improvement of legislation whose passage must initially have been hateful to them. Such liberals, of course, might also be called conservatives.

In his collective biography of liberal 1848ers drawn from many German states, Jansen examines the *crème de la crème* of the Saxon liberal movement – or rather, movements in the plural, for his study includes figures from the left wing of the Progressive camp to the right wing of National Liberalism.³⁶ Jansen profiles the professor, historian, pub-

34 *Richard D. Skinner*, *Artisan Rhetoric in Saxony, 1848–1849*, Diss. Austin/Texas 1994. Limits of space prevent me from discussing this important study more fully. Skinner focuses on such terms as »Stand« (Kap. 2), »Selbständigkeit« (Kap. 3), »Arbeit« (Kap. 4), »Gewerbefreiheit« and »Konkurrenz« (Kap. 5), »Association« (Kap. 6), and »Aristokratie« and »Volk« (Kap. 7).

35 Standard accounts include *Rolf Weber*, *Die Revolution in Sachsen 1848/49. Entwicklung und Analyse ihrer Triebkräfte*, Berlin 1970; *Roland Zeise*, *Bauern und Demokraten 1848/49. Zur anti-feudalen Bewegung der sächsischen Landbevölkerung in der Revolution vom Sommer 1848 bis zum Vorabend des Dresdner Maiaufstandes*, in: *JbRegG* 4, 1972, S. 14–178; vgl. *Annette Zwahr*, *Zur Politik der Bourgeoisie in Sachsen von Februar bis September 1848*, in: *Helmut Bleiber* (Hrsg.), *Bourgeoisie und bürgerliche Umwälzung in Deutschland 1780–1871*, Berlin 1971, S. 331–360; *Curt Geyer*, *Politische Parteien und Verfassungskämpfe in Sachsen von der Märzrevolution bis zum Ausbruch des Mai-Aufstandes 1848/49*, Diss. Leipzig 1914; *Walter Schinke*, *Der politische Charakter des Dresdener Maiaufstandes 1849 und die sächsischen Parteien während des Aufruhrs und seiner unmittelbaren Folgen*, Diss. Leipzig 1917/Halle a. S. 1917; *Dresdner Hefte* 13, 1995, H. 43 (= Themenheft: *Der Dresdner Maiaufstand von 1849 – zit. Maiaufstand*); *Hermann-Josef Rupieper*, *Die Sozialstruktur der Trägerschichten der Revolution von 1848/49 am Beispiel Sachsens*, in: *Hartmut Kaelble* (Hrsg.), *Probleme der Modernisierung in Deutschland*, 2. Aufl., Opladen 1978, S. 80–109; *Thorsten Tonndorf*, *Die wahl- und sozialpolitische Zusammensetzung der sächsischen Paulskirchenvertreter 1848/49*, in: *ZfG* 42, 1994, S. 773–794; *ders.*, *Die Wahlen zur Frankfurter Nationalversammlung im Großraum Dresden*, in: *Maiaufstand*, S. 19–26; *Gerhard Schilfert*, *Sieg und Niederlage des demokratischen Wahlrechts in der deutschen Revolution 184–1849*, Berlin 1952, S. 144–150; *Manfred Botzenhart*, *Deutscher Parlamentarismus in der Revolutionszeit 1848–1850*, Düsseldorf 1977, S. 222–237; *Rudolf Krauss*, *Das sächsische Vogtland in der Bewegung von 1848–1850*, Würzburg 1935. I have not yet been able to consult the following local studies: *Helmut Ruske*, *Kleinbürgerlich-demokratische Bestrebungen im sächsisch-thüringischen Raum vom Herbst 1849 bis Ende 1853*, Habil. Jena 1970; *Herbert Schröter*, *Die demokratische Bewegung in Sachsen zwischen 1849 und 1852*, Diss. Leipzig 1960; *Helmut Schmidt*, *Landtagsverhandlungen im Königreich Sachsen 1848–1850*, Diss. Leipzig 1923.

36 *Christian Jansen*, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit. Die Paulskirchenlinke und die deutsche Politik in der nachrevolutionären Epoche*, Habil. Bochum 1997; *ders.*, *Saxon '48ers in the Post-Revolutionary Epoch, 1849–1867*, in: *James Retallack* (Hrsg.), *Saxony in German History. Culture, Society, and Politics, 1830–1933* (in Vorbereitung).

licist, and later leader of Saxony's National Liberals, Karl Biedermann³⁷; the fiery Leipzig parliamentarian Hermann Joseph; the Progressive lawyers Franz Mammen and Wilhelm Schaffrath; and the Leipzig professor Heinrich Wuttke.³⁸ Not unlike Andreas Biefang's superb study of the *Nationalverein*³⁹, Jansen's account illuminates the dense network of personal and associational relationships that accorded these men such influence in local and regional contexts. Jansen examines these liberals' professional concerns and financial worries; their complex and dynamic networks of personal friendship and political allegiance; their fortunes as diarists, editors, and public speakers; their service to state governments at home or in exile; their willingness to consider foreign policy as a palliative in times of domestic crisis; their diverse understandings of the social question; and their preference for a modernisation project that was conceived mainly in national terms, with little regard for federal traditions and local sensibilities.

The tale Jansen tells is largely one of disappointed hopes. One is struck by how desperately Saxon liberals clung to past glories, not only into the era of unification but well beyond. Jansen does not carry his story past 1870. Yet all accounts of later liberal leaders will be indebted to him. For he has shown how historians can scrutinise a political elite through multiple lenses: through the lens of national politics, to be sure, but also through the lenses of local politics, regional politics, and »personality politics«. By offering so many perspectives at once, Jansen successfully goes beyond a mere synthesis of scattered biographical studies. He provides instead a cohesive analysis of »the politically most innovative faction within German history's first democratically elected elite embracing all parts of the later federal territory«. ⁴⁰ At the same time he contributes to the rediscovery of traditions within German liberalism that until now have been neglected in Prusso-centric studies.

Andreas Neemann's study of Saxony's reactionary era (1850–66) is the perfect complement to Jansen's biographical portraits.⁴¹ It focuses on the political institutions and other elements of regional political culture that government minister Count von Beust exploited in order to keep Jansen's liberals firmly under wraps. The contrast between the promise of a better future and the mendacity of the present could hardly be drawn more clearly in these two works. Yet Neemann is not willing to tell a simple story of disappointment and repression. Quite the contrary. He is alive to every political contingency that might have yielded a happier outcome (or, rather, did yield a happier outcome, but not before 1864). Neemann's search for alternatives is occasionally pressed

37 Most other accounts are disappointing, z. B. *Eugen F. Schneider*, *Großdeutsch oder Kleindeutsch? Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung zu Karl Biedermanns »Erinnerungen aus der Paulskirche«*, Berlin 1939 (ND Vaduz 1965); vgl. Section VI below.

38 *Tonndorf* weds electoral research and collective biography. Robert Blum is the only Saxon democrat profiled in the new collection by *Sabine Freitag* (Hrsg.), *Die Achtundvierziger. Lebensbilder aus der deutschen Revolution 1848/49*, München 1998. Vgl. *Karl Obermann u. a.* (Hrsg.), *Männer der Revolution von 1848*, 2 Bde., Berlin 1970. An auspicious doctoral project might be built around a double biography – of Robert Blum, the Radical martyr, and his National Liberal son, Hans Blum, who tended to see himself in the same role during an embattled career in Saxony as lawyer, publicist, and Reichstag deputy; vgl. *Hans Blum*, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 2 Bde., Berlin 1907/8.

39 *Andreas Biefang*, *Politisches Bürgertum in Deutschland 1857–1868*, Düsseldorf 1994.

40 *Jansen*, *Einheit*, S. 4.

41 *Andreas Neemann*, *Parlamentarismus im Königreich Sachsen während der Reaktionszeit 1850–1866* (Ms. – Dissertationsprojekt Tübingen); *ders.*, *Kontinuitäten und Brüche aus einzelstaatlicher Perspektive. Politische Milieus in Sachsen 1848 bis 1850*, in: *Thomas Mergel/Christian Jansen* (Hrsg.), *Die Revolutionen von 1848/49*, Göttingen 1998, S. 172–189; *ders.*, *Models of Political Participation in the Beust Era: The State, the Saxon Landtag, and the Public Sphere, 1849–1864*, in: *Retallack*, *Saxony* (in Vorbereitung).

too vigorously. His study nonetheless provides a corrective to views suggesting that the 1850s were uneventful and uninteresting.⁴²

How far should we go in trying to keep alive the contingencies of 1850-1866 and protect them from the dead hand of hindsight? When does resuscitation become rehabilitation? Karl Biedermann wrote retrospectively that after 1850 »a reaction swept through Germany that was so systematic, so uncompromising, [and] so willing to tread underfoot the nation's nobler instincts, that nothing like it had been experienced in the 1830s or 1840s«. This was a reaction, continued Biedermann, that the otherwise moderate Friedrich Dahmann condemned with the words: »injustice has lost all shame«. ⁴³ Neemann suggests that this picture needs to be revised. He accomplishes this goal by paying attention to Beust's increasing inability over time to block the emergence of a parliamentary »culture of rights«. Space does not permit a full consideration of Neemann's richly nuanced argument. Yet one short passage may illustrate how deftly Neemann is able to draw attention to at least six themes of wider significance. These are: 1. the actions of states – or rather their representatives – to legitimise themselves in civil liberties environments they could not wholly control⁴⁴; 2. the calculations of liberal parliamentarians caught between the dictates of power and reason; 3. the function of the popular press in unveiling official chicanery, legitimising opposition, and informing a curious public; 4. the interdependence of political, legal, and constitutional strategies deployed for and against the parliamentary principle; 5. the interplay of local, regional, and national interests; and 6. the accidents of fate that can reveal political actors' strength and conviction, but also their humanity and self-doubt.⁴⁵

Skinner, Jansen, and Neemann, then, open different windows on the themes of war, revolution, reaction, and reform. They do so in part by refusing to neglect the task of bringing the structures of history into proximity with the actual words, actions, and career choices of flesh-and-blood individuals. Unfortunately those windows are closed again for the period from the mid-1860s to the mid-1890s.⁴⁶ It is not until we return to Leipzig in 1914–1919 that these themes reappear in recent research. Two Americans –

42 We still lack anything to match *Günter Grünthal*, *Parlamentarismus in Preußen 1848/49–1857/58*, Düsseldorf 1982. Useful details can be mined from *Heinz Georg Holldack*, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Reaktion in Sachsen 1849–55*, Berlin 1931 (ND Vaduz 1965).

43 *Karl Biedermann*, *Mein Leben und ein Stück Zeitgeschichte*, 2 Bde., Breslau 1886, Bd. 1, S. 344, zit. nach *Hans-Ulrich Wehler*, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*. Bd. 3: *Von der »Deutschen Doppelrevolution« bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges 1849–1914*, München 1995, S. 210 f.

44 Vgl. *Marven H. Krug*, *Civil Liberties in Imperial Germany*, Diss. Toronto 1995.

45 *Neemann*, *Parlamentarismus* (Ms.), Sekt. 1.2.b, Anm. 115. All of these points can be illustrated by the way Neemann summarizes the story of Leipzig's liberal mayor Otto Koch: In 1850 a seat in Saxony's upper chamber fell to Koch by virtue of his municipal office. »Koch refused to enter the chamber because, as he explained in a letter to the Ministry of the Interior on 19 July 1850, »I was not in a position, despite the most intense soul-searching, to say upon what legal basis this assembly of estates should convene«. The government subsequently launched disciplinary proceedings of the most dubious sort against him. Just when all legal objections were exhausted, Koch fell seriously ill. Leipzig's district governor [*Kreisdirektor*] literally held a vigil at his bedside, awaiting the opportunity to suspend him from his mayoral office the moment he began to recover. Leipzig's newspapers carried regular medical reports about Koch's health – just as they would for a member of the royal house. After regaining his health, Koch acknowledged the legitimacy of the *Landtag* and declared his willingness to take his seat in the house, in order not to be stripped of his influential title: »Even though I declared in my statement of 19 July that I could not conceive how I could help the Fatherland as a member of this upper chamber«, wrote Koch on 19 September, »on the other hand I do not believe I exaggerate when I say that I can render important service here in my official role as mayor.«

46 See Section VI below, on the period 1896–1914.

Sean Dobson (Portland/Oregon) and David McKibbin (Buffalo/New York) – have attempted to chart the radicalism of the Saxon Left against the backdrop of socio-economic distress in Leipzig during the First World War.⁴⁷ Both Dobson and McKibbin take seriously the task of locating the roots of the USPD in pre-war Leipzig's political culture and associational life. But what do they contribute to new knowledge?

In McKibbin's case, not very much, for his study is afflicted by a serious lack of archival sources. Although McKibbin tells us that already before the *Wende* he had »nearly unlimited access to archives generally closed to western scholars« and that he paused to look at the city map on the wall of the Stadtarchiv Leipzig, his main sources are newspapers that could have been consulted in the USA or borrowed on inter-library loan. Nor is McKibbin particularly successful in his effort to »examine the city as in independent variable«. We are offered instead the bland hypothesis that Leipzig's reputation for radicalism and the local textures of the 1918 revolution were »manifestations of underlying economic and social patterns«. ⁴⁸ Unaware of mounting difficulties, McKibbin presses on: »Historically, Leipzig had divided itself physically around its various industries, and socially according to occupation, making it possible to locate the various kinds of workers within the urban environment. [...] Having mapped the city occupationally, I was then able to superimpose [...] such variables as multiple »class consciousness«, political proclivity, labor activism, and social expectation upon the physical map.«⁴⁹ The inadequacy of this approach is obvious. For the war years themselves, McKibbin is able to provide the English reader with a few insights about the level of misery in Saxony after 1917 and the changing vocabulary of death notices inserted in Leipzig newspapers. But a larger opportunity has been missed.

Sean Dobson's study of Leipzig from 1910 to 1920 breaks much more new ground. Using Leipzig address books, statistical sources, and police reports on associations and political parties in the city, Dobson reveals a local scene that was riven by class conflict long before 1914. Following on important local studies by GDR historians⁵⁰, Dobson is one of the first non-Saxon scholars to document the complex and shifting power re-

47 Sean Raymond Dobson, *Authority and Revolution in Leipzig, 1910–1920*, Diss. Columbia/New York 1995, rev. Ms. 1998; C. David McKibbin, *The Leipzig Working-Class and World War I: A Study of the German Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) as a Manifestation of Urban Historical Evolution*, Diss. Buffalo 1991, published as: *War and Revolution in Leipzig, 1914–1918: Socialist Politics and Urban Evolution in a German City*, Lanham 1998; vgl. auch *ders.*, Who Were the German Independent Socialists? The Leipzig City Council Election of 6 December 1917, in: CEH 25, 1992, S. 425–443.

48 McKibbin, *Leipzig Working-Class*, S. II f., S. 94, Anm. 39.

49 Ebd., S. 13.

50 The best GDR studies include Marianne Schmidt, *Die Arbeiterbewegung in Ostsachsen im Kampf um die einheitliche Partei des Proletariats, gegen das Bismarcksche Sozialistengesetz und um die Durchsetzung des Marxismus 1871–1900*, Dresden 1988, based on *dies.*, *Organisationsformen und Bewußtseinsentwicklung der Dresdner Sozialdemokratie in den Jahren 1881–1891*, Diss. PH Potsdam 1969, insb. Anlage 15–17, S. 355 ff., on *bürgerliche* festivities, associations, and anti-socialist literature; Roswitha Borrmann, *Die Dresdner Arbeiterbewegung 1861 bis 1869. Eine Untersuchung zu organisationsgeschichtlichen und politischen Aspekten der politisch-ideologischen Konstituierung des örtlichen Proletariats*, Diss. PH Dresden 1988; Roswitha Wiczorek [née Borrmann], *Zur Trennung der proletarischen von der bürgerlichen Demokratie. Die sozialistische Parteibildung in Dresden*, in: Helga Grebing/Hans Mommsen/Karsten Rudolph (Hrsg.), *Demokratie und Emanzipation zwischen Saale und Elbe. Beiträge zur Geschichte der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterbewegung bis 1933*, Essen 1993, S. 26–41; Barbara Rosonsky, *Die Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung in Leipzig vom Sturz des Sozialistengesetzes bis zur Jahrhundertwende*, Diss. Leipzig 1981; Simone Lässig, *Zum militärpolitischen Wirken der Sozialdemokratie in Ostsachsen von der Jahrhundertwende bis zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges*, 2 Bde., Diss. PH Dresden 1990.

relationships among Leipzig's non-socialist parties. For example, we learn that whereas the main antisemitic parties lost ground in Leipzig after 1903, the local chapter of the »Sächsische Mittelstandsvereinigung« (Saxon Middle-Class Union) did not.

Dobson is refreshingly forthright in exposing »the poverty of civic discourse« among such groups. To illustrate how cynicism and self-interest masqueraded as ideology, Dobson cites the journal of the powerful »Hausbesitzerverein« (Homeowners' Association) in Leipzig: »That a homeowner has more enemies than friends hardly requires explanation. [...] In a situation where other professional and interest groups unite to defend their own special interests, the homeowner should not lag behind if he wishes to avoid getting pressed to the wall. Only he who vigorously defends his own skin can hope to keep his nose above water.« This passage can be interpreted in more than one way. One might conclude, as Dobson does, that to favour the pursuit of naked class interest over any claim to be promoting the common good is a sign of political impotence. Hence Dobson writes that in making such pronouncements these groups »demonstrated their inability to formulate a persuasive justification for their rule – a vital element of any dominant group's ability to govern«. ⁵¹ Quite a different conclusion is possible, however. Judged according to such criteria as electoral success, access to local decision-making, and cultural influence among the middle classes, these groups registered many victories. Before 1914, the chauvinistic and self-serving views propagated by the Homeowners' Association and similar groups were widely accepted in urban middle-class circles. ⁵² After November 1918, the »persuasive justification« of rule that Dobson sees as a weakness emerged strongly once again – first as burgher *Angst*, and then later in the 1920s as a more positive commitment to turning back the revolution.

Saxon historians have tended to concentrate on the political economy of the post-war period. They have also scrutinised the careers of prominent business leaders organised in the »Verein Sächsischer Industrieller« (Association of Saxon Industrialists, VSI). ⁵³ Benjamin Lapp (Montclair/New Jersey) has connected up the issues of war, revolution, and reform in a different way. His book, »Revolution from the Right«, illustrates among other things how Saxony's burgher leagues attempted to overcome the persistent liabilities of *Honoratiorenpolitik*. According to Lapp, Saxony in 1923 lived up to its reputation as a pioneer. It provided an »early example« of »the extent to which conservative bourgeois politicians were willing to sacrifice democratic institutions in the interests of a militant anti-Socialism«. ⁵⁴ Other historians have noted that the *Reichsexekution* against Saxony in 1923 provided the perfect model (better: precedent) for Franz von Papen's *coup* against Prussia's SPD government in the summer of 1932. Yet if Saxony's ruling Social Democrats were occasionally guilty of faint-heartedness and impractica-

51 Zeitschrift für den Grundbesitz, Ausgabe vom 1. 9. 1908, cited in Dobson, S. 97 f.

52 Ebd., S. 113 ff. On the war years, see Christoph Nonn, Saxon Politics during the First World War: Modernization in the National-Liberal Style, in: Retallack, Saxony (in Vorbereitung); Simone Lässig, Sozialdemokratisches Friedensengagement, Julikrise und der 4. August 1914 in Ost-sachsen, in: Grebing/Mommsen/Rudolph, S. 147–170. Vgl. Caroline Ethel Cooper, Behind the Lines. One Woman's War 1914–18, hrsg. v. Decie Denholm, Sydney 1982. We can be thankful that Cooper followed a plan she outlined in a letter of 6 August 1914: »There is no possibility of posting this, but I am going to write every week as usual, and send the letters some day when the world has got so far into order again that one can talk of posts and trains and banks and such things« (S. 22).

53 Ulrich Heß/Michael Schäfer/Petra Listewnick (Hrsg.), Unternehmer in Sachsen. Aufstieg – Krise – Untergang – Neubeginn, Leipzig 1998 (im Druck).

54 Benjamin Lapp, Revolution from the Right. Politics, Class, and the Rise of Nazism in Saxony, 1919–1933, Humanities Press International, Atlantic Highlands 1997, 448 S., geb., 55 \$, hier: S. 77; for the following: ebd., S. 85–89, S. 93.

lity, those shortcomings were found on the Right as well. Hence we would like to have learned more about failed attempts by the moderate Right to resist the rise of terror, plundering, kidnapping, and robbery in Saxony. Lapp is nevertheless to be congratulated for attempting to grapple with the »everydayness« of political violence in the Republic. For example, he provides a chilling account of how a typical »degradation ceremony« in Saxony was choreographed.

Previous historians have tended to overemphasise the SPD's failures in these years, too seldom giving credit where credit is due. A corrective to this view has recently been provided in monographic studies by Karsten Rudolph (Bochum), who has examined the SPD in Saxony from 1870 to 1923 (but concentrates on the period 1919–23); by Matthias Seidel (Zwickau), who has studied Max Seydewitz and the SPD organisation in Zwickau; and by Torsten Kupfer (Bochum), who examines the SPD movement in the Free State of Anhalt. Rudolph argues that historians have indiscriminately accused the leaders of the Saxon SPD of blinkered thinking simply because they refused to enter into coalitions with bourgeois parties or the Communists. Rudolph, by contrast, discerns a »new Saxony« on the horizon between 1921 and 1923, in which SPD leaders envisaged a »leftwing republican project« that constituted a real historical alternative to the Weimar coalition and the Grand coalition. In a formulation that recalls Simone Lässig's words cited earlier, Rudolph asks pointedly: »Where, if not in Saxony, did Social Democracy come closest to its goal of erecting a legitimate counter-world to the society of Imperial Germany? Where, if not in Saxony, can one discern brighter prospects for what Arthur Rosenberg identified as the wide middle ground of a democratic socialist workers' movement, upon which the democratic and socialist Republic could be built?«⁵⁵ The same questions have been posed in virtually identical form by Seidel and Kupfer. Where if not in Zwickau, asks Seidel, did the SPD stand a chance to meet the challenges of maintaining party unity, overcome economic dislocation, and convince a rank-and-file membership that the party needed to devise new tactics and new aims?⁵⁶ And where if not in Anhalt, asks Kupfer, did moderate Social Democrats and left-liberal burghers better demonstrate their willingness to reach consensus in the interest of longevity and real power?⁵⁷ Where else among the Weimar Republic's many regional party systems, Kupfer adds, can one find anything approaching the »social liberal *Sonderweg*« predicated on the Anhalt SPD's self-understanding as a *Volkspartei*?

None of these authors is afraid to say why these questions were neither asked nor answered by East German historians, who subordinated the study of SPD regimes and their coalition strategies at the state level to national themes. Nevertheless, all three authors have identified one common strategy among these diverse SPD groups: their unbending determination not to serve local needs alone, not to serve class interests narrowly, and not to hold power merely in order to preclude worse scenarios. On the

55 Karsten Rudolph, *Die sächsische Sozialdemokratie vom Kaiserreich zur Republik (1871–1923)*, Böhlau Verlag, Weimar etc. 1995, 455 S., brosch., 68 DM, hier: S. 13; vgl. auch Mike Schmeitzner, *Die sozialdemokratischen Landtagsfraktionen im Freistaat Sachsen (1919–1933)*, in: ders./Michael Rudloff, *Geschichte der Sozialdemokratie im Sächsischen Landtag. Darstellung und Dokumentation 1877–1997*, Dresden 1997, S. 56–121.

56 Matthias Seidel, *Zehn Jahre Widerspruch. Max Seydewitz und die Zwickauer SPD 1921 bis 1931*, Peter Lang Verlag, Frankfurt/Main etc. 1994, 303 S., brosch., 89 DM; one eagerly awaits ders., *Das »sächsische Manchester«. Arbeiterschaft und Bürgertum in Chemnitz 1870–1914*, Weimar etc. 1999 (im Druck).

57 Torsten Kupfer, *Sozialdemokratie im Freistaat Anhalt 1918–1933*, Böhlau Verlag, Weimar etc. 1996, 280 S., brosch., 68 DM. I have not yet been able to consult ders., *Der Weg zum Bündnis. Entschieden Liberale und Sozialdemokraten in Dessau und Anhalt im Kaiserreich*, Weimar etc. 1998.

contrary, these SPD leaders were determined to undertake positive reforms toward the common good. They sought to use regional bastions of strength to promote political innovation. And they charted a course that nurtured ideological openness in order to demonstrate the viability of SPD policies in the national political arena.

The distressing endpoint of these developments – 1933 – is less significant to these authors than the need to point out the viability of Social Democratic reform projects at an earlier date (and on a different plane of politics than historians generally explore). Indeed, these works so often deal with the legacies of war and revolution at arms-length that they seem to take the caesura of 1918/19 in stride, rather than problematizing it. To their credit, however, none of them tries to extrapolate backward in time to suggest that the Saxon SPD was open to the idea of a coalition with non-socialist parties before 1918. The irony here – addressed in Section VI – is that the opposite conclusion is put forward in recent studies on the pre-war Saxon bourgeoisie.

It would explode the bounds of this review to consider all the works that have addressed the impact of unconditional surrender in 1945 and the challenges that confront Saxony in the 1990s.⁵⁸ But mention must be made of Hartmut Zwahr's study of East Germany's »self-destruction« in 1989/90.⁵⁹ Even German readers who found themselves in the streets of Leipzig in the autumn of 1989 will profit from revisiting this turning-point in German history and analysing it through the eyes of a professional historian. Zwahr's rather clipped style does not always leave room to explain why the author sees events in a certain light. It may or may not have been »self-evident« to all Saxons that they should *lead* the campaign in the winter of 1989/90 to resurrect a strong federalist tradition in Germany.⁶⁰ Saxons, after all, were not the only East Germans who tried, but failed, to prevent the SED regime from replacing *Länder* with *Bezirke* in 1952. Furthermore, no one can seriously doubt the determination, courage, and self-discipline of Leipzig's demonstrators. Yet one must ask: Do these qualities reflect a peculiar trait of Saxons »sächsische Massenintelligenz«, as Zwahr claims?⁶¹ These caveats aside, Zwahr has given us an original, insightful, and highly personal account of behind-the-scenes decision-making in the critical days of 1989. Zwahr convinces us – if there was ever any doubt – that this revolution, too, was *kleinstaatlich*: it took shape not in Berlin but in the provinces. No one making that simple point need fear the charge of unhistorical *Landespatritismus*.⁶²

58 Vgl. various contributions to *Werner Bramke/Ulrich Heß* (Hrsg.), *Region und Regionalität in der Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (= *Comparativ* 5, 1995, H. 4); *dies.* (Hrsg.), *Sachsen und Mitteldeutschland*, Weimar etc. 1995.

59 *Zwahr*, *Revolutionen*, S. 403–476; *ders.*, *Ende einer Selbstzerstörung. Leipzig und die Revolution in der DDR*, 2. Aufl., Göttingen 1993.

60 Vgl. *Hartmut Zwahr*, *Vertragsgemeinschaft, Konföderation oder Vereinigung? Die Übergang zur nationaldemokratischen Revolution in der DDR im Herbst 1989*, in: *John/Matzerath*, *Landesgeschichte*, S. 709–729; *Wolf-Jürgen Grabner/Christiane Heinze/Detlef Pollack* (Hrsg.), *Leipzig im Oktober. Kirchen und alternative Gruppen im Umbruch der DDR. Analysen zur Wende*, Berlin 1990.

61 *Zwahr*, *Revolutionen*, S. 410, S. 464; vgl. *Michael Hoffmann/Dieter Rink*, *Der Leipziger Aufbruch: Zur Genesis einer Heldenstadt*, in: *Grabner/Heinze/Pollack*, S. 114–122.

62 Vgl. u. a. *Karl Heinrich Pohl*, *Historiker in der DDR*, Göttingen 1997; *Alexander Fischer/Günther Heydemann* (Hrsg.), *Die politische »Wende« 1989/90 in Sachsen. Rückblick und Zwischenbilanz*, Weimar etc. 1995. I have explored the legacy of pre-1989 Saxon historiography in: *James Retallack*, *Politische Kultur, Wahlkultur, Regionalgeschichte: Methodologische Überlegungen am Beispiel Sachsens und des Reiches*, in: *Simone Lässig/Karl Heinrich Pohl/James Retallack* (Hrsg.), *Modernisierung und Region im wilhelminischen Deutschland. Wahlen, Wahlrecht und Politische Kultur*, 2. Aufl., Bielefeld 1998, S. 15–38.

IV. NOBLES, BURGHERS, WORKERS

A perennial question of Saxon historiography concerns the ease with which contemporaries crossed lines dividing social classes, social-moral milieus, and political camps. Let us first consider Saxony's class hierarchy, beginning at the top.

1. Nobles

Historians have long agreed that Saxony's aristocracy was open. More: it was permanently, willingly, and perhaps even uniquely open.⁶³ Recent studies have underscored this permeability. Volkmar Weiss (Leipzig) has observed that in 1845, of 236 knights' estates (*Rittergüter*) in the Leipzig district, only 124 were owned by nobles.⁶⁴ Despite our complete ignorance about noble marriage patterns in Saxony, scattered information about typical career paths and business contacts reinforces this picture. Many sons of nobles turned to bourgeois occupations in the nineteenth century (Weiss cites the interesting case of one Wilhelm Aemilus von Schwanenflügel, who became a railway inspector in Zwickau in 1870). Many Saxon landowners, as in neighbouring Silesia, invested so early and so heavily in industrial enterprises that they have been likened to Prussian Junkers.

A great deal of work must be done before Saxony's landholding class can be integrated into broad studies based on national and international comparisons.⁶⁵ Research on the Saxon aristocracy has been pursued mainly by genealogists or tends to focus on the early-modern period; therefore it has not often addressed dominant themes in Kaiserreich historiography.⁶⁶ We are not likely soon to see a study of the Saxon nobility with the stunning sweep of Hans Rosenberg's essay (1958) on the »pseudo-democratisation« of the Prussian Junkers. On the contrary, research on estate life – even when it explores large issues such as paternalism and protest – tends most often to be presented in the form of micro-studies. There is no reason this practice should be discontinued or discouraged. Some of the biggest gaps in our knowledge include the history of estate economies, patrimonial *Herrschaft*, and the joint exercise of administrative, judicial, and political functions by the rural nobility. For such investigations Saxon archives hold vast collections of estate records which have not even been fully catalogued yet.⁶⁷ Those re-

63 *Blaschke*, Hof, insb. S. 197, S. 206.

64 103 estates were in bourgeois hands, and 7 were owned by the cities. By 1866 the number of noble estates had sunk to 108; *Weiss*, Bevölkerung, S. 81; *ders.*, Sozialstruktur und soziale Mobilität der Landbevölkerung: Das Beispiel Sachsen 1550–1880, in: ZAA 39, 1991, S. 24–43. Vgl. auch *Zwahr*, Revolutionen, S. 112; *H. L. Hofmann*, Die Rittergüter des Königreichs Sachsen, Dresden-Blasewitz 1914; *Rudolf Kötzschke*, Ländliche Siedlung und Agrarwesen in Sachsen, Remagen 1953; *Karl Hey*, Die Parzellenwirtschaften im Königreich Sachsen, Tübingen 1903; *Karl von Langsdorff*, Die Landwirtschaft im Königreich Sachsen, Dresden 1889; *Hubertus Schrapps*, Bürgerliche und adlige Großgrundbesitzer in Sachsen 1910 bis 1925, in: Jahrbuch zur sächsischen Geschichte 2, 1993, S. 47–57; *Rudolf Martin*, Jahrbuch des Vermögens und Einkommens der Millionäre im Königreich Sachsen, Berlin 1912.

65 *Weiss*, Bevölkerung, S. 86; vgl. *Hubert Kiesewetter*, Industrialisierung und Landwirtschaft. Sachsens Stellung im regionalen Industrialisierungsprozeß Deutschlands im 19. Jahrhundert, Köln 1988, S. 257 ff. For examples of Prussian studies that might be extended to the Saxon case, vgl. *Heinz Reif* (Hrsg.), Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik, Berlin 1994; *Robert M. Berdahl*, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility 1770–1848, Princeton 1985.

66 *Katrin Keller/Josef Matzerath* (Hrsg.), Geschichte des sächsischen Adels, Köln etc. 1997, S. 9.

67 Saxon archivists are uncommonly willing to help, however: parts of the Bestand Rittergut Rötha mit Trachenau were indexed virtually overnight by the staff of the Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Leip-

cords might provide the evidence we need to confirm or to discard the hypothesis that Saxon nobles were more antisemitic than nobles elsewhere in Germany.⁶⁸ Even more likely is the prospect that such investigations will reveal new dimensions to social, economic, and political relations between large estate owners, small farmers, and landless agricultural labourers.⁶⁹

The research of Axel Flügel (Bielefeld) and Josef Matzerath (Dresden) has led in this direction.⁷⁰ By consistently trying to link the social and economic worlds of the Saxon nobility to its influence in the political sphere, these authors are opening up questions that ought to have been recognised long ago as central to any reassessment of Saxon political culture over the long term. What conclusions arise from this admittedly small body of work? Axel Flügel has demonstrated the degree to which the Saxon nobility was forced to recognise even in the 1830s that estate-bound (*ständisch*) society could not survive. Certainly Saxon nobles continued to stress the need to preserve the »organic« nature of society for many decades thereafter. Yet Flügel suggests that Saxon nobles understood at a relatively early stage that they had to make the best of a bad business.⁷¹ The most they could hope for was that the land-owning *interest* might continue to hold sway in a modern parliament.⁷² Flügel also suggests that we break with the historiographical orthodoxy ascribing progressive instincts exclusively to burghers and reactionary instincts exclusively to nobles.

Such considerations have direct relevance for comparisons between Saxon nobles and their peers elsewhere in Europe.⁷³ On the one hand, by the late nineteenth century Saxon nobles no longer made a pretence of preserving feudal traditions or resurrecting *ständisch* society. On the contrary: when the threat of mass politics became acute, they helped enact two new *Landtag* suffrage laws (in 1896 and 1909) that rewarded discrete levels of tax payment, education, and property ownership. On the other hand, we may be tempted to regard as inevitable the gradual detachment of Saxon nobles from older

zig. The staff of the Stadtarchiv Dresden was equally helpful in allowing access to the voluminous but only partially-indexed Nachlaß of Heinrich Wuttke.

68 Vgl. Section VI.

69 *Kuno Frankenstein*, Die Verhältnisse der Landarbeiter in Deutschland, Bd. 2 (= Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Bd. 54), Leipzig 1892, S. 330–343; *Bruno Moll*, Die Landarbeiterfrage im Königreich Sachsen, Diss. Leipzig 1908; *Curt Ritthausen*, Denkschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen des Landwirtschaftlichen Kreditvereins im Königreiche Sachsen, Dresden 1916; *Franz Thierfelder*, Die Entwicklung und Tätigkeit des Bundes der Landwirte Sachsens, Diss. Leipzig o.D. [1925]; *Roland Zeise*, Der Kampf um die Mobilmachung der Landbevölkerung in Sachsen im Frühjahr 1848, in: SHBl 12, 1966, S. 429–444; *Reiner Groß*, Die rechtlichen Verhältnisse der Bauern in Sachsen zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: Letopis, Reihe B 17, 1970, H. 1/2, S. 207–228.

70 For the following see *Axel Flügel*, Sozialer Wandel und politische Reform in Sachsen. Rittergüter und Gutsbesitzer im Übergang von der Landeshoheit zum Konstitutionalismus 1763–1843, in: *Klaus Tenfelde/Hans-Ulrich Wehler* (Hrsg.), Wege zur Geschichte des Bürgertums, Göttingen 1994, S. 36–56; *ders.*, Bürgerliche Kritik und adelige Landtagsrepresentation. Die Ritterkurie des sächsischen Landtages im Jahr 1793, in: GG 23, 1997, S. 384–404; *ders.* Der Rittergutsbesitz des Adels im Königreich Sachsen im 19. Jahrhundert, in: *Keller/Matzerath*, S. 71–88; *Josef Matzerath*, Sächsische Ritterschaft im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. Vorüberlegungen zu einer Fallstudie des landsässigen Adels, in: Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte (NASG) 64, 1993, 61–74; *ders.*, Adelsrecht; *ders.*, Adel im Übergang: Die gesellschaftliche Stellung des niederen sächsischen Adels vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, in: *Lässig/Pohl*, S. 271–297; *ders.*, Nicht nur ein »von« vor dem Namen. Der niedere sächsische Adel in der Weimarer Republik, in: SHBl 42, 1996, S. 92–96 (and other contributions to this *Themenheft* on the Saxon nobility).

71 *Flügel*, Wandel, S. 48; *ders.*, Kritik, insb. S. 386.

72 *Ders.*, Wandel, S. 37.

73 Vgl. *James Retallack*, »Ideology without Vision«? Recent Literature on Nineteenth-Century German Conservatism, in: Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London 13, 1991, H. 2, S. 3–22.

ideals of honour and service. Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Saxon nobles were more willing than some of their European counterparts to revise the means and ends of exerting political power, in ways that cast ominous shadows far into the twentieth century. By striving from the 1890s onward to disenfranchise Saxony's working classes and to label Social Democrats political »unpersons«, Saxon nobles abandoned basic rules of the political game that had still held sway in the 1830s. That non-noble conservatives were equally willing to proceed down this path should not distract us from the magnitude of the change that had taken place. The political culture of the 1830s, as described by Flügel, was still »universally accepted as legitimate by all politically influential elites«. ⁷⁴ On the eve of 1914, however, Saxon nobles were actively demonstrating that this fundamental consensus no longer existed. Matzerath is surely correct to emphasise transition (*Übergang*) rather than decline (*Untergang*) in this instance: the disproportionate influence of Saxony's noble class did survive into the twentieth century. ⁷⁵ But the nobility's acceptance of a political culture based on the principle of fairness – encompassing civil liberties, the meaningful representation of competing interests, and tolerance of the views of one's political opponents – did not. ⁷⁶

2. Burghers

Axel Flügel is not the only Bielefeld-trained scholar who has taken an interest in Saxony's class society. Among the more prolific members of this group is Karl Heinrich Pohl, who has published a battery of articles on the Saxon National Liberal Party, on its leader Gustav Stresemann, and on the VSI. In addition, Harold Wixforth has examined the Saxon banking community, and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann has investigated the public subscription campaign to build Leipzig's *Völkerschlachtdenkmal* (monument to the Battle of Nations). ⁷⁷ In contrast to their mentors Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka, whose tendency to focus on national patterns and international comparisons pushed the Bielefeld *Bürgertum* project ⁷⁸ of the 1980s in the same directions, these

74 Flügel, *Wandel*, S. 41, S. 50 f., and *ders.*, *Kritik*, S. 403. Vgl. auch Schmidt, *Staatsreform*; Reiner Groß, *Die bürgerliche Agrarreform in Sachsen in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Weimar 1968.

75 Matzerath, *Adel*, S. 294. Matzerath's differentiation between the higher and lower nobility is salutary. Yet it remains unclear how the »pre-industrial ethos« identified by him (S. 297) actually conditioned the political choices of nobles who saw themselves as Saxony's »born leaders« (*Führungsschicht*) after 1900. A study of the *Landtag's* upper chamber would help illuminate this problem.

76 Flügel, *Wandel*, S. 52 f., suggests possible reasons for the political brittleness of Saxony's noble class before 1914; vgl. James Retallack, *Die »liberalen« Konservativen? Konservatismus und Antisemitismus im industrialisierten Sachsen*, in: Lässig/Pohl, S. 134–50; *ders.*, *Civil Society, Suffrage Reform, and the Authoritarian State: Saxon Transitions to Modernity in the Era of Unification*, unpublished paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the German Studies Association, Washington, D.C., September 1997.

77 On Pohl's and Hoffmann's work, see Sections VI and VII respectively; Harald Wixforth, *Bank für Sachsen oder Bank für das Reich? Zur Geschichte der Dresdner Bank von 1871–1914*, in: Lässig/Pohl, S. 309–342. Other important regional studies by (former) Bielefelders include Thomas Mergel, *Zwischen Klasse und Konfession. Katholisches Bürgertum im Rheinland 1794–1914*, Göttingen 1994; Paul Nolte, *Gemeindebürgertum und Liberalismus in Baden 1800–1850*, Göttingen 1994; Manfred Hettling, *Reform ohne Revolution. Bürgertum, Bürokratie und kommunale Selbstverwaltung in Württemberg von 1800 bis 1850*, Göttingen 1990.

78 For recent Anglo-American viewpoints and further references vgl. Jonathan Sperber, *Bürger, Bürgertum, Bürgerlichkeit, Bürgerliche Gesellschaft: Studies of the German (Upper) Middle Class and its Sociocultural World*, in: *JMH* 69, 1997, S. 271–297; Ursula Vogel, *Competing Projects of*

younger scholars have at least begun the task of applying such concepts as *Bürgerlichkeit*, *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, and *Verbürgerlichung* to German regions.⁷⁹ Including those associated with Wehler's *Arbeitsgruppe* on nationalism in the 1990s, these scholars are showing distinctly less interest in locating the German bourgeoisie within a specific social hierarchy or depicting its direct political engagement. Instead they are directing their attention toward the bourgeoisie's more abstract perceptions of the world.⁸⁰ This trend accords with increasing interest in the history of culture, of mentalities, of experience, of memory, and of perception. It also gives a fillip to the early rebukes that initially greeted practitioners of *Alltagsgeschichte*.

The many directions in which historians of the German bourgeoisie have travelled since the early 1980s are well known. A vast literature already exists on subjects ranging from bourgeois codes of cleanliness and honour to the patterns of bourgeois sociability. Such approaches need not abandon »traditional« subjects that continue to interest mainstream historians (and students). One new collection of essays, for example, reconsiders »the« revolution of 1848 as a multiplicity of revolutions. Going further, it considers those revolutions as a multiplicity of *experiences*, which conditioned future patterns of social contention, strategies for political action, and paradigms of national identity.⁸¹ Another example is Hartmut Zwahr's essay on the symbolic meaning of names chosen by opponents of German authoritarian regimes through the ages.⁸²

Although a start has been made, Saxon historiography demonstrates the lag between the unearthing of new questions about mentalities, emotions, and perceptions and the delivery of answers to those questions based on sub-national studies. This lag has already been noted with reference to the *Bürgersinn* of Leipzig merchants in the 1820s. A similar blind spot is evident when one looks to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This point can be demonstrated by considering three discussions that will be revisited in Sections V, VI, and VII respectively. First, whereas historians have lately explored the question whether Saxon burghers were willing or able to cross lines dividing social classes and political camps, they have not yet travelled very far in investigating those bourgeois habits of mind conjured up by the terms *Bürgersinn*, *Bürgerstolz*, and *Bürgerangst*. Second, whereas historians have begun to explore how liberals and industrial leaders in Saxony reacted to the challenges of labour unrest and suffrage reform, they have not paid much attention to the mental and emotional strains that arose from bourgeois attempts to defend privileges that were attacked by others in the name of social, economic, or political fairness. And third, whereas historians are showing an inte-

»Bürgertumsforschung«, in: Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London, 19, 1997, H. 2, S. 5–14.

79 Vgl. Hartmut Zwahr, Konstitution der Bourgeoisie im Verhältnis zur Arbeiterklasse. Ein deutsch-polnischer Vergleich, in: *ders.*, Revolutionen, S. 279–311.

80 Vgl. Wolfgang Hardtwig (Hrsg.), Nationalismus und Bürgerkultur in Deutschland 1500–1914, Göttingen 1994; Reinhart Koselleck/Michael Jeismann (Hrsg.), Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne, München 1994; Etienne François/Hannes Siegrist/Jakob Vogel (Hrsg.), Nation und Emotion. Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich. 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1995; Manfred Hettling/Paul Nolte (Hrsg.), Nation und Gesellschaft in Deutschland, München 1996; Klaus Tenfelde/Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Hrsg.), Wege zur Geschichte des Bürgertums, Göttingen 1994.

81 Vgl. Christian Jansen/Thomas Mergel, Von »der Revolution« zu »den Revolutionen«: Probleme einer Interpretation von 1848/49; and Thomas Mergel, Sozialmoralische Milieus und Revolutionsgeschichtsschreibung. Zum Bild der Revolution von 1848/49 in den Subgesellschaften des deutschen Kaiserreich, both in: Jansen/Mergel, Revolutionen, S. 7–13, S. 247–267. Note the subtitle to this volume: Erfahrung – Verarbeitung – Deutung.

82 Hartmut Zwahr, Der Distelfink unter der Pickelhaube. Namen, Symbole und Identitäten Geächteter im 19. Jahrhundert, in: *ders.*, Revolutionen, S. 325–334.

rest in charting the broadening mental horizons of Saxon burghers from about 1860 onward, so far they have stuck close to the traditional means of taking such readings – for example, by examining the influence of local chapters on national associations and their executives. In the process they have rarely explored how cultural symbols and rituals reflected overlapping local, regional, and national identities.

In recent years we have learned a great deal about the Saxon bourgeoisie's public face, but very little about its private one. Even more striking is our ignorance of those areas of social and political activity where the public and the private intersect. Because the concept of civil society presupposes attention to this middle ground between the public and the private, the lack of preliminary work on the Saxon bourgeoisie has left us poorly equipped to answer fundamental questions about Saxony's place in German history. For example: Because historians have not yet examined processes of professionalization in Saxony prior to the First World War, we can say little about the deeper roots of status anxiety among Saxon burghers in the 1920s. Because we know next to nothing about small businessmen, civil servants, and professional politicians among the Saxon petit bourgeoisie, it is difficult to say whether the »*Panik im Mittelstand*« theory once used to explain the success of the Nazis might not still be relevant today. Because we are ignorant about the roles of women, the family, and education in bourgeois experiences, it is difficult to draw comparisons between Saxon *Bürgerlichkeit* and bourgeois codes in other regions.

There are many welcome signs that this situation is already changing. As noted already, Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann has done excellent work on the importance of national symbols and the social place of Freemasons in Leipzig. Robert Beachy's work on similar themes has the added benefit of spanning the early-modern/modern divide. Until now Hoffmann and Beachy must have felt rather alone among historians of Saxony. But the work-in-progress of Páll Björnsson (Rochester), H. Glenn Penny III (Urbana-Champaign/Illinois), and Barry Jackisch (Buffalo), among others, suggests that two salient themes of *Bürgertum* research are beginning to come together in scholarship on Saxony as well.⁸³ One theme focuses on the values, lifestyles, representational symbols, intra-family dynamics, and gender relations that constituted the condition of being a burgher (*Bürgerlichkeit*). The other theme concerns the bourgeoisie's public face – a face that was turned toward the state, away from other social classes, and fixated on burghers' ideal social order (the *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* itself). The main point is that these two faces of the Saxon burgher class are at least beginning to be viewed together in their proper local, material, and cultural contexts.

The point of these reflections should not be misunderstood. To identify areas of Saxon historiography where strategies for innovative work remain more potential than realized is not to diminish the quality of recent work. To suggest that the new cultural history has not yet made much impact on Saxon historiography is to suggest only that a

83 Páll Björnsson, *Liberalism and the Making of German Men. Politics, Associations and Festivals in Leipzig, 1845–1871*, Dissertationsprojekt Rochester; *ders.*, *Die liberale Bewegung in Leipzig, 1848–1878: Politik, Gesellschaftsbild, Bürgerideal*, unpublished paper 1994; *ders.*, *Liberalism and the Making of the »New Man«: The Case of Gymnasts in Leipzig, 1845–1871*, in: *Retallack, Saxony (in Vorbereitung)*; H. Glenn Penny III, *Germans' Others and Other Germans: Ethnographic Museums and the Formation of Identities, 1868–1914*, Dissertationsprojekt Urbana-Champaign/Illinois; *ders.*, »Beati possedentes«: The Commodification of Material Culture and the Politics of Possession in Leipzig's *Völkerkunde Museum* (Ms.), ersch. voraus. 1998 in: *Comparativ*; *ders.*, *The Audience as Author: Museums and their Publics in Wilhelmine Germany*, unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Seattle, January 1998; Barry Jackisch, »Make the Right-Wing Strong!«: The Pan-German League, Radical Nationalism, and the German Right, 1918–1933, Dissertationsprojekt Buffalo/New York.

great deal of work remains to be done.⁸⁴ When we take stock of existing knowledge about how Saxon burghers viewed their world in cultural terms, the remaining gaps are so numerous that renewed vigour seems called for on many fronts.

3. Workers

One of the greatest ironies of GDR scholarship was its relative neglect of German workers and their everyday experiences before 1933. Pressures for political orthodoxy left it to quasi-outsiders such as Hartmut Zwahr to move beyond party analyses and examine the human dimensions of working-class life.⁸⁵ Zwahr's pioneering work on the emergence of a proletarian class in Leipzig appeared first in a series of articles published during the 1970s and then in a monograph published in 1978.⁸⁶ Zwahr examined the social and economic processes from the 1830s to the 1870s whereby Leipzig workers gradually came to constitute a proletarian class. In Zwahr's usage, »worker« is a broad category. It includes artisanal journeymen and apprentices whose workplace dependence upon masters effectively gave them the same status and outlook as wage-earners (*Lohnarbeiter*). On the basis of baptismal records and sophisticated statistical analysis, Zwahr showed that the gradual emergence of a second generation of class-conscious workers in Leipzig dovetailed with increasing uniformity of social experience. As a result of these processes a distinctive proletarian class was born. The social contours of that class were well defined by the 1870s, when about 90 per cent of Leipzig factory workers were sons or daughters of proletarian parents. The labour movement *per se* is not part of Zwahr's story. Nevertheless, the emergence of class consciousness in Leipzig was inseparable from the evolution of organisational skills, codes of discipline, and manifestations of self-confidence among local labour leaders. Hence Zwahr unequivocally identifies Leipzig as the »cradle« of the German labour movement.⁸⁷

Zwahr's work found an appreciative echo in Bielefeld, where he was praised for pioneering the practice of historical social science in the GDR.⁸⁸ But even laudatory re-

84 Stressing »experience« over »everydayness« vgl. u. a. *Thomas Mergel/Thomas Welskopp*, *Geschichtswissenschaft und Gesellschaftstheorie*, in: *dies.* (Hrsg.), *Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft*, München 1997, S. 9–38; *Peter Steinbach*, *Geschichte des Alltags – Alltagsgeschichte. Erkenntnisinteresse, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines »neuen« Zugangs zur Geschichte*, in: *NPL* 31, 1986, S. 249–273; *Wolfgang Hardtwig/Hans-Ulrich Wehler*, *Kulturgeschichte Heute*, Göttingen 1996; *Winfried Schulze* (Hrsg.), *Sozialgeschichte, Alltagsgeschichte, Mikro-Historie*, Göttingen 1994; *Wolfgang Hardtwig/Harm-Hinrich Brandt* (Hrsg.), *Deutschlands Weg in die Moderne*, München 1993; *Alf Lüdtke* (Hrsg.), *Alltagsgeschichte*, Frankfurt/Main 1989.

85 *Hartmut Zwahr*, *Arbeiterbewegung in Leipzig vor der Jahrhundertwende*, in: *dies.*, *Revolutionen*, S. 230 f.: »One hopes that in a [future] historical account of Leipzig's labour movement, the human practices that are constitutive of meaning will be given a more central role than is perhaps typical these days, and [...] that history can be written as the story of active individuals.«

86 *Dies.*, *Zur Konstituierung des Proletariats als Klasse. Strukturuntersuchung über das Leipziger Proletariat während der industriellen Revolution*, Ost-Berlin 1978/München 1981.

87 *Dies.*, *Arbeiterbewegung*, S. 239: »Strictly speaking, this metaphor fits Leipzig. He who sees the world for the first time from a cradle has been born into an orderly household, that is, a household that owns a cradle and not a bundle of straw [...]. The founders of the workers' organizations were – in modern parlance – men in suits, with starched shirt-fronts and winged collars, men who posed for the photographer no differently than might the founder of a publicly-offered brewery. What divided these two men was the proletarian »way of life« and the experience of social and cultural exclusion.«

88 Vgl. *Jürgen Kocka*, *Sozialstruktur und Arbeiterbewegung. Die Entstehung des Leipziger Proletariats*, in: *AfS* 20, 1980, S. 584–592; other appreciative reviewers included Sidney Pollard and John Breuilly.

views recognised that Zwahr's study raised as many questions as it answered. For one thing, it did not always differentiate clearly between ways of life or views of the world held by members of two distinct groups: workers who were born in Leipzig, or at least in the small towns nearby; and workers who migrated (or whose parents had migrated) from the Saxon countryside to the city. Some historians queried the inferences Zwahr made between social status and political behaviour. Why were Leipzig workers willing to listen to scholarly lectures by prominent burghers (including Biedermann) whose interest in the social question motivated them to address workers' educational societies well into the 1860s? How could Leipzig's workers succeed so quickly with their efforts to build an independent political organisation in the 1860s when a typical Leipzig worker spent 84 hours per week either in the workplace or travelling to and from it?⁸⁹ Did Zwahr neglect workers who were never recruited successfully for the organised labour movement? And if the breakthrough of industrial capitalism between 1830 and the 1850s was the decisive factor in defining the contours of Leipzig's proletariat, could the distinguishing features of that class possibly have remained static as Saxon trade unions and cultural associations faced new challenges after 1871?

The raising of such questions signified not that Zwahr's basic conclusions were flawed, but that they deserved further scrutiny. Thanks in part to the work of Zwahr's own students in Leipzig, workers' culture is coming into sharper focus. As we shall see in Section V below, a 1998 dissertation by Thomas Adam (Leipzig) suggests that where Zwahr stressed exclusion and cohesion, one can also discern the permeability and complexity of class divisions. Susanne Schötz's (Leipzig) study of lower-middle-class Leipzigers in the mid-nineteenth century is another example of how scholars have explored dimensions of working-class life addressed only in passing by Zwahr.⁹⁰ Lastly, Frank Heidenreich's (Berlin) study of Social Democratic cultural associations in the Weimar Republic attempts to move outward from Leipzig and consider state-wide associations. As we shall also see in Section V, his research, too, provides an important perspective on the alleged gulf separating bourgeois and working-class culture in Saxony.⁹¹

Taking stock of this work (as well as older studies on the same themes) calls for a mixed appraisal. If we ask whether historians have provided anything like a comprehensive picture of working-class *experiences* in Saxon history, the answer must be no. If we ask only whether historians have come close to achieving this objective for a specific locality, a specific decade, or a specific industrial sector, here the answer is a qualified yes.⁹² These conclusions are all the more surprising when one considers the richness of available sources. These include autobiographies written by Saxon workers⁹³, surveys

89 *Hartmut Zwahr*, *Ausbeutung und gesellschaftliche Stellung des Fabrik- und Manufakturproletariats am Ende der Industriellen Revolution im Spiegel Leipziger Fabrikordnungen*, in: *Wolfgang Jacobeit/Ute Mohrmann* (Hrsg.), *Kultur und Lebensweise des Proletariats*, 2. Aufl., Berlin 1974, S. 85–136.

90 *Susanne Schötz*, *Städtische Mittelschichten in Leipzig während der bürgerlichen Umwälzung (1830–1870)*, Diss. Leipzig 1985; see esp. sections on *Post- and Eisenbahnpersonal* (S. 55 ff.) and on *Viktualienhändler, Kaufleute, Schank- and Gastwirte, and Fabrikanten* (S. 144 ff.).

91 *Frank Heidenreich*, *Arbeiterkulturbewegung und Sozialdemokratie in Sachsen vor 1933*, Böhlau Verlag, Weimar etc. 1995, 479 S., brosch., 78 DM.

92 Vgl. u. a. *Bernd Schöne*, *Posamentierer – Strumpfwirker – Spitzenklöpplerinnen. Zu Kultur und Lebensweise von Textilproduzenten im Erzgebirge und im Vogtland während der Periode des Übergangs vom Feudalismus zum Kapitalismus (1750 bis 1850)*, (besides other contributions) in: *Rudolf Weinhold* (Hrsg.), *Volksleben zwischen Zunft und Fabrik*, Berlin 1982, S. 107–159; *Bernhard Westenberger*, *Die Holzspielwarenindustrie im sächsischen Erzgebirge*, Leipzig 1911.

93 *Rudolph Strauß*, *Die Lebensverhältnisse der Chemnitzer Arbeiter gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Beiträge zur Heimatgeschichte von Karl-Marx-Stadt* H. 15 (1967), S. 7–88; *Alfred Kelly* (Hrsg.), *The German Worker*, Berkeley 1987, including accounts of Saxon experiences by *Paul*

of working-class household inventories⁹⁴, reports of living conditions and housing markets⁹⁵, the mammoth study of Saxony's artisanal trades undertaken by Karl Bücher's »Volkswirtschaftlich-statistisches Seminar« at the University of Leipzig⁹⁶, newspapers published by Protestant workers' associations⁹⁷, studies of Saxony's consumer co-operatives⁹⁸, and investigations into working-class savings patterns.⁹⁹

Summing up this section, we would be astounded if we had discovered that class relationships were not central to past, present, and future literature on Saxony. We would be even more astonished if it were suggested that historical scholarship on the class structure of any *other* region of Germany is somehow »complete«. Who is to say whether the deficit faced by historians of Saxony is unique? To fill remaining gaps, future historians will have to take up a variety of methods that are only loosely subsumed under the rubric of cultural history. One can only hope that scholars drawing from such a well-stocked arsenal will explore Saxony's class layerings from perspectives that have not hitherto been strongly represented in the literature.¹⁰⁰

Göhre, Drei Monate Fabrikarbeiter und Handwerksbursche, Leipzig 1891 (ND 1978); *ders.*, Three Months in a Workshop, London 1895 (ND New York 1972); *Minna Wettstein-Adelt*, Dreieinhalb Monate Fabrik-Arbeiterin, Berlin 1892; *Wenzel Holek*, Lebensgang eines deutsch-tschechischen Handarbeiters, Jena 1909; *Moritz Th. W. Bromme*, Lebensgeschichte eines modernen Fabrikarbeiters, Jena 1905; *Otto Krille*, Unter dem Joch. Die Geschichte einer Jugend, Berlin 1914; *Ernst Schuchardt*, Sechs Monate Arbeitshaus. Erlebnisse eines wandernden Arbeiters, Berlin 1907; *Eugen May*, Mein Lebenslauf, in: *Eugen Rosenstock* (Hrsg.), Werkstattausiedlung. Untersuchungen über den Lebenslauf des Industriearbeiters, Berlin 1922, S. 16–29.

94 Inventarien von 87 Dresdner Arbeiterhaushalten, in: Mitteilungen des statistischen Amtes der Stadt Dresden H. 13 (1904), S. 1–36; also in: Verwaltungsbericht des Rathes der Königlichen Haupt- und Residenzstadt Dresden für das Jahr 1902, Dresden 1903, Anlage, S. 78–96.

95 *Oskar Friedrich*, Die Wohnungspolitik der Stadt Dresden, in: Soziale Praxis 22, 1913, Sp. 1058–1061; Die wirtschaftliche und soziale Lage der Arbeiterschaft von Dresden und Umg[ebung] in den Jahren 1902–1904, in: Jahres- und Kassenbericht des Gewerkschaftskartells Dresden u. Umg., o.O. [Dresden] 1902, S. 3–9; ebd. 1903, S. 3–20; ebd. 1904, S. 3–5. Andrew Lees (Rutgers) is working on a study of Viktor Böhmert (1829–1918), Professor of National Economy at the TH in Dresden, director of the Kgl. Sächs. Statistischen Amt, and a leading advocate of both temperance and leisure pursuits for Saxon workers. Vgl. auch *Jürgen Reulecke*, Bürgerliche Sozialreformer und Arbeiterjugend im Kaiserreich, in: AfS 22, 1982, S. 299–329.

96 *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (Hrsg.), Untersuchungen über die Lage des Handwerks in Deutschland, Bd. 2: Königreich Sachsen, T. 1 (= Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik Bd. 63), Leipzig 1895; Bde. 5 u. 6: Königreich Sachsen. Arbeiten aus dem Volkswirtschaftlich-statistischen Seminar der Universität Leipzig, T. 2 u. 3 (= Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Bde. 66 u. 67), Leipzig 1896.

97 Including: »Deutschnationale Arbeiter-Zeitung« (Crimmitschau); »Sächsisch-Thüringische Arbeiterzeitung« (Crimmitschau); and the »Sächsisches Evangelisches Arbeiterblatt« (Dresden); vgl. *Evangelischer Landespreßverband für das Königreich Sachsen* (Hrsg.), Arbeitsbericht, Dresden 1918; *Eberhard Wächtler*, Zur Geschichte des Kampfes des Bergarbeiterverbandes in Sachsen, Berlin 1959.

98 *Carl Launer*, Die Konsumgenossenschaftsbewegung im Freistaat Sachsen: 1845 bis zur Gegenwart, Bad Dürrenberg 1932, should be read with a critical eye.

99 *Hubert Kiesewetter*, Zur Entwicklung sächsischer Sparkassen, zum Sparverhalten und zur Lebenshaltung sächsischer Arbeiter im 19. Jahrhundert (1819–1914), in: *Werner Conze/Ulrich Engelhardt* (Hrsg.), Arbeiterexistenz im 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1981, S. 446–486; *ders.*, Die Entwicklung des gesellschaftlichen und politischen Umfelds der Sparkassen in Bayern und Sachsen vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieges, in: Zeitschrift für bayerische Sparkassengeschichte 9, 1995, S. 135–176.

100 Vgl. *Peter Jelavich*, Poststrukturalismus und Sozialgeschichte – aus amerikanischer Perspektive, in: GG 21, 1995, S. 259–289; *Helmut Walser Smith*, Geschichte zwischen den Fronten. Meisterwerke der neuesten Geschichtsschreibung und postmoderne Kritik, in: GG 22, 1996, S. 592–608. To younger German scholars, Jelavich and Smith might appear to be running through open

V. MILIEUS, CLEAVAGES, CAMPS

With increasing frequency, historians are citing Saxony as the testing ground for models designed to investigate regional political cultures. Yet historians have lately begun to express more scepticism than confidence about the usefulness of such experiments. Christopher Harvie (Tübingen) has written that regional history may not even exist: »there is a vast range of regional disciplines – geographical, ethnological, sociological, political, economic, anthropological – but somehow these contrive to speak not to but *alongside* one another, rather like guests at a badly organised dinner party«. ¹⁰¹ Thomas Kühne (Konstanz) has asked whether regional political cultures exist today or have ever existed in the past. ¹⁰² Nor is it clear that historians mean the same thing when they speak of regional political cultures. Some, for example, speak of a national political culture, in the singular. Others declare that individual states, provinces, towns, and even neighbourhoods having distinctive political cultures. Still others refer to a »conservative« political culture, a »liberal« political culture, or a »Catholic« political culture. ¹⁰³ As if this diversity of opinion were not enough, historians cannot agree on whether political cultures are best analysed by deploying the concept of social-moral milieus, of cleavages, or of »camps« (*Lager*). ¹⁰⁴

Scepticism on each of these fronts is not entirely misplaced. That being said, there is no good reason why scholars should not continue to view Saxony as a laboratory where they can test theories deemed to explain patterns of historical change, as long as they remember that contemporaries constructed their own regional identities for specific economic, social, and political purposes. While this insight has long been applied effectively in the study of nationalism – via concepts of »imagined communities« and »invented traditions« – it is less frequently applied in German regional historiography. Moreover, allegiance to »the region« is wrongly supposed to have displaced local allegiances in the modernisation process, just as regional allegiances are said to have given way to national ones in the course of nation-building. There exists a large and growing body of literature that considers why local and national allegiances were not necessarily mutually exclusive. Yet the often uneasy relationship between regional identities and identities on »higher« and »lower« political levels has been less often explored. Lastly, scholars and students often idealise the regions they study. Penetrating to the regional level, scholars revel in having discovered traditional or »genuine« roots of present societies. It is part of the historian's task, such scholars believe, to rediscover and nurture such roots, in the interest of fostering a more »positive« identity. This tendency is evident in some of the more popular works of history published for the general public in Saxony. ¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, historians of political culture who are more attuned to

doors; vgl. *Thomas Mergel*, *Kulturgeschichte – die neue »große Erzählung«?*, in: *Hardtwig/Wehler*, *Kulturgeschichte*, S. 41–77, insb. 57 f. But *Roger Chickering*, *Drei Gesichter des Kaiserreiches*, in: *NPL* 41, 1996, S. 364–375, insb. S. 373 f., reminds us how strong the resistance has been.

101 *Christopher Harvie*, *The Rise of Regional Europe*, London 1994, S. X.

102 *Thomas Kühne*, *Regional Political Cultures and the Construction of Traditional, Democratic, and Other Identities*, in: *Retallack*, *Saxony* (in Vorbereitung).

103 Vgl. the intelligent discussion in *Wolfram Pyta*, *Politische Kultur und Wahlen in der Weimarer Republik*, in: *Gerhard A. Ritter* (Hrsg.), *Wahlen und Wahlkämpfe in Deutschland*, Düsseldorf 1997, S. 197–239, insb. S. 200; vgl. auch *Gerhard A. Ritter*, *Die deutschen Parteien 1830–1914*, Göttingen 1985, S. 49 f.

104 Vgl. *Karl Rohe*, *Wahlen und Wählertraditionen in Deutschland*, Frankfurt/Main 1992, insb. S. 19–29; *Thomas Kühne*, *Wahlrecht – Wahlverhalten – Wahlkultur. Tradition und Innovation in der historischen Wahlforschung*, in: *AfS* 33, 1993, S. 481–547, insb. S. 517–522.

105 For example: *Siegfried Gerlach* (Hrsg.): *Sachsen. Eine politische Landeskunde*, Stuttgart 1993; *Johannes Zemmrich*, *Landeskunde von Sachsen*. Hrsg., überarb. u. erg. v. *Karlheinz Blaschke*

the constructed, discursive nature of identity have generally resisted tendencies toward regional »boosterism«.¹⁰⁶

The concept of social-moral milieus is based originally on the work of M. Rainer Lepsius (Heidelberg).¹⁰⁷ Lepsius suggested that political behaviour in general, and voting behaviour specifically, is influenced by dispositions other than those conveyed by one's »class«. Political behaviour is determined not only by status, wealth, and power, but also by experience, perception, and emotion. Given these emphases, it is no surprise that the concept of social-moral milieus has been taken on board without difficulty by advocates of cultural history. A second concept, developed in conjunction with theories of nation-building by the late Norwegian scholar Stein Rokkan, sees political conflicts falling along four main axes, or »cleavages«. These cleavages divide centre and periphery, church and state, the agrarian and industrial sectors, and workers and employers. A third concept, elaborated most fully by the political scientist Karl Rohe (Essen), suggests that political allegiances can be grouped into three camps: the social democratic, the Catholic, and the »national«.

A review essay of this scope cannot fully demonstrate how insights derived from one concept force us to revise our thinking about the other two. Nevertheless, these concepts have been so central to such a large proportion of work on Saxon political history that we should not pass up this opportunity to take stock. How are regional historians applying these concepts in practice, and with what success? The short answer is relatively clear. An emerging consensus sees a poor fit between Saxon circumstances and

[Neuausgabe der 2. Aufl. – Leipzig 1923 – des Werkes], Berlin 1991; *Günter Naumann*, Sächsische Geschichte in Daten, Berlin 1991; *Sächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung* (Hrsg.), Sachsen – Land im Aufbruch. Der Freistaat Sachsen stellt sich vor, Dresden 1991; *dies.* (Hrsg.), Sachsen, Böhmen, Bayern. Gemeinsame Geschichte und wandelnde Perspektiven, Dresden 1996; *Karl Jacob/Max Wagner*, Unser Vaterland Sachsen in Karte und Bild, 3. Aufl., o.O. 1915 (ND 2. Aufl.: Leipzig 1991); *Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte* (Hrsg.), Methoden und Themen der Landes-, Regional- und Heimatgeschichte in Bayern, Sachsen und Thüringen. Kolloquiumsbericht, München 1991; *Karlheinz Blaschke/Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte* (Hrsg.), Politische Geschichte Sachsens und Thüringens, München 1991; *Karlheinz Blaschke* (Hrsg.), 700 Jahre Mitbestimmung in Sachsen, Dresden 1994; *Hermann Heckmann* (Hrsg.), Sachsen. Historische Landeskunde Mitteldeutschlands, 3. Aufl., Würzburg 1991; *Manfred Kluge* (Hrsg.), Sachsen. Ein Lesebuch, München 1993. For younger readers: *Gerhard Billig u. a.* (Hrsg.), Aus der Geschichte Sachsens. Ein Arbeitsbuch für die Schule, 3 Bde., Frankfurt/Main 1991, insb. Bd. 2 [1500–1918], hrsg. v. *Wendelin Szalai*, and Bd. 3 [1918–1990], hrsg. v. *Renate Kappler*. *Manfred Artur Fellisch*, Sachsen: ein Land mit großer kultureller und wirtschaftlicher Vergangenheit, in: *Martin Greiffenhagen u. a.* (Hrsg.), Die neuen Bundesländer, Stuttgart 1994, S. 124, identifies »das Sächsische« as »Selbstschutz«, »Abgrenzung«, and »Ermutigung«.

106 Vgl. u. a. *Heinrich Best*, Politische Regionen in Deutschland: Historische (Dis-)Kontinuitäten, in: *Dieter Oberndörfer/Karl Schmitt* (Hrsg.), Parteien und regionale politische Traditionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin 1991, S. 39–64; *Axel Flügel*, Der Ort der Regionalgeschichte in der neuzeitlichen Geschichte, in: *Stefan Brakensiek u. a.* (Hrsg.), Kultur und Staat in der Provinz. Perspektiven und Erträge der Regionalgeschichte, Bielefeld 1992, S. 1–28; *Karlheinz Blaschke*, Die sächsische Landesgeschichte zwischen Tradition und neuem Anfang, in: *NASG* 64, 1993, S. 7–28; *Stefan Berger*, Historians and Nation-Building in Germany after Reunification, in: *Past & Present*, Bd. 148 (1995), S. 187–222; *Detlef Briesen*, Regionalbewußtsein – einige Fragen an einen schwierigen Begriff, in: *Bramke/Heß*, Sachsen, S. 31–49; *Hartmut Voit*, Regionale Identität im vereinigten Deutschland: Chancen und Probleme, in: *Lässig/Pohl*, S. 395–410; *Bernd Weisbrod*, Region und Zeitgeschichte: das Beispiel Niedersachsen, in: *Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch* 68, 1996, S. 91–105.

107 *M. Rainer Lepsius*, Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft, wiederabgedr. in: *ders.*, Demokratie in Deutschland, Göttingen 1993, S. 25–50.

any model based squarely on milieus, cleavages, or camps. The concept of »camps« is most frequently said to be inapplicable to Saxony. Nevertheless, sceptics have already begun to wonder what alternatives exist to organise our thinking about Saxon political development and to establish agendas for future research.

1. Milieus

One obvious advantage of the concept of social-moral milieus is that it helps us avoid conflating social and political categories. Thus the social condition of being »middle-class« does not necessarily foster the political outlook we label »liberal«. Similarly, not all members of the upper classes are conservative and not all workers are socialists. One can identify (at least) three junctures in Saxony's political history where historians need to be particularly wary of mapping social status directly onto political allegiance. The first is the decade of the 1860s. In that era the »social« and the »democratic« components of Social Democracy overlapped. The degree of overlap, while not yet entirely clear, had large implications. On the one hand, early followers of August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht were drawn from the ranks of the petit bourgeoisie to a greater extent than from the ranks of factory wage-earners. On the other hand, those followers often tended to give priority to democratic goals – most notably, popular representation and the universal franchise – rather than to socialist goals. Yet if we accept that the social constituency of Saxon Social Democracy was very fluid in the 1860s, and its political trajectory uncharted, we may need to reconsider Zwahr's thesis that a proletarian class had formed in Leipzig by 1870.¹⁰⁸

The second era that merits reconsideration is the first decade of the twentieth century. Although contemporaries did not use the term »milieu« at the time, in 1903 they came face to face with the same historical problem that the concept of social-moral milieus was designed to address. In June 1903, SPD candidates won 22 of Saxony's 23 constituencies in national *Reichstag* elections. By coining the term »Red Saxony«, the Social Democrats meant to suggest almost literally that Saxony's »social-moral« fibre had changed overnight. For those socialists inclined to wishful thinking, the Saxon wing of the SPD was no longer just one among many parties competing for the allegiance of voters. Rather, the election victory signalled a sea-change in Saxony's political culture – one, moreover, that would not easily be reversed at the next election. In other words, the Saxon SPD was now seen by its own supporters as firmly anchored in a particular social constituency and morally empowered to lead the campaign for reform in the future. More realistic observers, even within the Saxon SPD, understood that the triumph at the polls was also the result of a confluence of acute economic and political crises that tended to favour a strong socialist showing. But the recognition that something dramatic had changed in Saxony reinvigorated the regional party and gave it new national prominence. As Saxony's SPD leaders put it at the time: »Germany must become what Saxony has become.«

The SPD's opponents, meanwhile, were also forced to confront the implications of this stunning electoral outcome. If Saxony had not quite become »red« overnight, might 1903 nonetheless signify the emergence of a cohesive socialist milieu in Saxony where none had existed before? Understandably, most conservatives shied away from this unpalatable conclusion. Saxony's premier, Georg von Metzsch, believed that the »terrible results« of the 1903 election suggested a »burgher repudiation« of Saxony's electoral sys-

108 *Karsten Rudolph*, On the Disappearance of a Political Party in German History: The Saxon People's Party, 1866–1869, in: *Retallack*, Saxony (in Vorbereitung).

tem.¹⁰⁹ But it was left to statisticians, social reformers, electoral cartographers, and party politicians to elaborate on what this »repudiation« of the status quo really meant. Some argued petulantly that because Saxony was represented in the Berlin *Reichstag* by 22 socialist deputies and only one non-socialist – as it happened, a rabid antisemite¹¹⁰ – bourgeois Saxons had effectively been disfranchised. Others undertook detailed analysis of election returns to determine what proportion of those voters who had cast ballots for SPD candidates might belong to the lower-middle or middle classes. When statistical and anecdotal data were reviewed, no one could avoid the conclusion that socialist candidates owed much of their support to members of the lower middle classes who either had specific economic grievances or who felt excluded from political influence by the three-class *Landtag* suffrage introduced in 1896. So the consensus suggested that Metzsch was at least partly correct.¹¹¹

The concept of social-moral milieus is particularly relevant – third – during the 1920s. When we consider the research of Rudolph, Seidel, Lapp, and Claus-Christian Szejnmann (London)¹¹², the importance of determining whether the socialist milieu was expanding or shrinking becomes clear. The general trend after 1919 was toward shrinkage. Yet these authors have all stressed how diffuse, permeable, and unstable Saxon milieus actually were during the 1920s. They may not be willing to say so explicitly, but their conclusions point in one direction: milieu theory does not go very far in explaining voting behaviour in Saxony.

A different approach to the same problem has been suggested by Thomas Adam and Frank Heidenreich. One salient strength of their work is that it identifies the difficulty of defining a socialist milieu over a much longer term: from the 1890s to the 1930s. Heidenreich's study in many respects leads the way into this uncharted territory, because of his impressively broad knowledge of the myriad SPD cultural organisations. On the other hand, both studies reach essentially the same conclusion regarding the existence of a socialist milieu in Saxony. Adam has discovered that the attempt to apply the theory of social-moral milieus to the case of Leipzig raises more questions than it answers. For example, in the course of showing how and why the socialist milieu in Leipzig was so porous and shifting, he demonstrates that leaders of staunchly conservative veterans' or-

109 Simone Lässig, *Wahlrechtskampf und Wahlreform in Sachsen (1895–1909)*, Böhlau Verlag, Weimar etc. 1996, 304 S., brosch., 58 DM, hier: S. 101–117, insb. S. 108; James Retallack, *Liberals, Conservatives, and the Modernizing State: The Kaiserreich in Regional Perspective*, in: Geoff Eley (Hrsg.), *Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870–1930*, Ann Arbor 1996, S. 221–256; Warren, *Red Kingdom*, S. 63.

110 On the campaign leading to the Reform candidate's victory in Bautzen, vgl. Martin Burkhardt, *Die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung im Kreis Bischofswerda*, T. 1, Bischofswerda 1968, S. 88–92.

111 Vgl. Robert Michels, *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie*. T. I: Parteimitgliedschaft und soziale Zusammensetzung, in: *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 23, 1906, S. 471–456; R. Blank, *Die soziale Zusammensetzung der sozialdemokratischen Wählerschaft Deutschlands*, in: ebd. 20, 1905, S. 507–550 (Max Weber's commentary: ebd., S. 550–553); Hermann Goldstein, *Das Reichstagswahlrecht und seine Gegner*, Leipzig 1903. The debate begun in 1903 continues today: vgl. Franz Walter, *Sachsen – ein Stammland der Sozialdemokratie?*, in: *PVS* 32, 1991, S. 207–231; the reply by Christopher Hausmann/Karsten Rudolph, *Trotz allem: Sachsen, die rote Hochburg*, in: *PVS* 34, 1993, S. 92–97; and finally Franz Walter, *Analyse von regionalen Teilkulturen im Zerfall – das Beispiel Sachsen*. Göttinger Antwort auf Bochumer Kritik, in: ebd., S. 674–680.

112 Claus-Christian Szejnmann, *The Success of Nazism in the Landscape of Socialism and Nationalism: The Case of Saxony*, Oxford 1998 (im Druck); ders., *The Rise of the Nazi Party in the Working-Class Milieu of Saxony*, in: Conan J. Fischer (Hrsg.), *The Rise of National Socialism and the Working Classes in Weimar Germany*, Providence 1996, S. 189–216; ders., *The Success of Nazism in Saxony and Germany: The Landscape of Left and Right*, in: Retallack, *Saxony* (in Vorbereitung).

ganisations were unable to convince their members to steer clear of consumer co-operatives patronised mainly by workers.¹¹³ Adam does not make it entirely clear why, despite such permeability, he still prefers the term »alternative culture«, coined by Vernon Lidtke, to describe the socialist milieu. Adam writes late in his study that the alternative culture he discovered in Leipzig actually »mirrored« mainstream bourgeois culture. In the same vein Heidenreich argues that »the self-image of the socialist sports movement required explicit cultural exclusion as a necessary precondition for its existence«.¹¹⁴ These observations stand in possible contradiction to the general thesis of each book, which emphasises the intermingling of working-class and bourgeois members in such organisations. Adam nonetheless reminds us that attempts (from above) to target Social Democracy as the enemy of the bourgeoisie often failed. Even where they did not fail, the means of transmitting ideologies designed to reinforce this »friend-foe« polarity were more complex and unpredictable than historians have believed.¹¹⁵

Adam also builds on the work of analysts who since 1903 have tried to discern the typical socialist voter in Saxony. Among many other factors tending to undermine the notion of a sudden expansion of the socialist milieu in 1903 (or its sudden contraction in the *Reichstag* elections of 1907), Adam provides details about the day-to-day campaign work SPD functionaries had to perform in order to finance their local election races and recruit new supporters. Adam correctly identifies poorly-paid state officials as having shifted their allegiance to the socialists when they felt they had no other means to register a protest vote against their own employers. Adam is attentive to the different electoral strategies deployed in Leipzig's neighbourhoods to win these lower-middle-class voters. For example, he enlightens us about how »milieu« behaviour itself depended upon whether municipal, *Landtag*, or *Reichstag* election campaigns were being waged. The strikingly different suffrage laws for each parliament had a direct impact on the ability of SPD functionaries to mobilise allegiances within the milieu. That such analysis is found far too seldom even in local studies may be one reason milieu theories have proved so durable.

Lastly, Adam points out that one important pillar of the milieu concept is lacking in the Leipzig case. According to Lepsius's formulation, party leaders are expected to act in accordance with the wishes of members of the social-moral milieu they represent. In Leipzig, however, SPD leaders disregarded and even disparaged the opinion of workers about what sort of sports clubs and self-help programs they should promote. Workers loved their soccer, whereas SPD leaders disapproved of its competitive nature. Many members of the Leipzig SPD subscribed to bourgeois newspapers, whereas only about one of every two union members subscribed to a local SPD newspaper.¹¹⁶ Heavy-handed propaganda in SPD educational groups generally failed, whereas workers happily sought sociability and recreation in bourgeois associations. Workers were forced for economic reasons to purchase their household goods from consumer co-operatives, whereas SPD leaders feared that these co-operatives replicated bourgeois values. Workers spent their Sunday afternoons on their tiny garden allotments. But middle-class Leipzigers did too. In short, Adam and Heidenreich suggest that when we look not at ideology but at everyday practices, neither working-class nor bourgeois Saxons apparently paid much attention to the cultural values and political strictures allegedly inculcated in

113 Vgl. *Thomas Adam*, *Arbeitermilieu und sozialdemokratisch orientierte Arbeiterbewegung in einer Großstadt – Das Beispiel Leipzig*, Diss. Leipzig 1998.

114 *Heidenreich*, *Arbeiterkulturbewegung*, S. 51, S. 395; *Adam*, *Arbeitermilieu*, S. 338 f. Both authors might have devoted more attention to work in English on their subject by Guenther Roth, Vernon Lidtke, Richard J. Evans, and Lynn Abrams.

115 Vgl. *Heidenreich*, *Arbeiterkulturbewegung*, S. 112 ff. on workers' gymnastic societies.

116 *Ebd.*, S. 80.

distinct social-moral milieus. When it was a matter of finding cheap groceries, low-interest building loans, sunny garden plots, lively athletic contests, and talented choral directors, milieus were largely irrelevant.

Occasionally Adam falls into a familiar conceptual trap. At one point he tries to stress the permeability of the socialist milieu by noting »the lack of a ›liberal-petit-bourgeois milieu« in Leipzig«. This formulation, besides conflating social and political categories once again, leaves us uncertain about which was more important: the deficit of liberalism or the deficit of *Bürgerlichkeit*? At another point, Adam asserts that about one-sixth of the Leipzig SPD's membership in the 1920s was comprised of »white-collar workers [*Angestellte*], officials [*Beamte*], intellectuals, entrepreneurs, etc.« This list, however, soon becomes ritualised, reappearing frequently with only minor variations. No real attempt is made to disaggregate these huge categories by economic sector, by neighbourhood, or up and down the social ladder. We are willing to accept Adam's conclusion that many lower-middle-class and middle-class Saxons did not shy away from casting their votes for socialists. But still we want to know: What specific grievances would actually induce a retail clerk, a lower official, a shopkeeper, or a university professor to join the Social Democratic Party or support it at the polls? Did these middle-class SPD supporters give any credence to right-wing propagandists who claimed that socialists had no monopoly on solutions to their problems? And what other groups would Adam include among those unspecified »et ceteras«? These caveats aside, both Adam and Heidenreich have contributed to broadening the analytical terrain on which questions about social-moral milieus are posed. Their work compels us to think in fresh ways about how group solidarities are formed, how they influence everyday life, and how both mainstream and »alternative« cultures evolve in specific local contexts.

2. Cleavages

In Saxon historical writing, to move from consideration of social-moral milieus to consideration of »cleavages« and »camps« is to move from studies of working-class life to studies of the bourgeoisie. This imbalance has arisen for two reasons. On the one hand, historians of the labour movement have generally paid little attention to rural-urban conflicts, church-state relations, and tensions between the centre and the periphery. On the other hand, scholars conducting research on the middle and upper ranks of Saxon society seem to have abandoned the search for coherent liberal or conservative milieus. Instead they tend to explore specific conflicts that can be included under the rubric of cleavages. More recently they have also begun to investigate whether Karl Rohe's model of discrete socialist, Catholic, and nationalist camps applies to the Saxon case. Much of this research is acknowledged even by its staunchest advocates as preliminary and incomplete.¹¹⁷

Of Rokkan's four cleavages, the question of church-state relations has long been considered a »non-starter« of Saxon historiography. This problem will be considered in the next section. But here we can note that historians seeking to apply the theory of cleavages often assume that a strong Catholic presence in Saxony would have mediated socially between workers and the bourgeoisie or, politically, between the socialist and the nationalist camps.¹¹⁸ Such inferences are patently counterfactual. They also suggest,

117 Vgl. the résumés in Kühne, Wahlen; Christoph Nonn, Parteien und Wahlen im wilhelminischen Deutschland (1890–1914), in: NPL 41, 1996, S. 30–42; Retallack, Die »liberalen« Konservativen?, S. 147 f.

118 As just one example among many vgl. Benjamin Lapp, Revolution, S. 1; vgl. ferner Thomas Mergel, Grenzgänger. Das katholische Bürgertum im Rheinland zwischen bürgerlichem und katholi-

wrongly, that confessional antagonisms run on the same social, cultural, and political axes everywhere.

The cleavage between the industrial and agricultural sectors in Saxony has been investigated very thoroughly for the early nineteenth century. The work of Hubert Kiewewetter (also discussed in Section VII) represents a major contribution to this topic. For the Kaiserreich and Weimar periods, on the other hand, historians are just beginning to grasp the complexity of this cleavage. Here, Christoph Nonn's (Köln) research is of particular importance, for two reasons.¹¹⁹ First, rural-urban conflicts and producer-consumer conflicts run diagonally through traditional class conflicts. As Nonn has written, Saxony would appear to offer little evidence of such cleavages because the polarity of classes was so marked. Upon closer inspection, however, attention to urban-rural conflicts in the state demonstrates that the political *Kartell* between liberals and conservatives in the *Landtag* became increasingly fragile after 1900. This fragility in turn resulted from: increasing politicisation of the countryside, especially in the Saxon northeast; the sharp economic downturn in Saxony in 1900–1902, which brought industrialists and agrarians into direct conflict over tax issues; and the SPD's realisation that tariffs and indirect taxes provided excellent election campaign issues. Nonn's work, second, reinforces the conclusion that class analysis must be supplemented with consideration of milieus, cleavages, and camps before we can understand where the Saxon *Mittelstand* fits within patterns of social and political conflict in the state.¹²⁰ Saxon *Mittelständler* were perfectly willing to express their antipathy to the one-sided preferment of agrarian interests. Yet artisans, shopkeepers, and other *petit bourgeois* were frightened by the threat of SPD strikes and boycotts. That fear became politically significant after the mid-1890s, when socialist boycotts of breweries in Dresden and Berlin captured national headlines. In subsequent years the *Mittelstand* »swing vote« may have been the most important destabilizing factor in Saxon politics. For example, fear of the SPD, combined with resentment toward trade union agitation and consumer co-operatives, almost certainly drove many Saxon retailers and shopkeepers who had voted for socialist candidates in 1903 back into the arms of the *Kartell* parties in 1907. Little wonder that Conservatives after 1900 accepted the proposition of secret balloting for *Landtag* elections, because they hoped that the secret ballot would insulate lower-middle-class voters from SPD »terrorism«. Nevertheless, Conservatives were not willing to meet *Mittelstand* demands on many other issues, including the threshold for enfranchisement. By 1906 at the latest, the Conservatives' »friendliness to artisans« (*Handwerkerfreundlichkeit*) was being called into question across the board. Meanwhile the SPD had convinced many members of the new *Mittelstand* that they shared common interests as consumers. Hence one cannot say that Saxon *Mittelständler* were trapped in a »client« relationship with agrarian or antisemitic wire-pullers. The situation was more complicated and volatile than this simple formulation would suggest.¹²¹

schem Milieu 1870–1914, in: *Olaf Blaschke/Frank-Michael Kuhlemann* (Hrsg.), *Religion im Kaiserreich. Milieus – Mentalitäten – Krisen*, Gütersloh 1996, S. 166–192.

119 For the following see *Christoph Nonn*, *Arbeiter, Bürger und »Agrarier«: Stadt-Land-Gegensatz und Klassenkonflikt im Wilhelminischen Deutschland am Beispiel des Königreichs Sachsen*, in: *Grebing/Mommsen/Rudolph*, S. 101–113; *ders.*, *Soziale Hintergründe des politischen Wandels im Königreich Sachsen vor 1914*, in: *Lässig/Pohl*, S. 371–392; *ders.*, *Putting Radicalism to the Test: German Social Democracy and the 1905 Suffrage Demonstrations in Dresden*, in: *International Review of Social History* 41, 1996, S. 183–208; *ders.*, *Verbraucherprotest und Parteiensystem im wilhelminischen Deutschland*, Düsseldorf 1996.

120 Even *Warren*, *Red Kingdom*, S. 90, tried to fit small business into a social-political matrix that did not take proper account of gradations of conflict and consensus.

121 One antisemite vented his frustration over this situation when he wrote: »*Mittelstand* and *Mittelstand*: we're firm on that point, but it's not the least bit clear what we want and what we don't

There are numerous ways in which historians might grapple with such issues. To suggest only one of these, historians might take up the odd congruency found among different groups' attitudes toward the following issues: SPD boycotts against shopkeepers, tavern owners, and small producers; SPD boycotts of *Landtag* elections to protest unfair suffrages; use of the mass strike as a political »super-weapon«; and boycotts by radical nationalists against those who allegedly lacked patriotic fervour (e.g. producers of postcards in foreign languages or distributors of Czech beer).¹²² Boycotts and mass strikes are interesting because they compelled contemporaries to consider what political strategies were »legitimate« in everyday contexts. They also demonstrated to entrenched elites that social, economic, and political grievances could not be neatly compartmentalised (and thus neutralised). By studying such issues through the eyes of Saxony's beleaguered *Mittelständler*, we might better estimate how they gauged the relative »fairness« (*Gerechtigkeit*) of Saxon political culture.

Nonn's findings run parallel to those of Brett Fairbairn (Saskatoon), whose 1997 monograph provides an exhaustive yet richly nuanced study of the *Reichstag* elections of 1898 and 1903.¹²³ Like Nonn, Fairbairn demonstrates on a national level just how strongly taxes, tariffs, and suffrage issues resonated among German voters. Like Nonn, Fairbairn concludes that such issues sowed disunity among the anti-socialist parties around the turn of the century: such disunity more than counter-balanced attempts to implement a »rallying together« (*Sammlung*) within the nationalist camp. And like Nonn, Fairbairn demonstrates that radical nationalist associations did not offer unqualified loyalty to any single political party. As a result, efforts to instrumentalise such associations often failed dismally.¹²⁴

To be sure, Nonn occasionally over-estimates the impact of consumer protest. Thus he goes too far in suggesting that the Saxon SPD's *Reichstag* triumph in 1903 was due mainly to high prices and tariffs. He also appears to imply that Saxons demonstrating in the streets of Dresden and Leipzig in late 1905 were agitating on the same issues as well as against the three-class *Landtag* suffrage. Nevertheless – and this is the main point – Nonn provides convincing evidence that Saxony was the testing ground for political strategies that later assumed national importance. As he writes: »The recipe for success,

want.« Cited in Dieter Fricke, *Deutschsoziale Reformpartei (DSRP) 1894–1900*, in: *ders. u. a.* (Hrsg.), *Lexikon zur Parteiengeschichte 1789–1945*, 4 Bde., Leipzig 1983/86, Bd. 2, S. 545 f. Nonn, *Hintergründe*, suggests that frustration and apathy still characterised the Saxon *Mittelstand* movement in 1914.

122 Vgl. u. a.: Der Kampf gegen die Waldschlößchen-Brauerei Juli 1894. »Erpressungsprozeß«, in: *Sächsische Arbeiter-Zeitung*, Nrn. 194–200 (23.–30. 8. 1894); Nonn, *Verbraucherprotest*, S. 97–99; Eleanore L. Turk, *The Great Berlin Beer Boycott of 1894*, in: *CEH* 15, 1982, S. 377–397; Thomas Kühne, *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preussen 1867–1914*, Düsseldorf 1994, S. 109–115; Lässig, *Wahlrechtskampf*, S. 81–89; Susan Tegel, *Reformist Social Democrats, the Mass Strike and the Prussian Suffrage 1913*, in: *European History Quarterly* 17, 1987, S. 307–344; Torsten Kupfer/Bernd Rother, *Kooperation oder Konfrontation – SPD und Linksliberale in Anhalt und Braunschweig 1890–1914*, in: *Grebing/Mommsen/Rudolph*, S. 129–138; Gerald Kolditz, *Der Alldeutsche Verband in Dresden. Antitschechische Aktivitäten zwischen 1895 und 1914*, in: *Aurig/Herzog/Lässig*, S. 235–248.

123 Brett Fairbairn, *Democracy in the Undemocratic State. The German Reichstag Elections of 1898 and 1903*, Toronto etc. 1997, insb. S. 225 f. on Saxony.

124 Ebd., S. 69–109; vgl. auch *ders.*, *The Limits of Nationalist Politics: Electoral Culture and Mobilization in Germany, 1898–1903*, in: *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*, N.S. 1, 1990, S. 145–170; *ders.*, *Interpreting Wilhelmine Elections: National Issues, Fairness Issues, and Electoral Mobilization*, in: *Larry Eugene Jones/James Retallack* (Hrsg.), *Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany*, New York 1992, S. 17–48; Nonn, *Hintergründe*, S. 377.

used in the last years before World War One by Social Democrats in Prussia and the Reich to pit consumer protest against conservative political structures, was perfected first by Social Democrats in Saxony.«¹²⁵

By this stage there should be no need to elaborate on the centre-periphery and employer-employee cleavages. Future work on conflicts between Saxony and the German »centre« will need to consider in cultural terms the specific ways in which Saxons may or may not have felt »peripheral« to German affairs. Historians will also need to be more explicit about where they consider the »centre« of German affairs to be found. One ought to remember that Dresden lies closer to Prague than to Berlin. As for the issue of employer-employee relations, GDR historians produced some solid empirical work on strikes and other labour disputes in Saxony. This work will provide an important handhold for future historians.¹²⁶

3. Camps

On the face of it, the resentments and grievances that percolated in middle-class ranks would seem to open the door for those wishing to apply the concept of »political culture«, whose advocates often stress the importance of psychological dispositions toward politics. The concept of »camps« in particular would seem to work with the grain of these dispositions. After all, camps are generally defined more by what their members oppose than what unites them. Demonologies, hatreds, fears for the stability of the socio-economic status quo – all these factors play a role in generating group identities that underlie the notion of camps. They also help explain why camps are more than just a convenient or momentary coalition. Camps are built on powerful historical, cultural, and emotional foundations. These foundations make it difficult to move between camps.

Because Saxon Social Democracy became strong at such an early date, the threat of revolution would appear to have driven the SPD's enemies into one camp, which is clearly identifiable in the Saxon case in the form of the *Kartell*. With some over-simplification, this is the view of such eminent scholars as Gerhard A. Ritter and Karl Rohe. In the Weimar years, so the general argument goes, the gulf dividing the socialist and nationalist camps in Saxony only deepened. This gulf doomed the efforts of Majority Socialists, liberals, and moderate conservatives to steer a viable path between the extremes of Communism and National Socialism. The metaphor of opposing camps infuses even the titles of many historical accounts: Lapp writes of a revolution from the right, while Szejnmann describes the triumph of the Nazi brown-shirts in red Saxony.¹²⁷ Although hedged with qualifying arguments, these works are built on a single hypothesis: that contemporaries' inability to bridge the gulf between the socialist and nationalist camps was the determining factor steering Saxony toward disaster.

125 *Nonn*, *Arbeiter*, S. 106.

126 Vgl. u. a. *Herbert Stöbe*, *Der Grosse Streik der Chemnitzer Metallarbeiter zur Durchsetzung des Zehnstundentages im Jahre 1871*, Karl-Marx-Stadt 1962; *Wächtler*; *Woldemar Wagner*, *Der Crimmitschauer Textilarbeiterstreik in den Jahren 1903/04*, Diss. Leipzig 1959; *Dorothea Heinzel*, *Der Streik der Metallarbeiter bei der Firma Seidel und Naumann (Dresden) im Jahre 1907*, Staatsex. PH Dresden o.D.; *Warren*, *Red Kingdom*; *Günter Gorski*, *Sachsen 1917. Ein Beitrag zu den Auswirkungen der russischen Februarrevolution auf Deutschland*, Diss. Halle-Wittenberg 1962, S. 206 ff.; ferner *Friedhelm Boll*, *Arbeitskampf und Region. Arbeitskämpfe, Tarifverträge und Streikwellen im regionalen Vergleich 1871–1914*, in: *Gerhard A. Ritter* (Hrsg.), *Der Aufstieg der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, München 1990, S. 379–414.

127 *Lapp*, *Revolution*, S. 2: »A wide gap separated the bourgeois elite [...] from the lower middle classes.«

Lately, however, historians have begun to question the premise underlying this interpretation. These historians use another metaphor – this time a spatial one – to suggest that even Saxons who were motivated by social *Angst* followed an uncertain political compass. These Saxons, in other words, did find ways to traverse the difficult middle ground between the socialist and nationalist camps. Thus Christoph Nonn has identified a »grey zone« (*Grauzone*) between a lower-middle-class and a proletarian existence: Many Saxon artisans wandered in this no-man's land before confronting the allegedly stark alternatives of liberalism or conservatism; and it was here, adds Nonn, that the SPD discovered its most bountiful »hunting grounds« (*Jagdgründe*) as early as the 1870s. Thomas Adam, too, has stressed the »transitory zone« (*Übergangszone*) through which workers and lower-middle-class Saxons travelled in order to partake of the other's associational culture.¹²⁸ Karl Heinrich Pohl has argued that although National Liberals in Saxony were firmly enmeshed in the nationalist camp until the 1890s, thereafter they demonstrated – not only in Saxony – a marked ability »to unite wide segments of the political middle and to expand their capacity for co-operation toward right and left«. The expanding political zone dominated by liberals was matched in the social realm: there Pohl identifies a »trend toward partial expansion of the [liberal] milieu«. ¹²⁹ And Simone Lässig's work suggests that suffrage reform movements conspicuously »undermined the old mental blockages« upon which political camps had previously rested: »Earlier the »spectre« of the SPD sufficed to paste over the conflicts between »parties of order« [*Ordnungsparteien*]«, writes Lässig. But after 1900, »consensus-building [...] superseded the lines between factions«. This made possible the partial integration of the previously-isolated SPD, »who for their part [...] could partially remove the stigma of being enemies of the system«. ¹³⁰

128 Nonn, *Hintergründe*, S. 379 f.; Adam, *Arbeitermilieu*, S. 231 f.

129 Karl Heinrich Pohl, Ein zweiter politischer Emanzipationsprozeß des liberalen Unternehmertums? Zur Sozialstruktur und Politik der Liberalen in Sachsen zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: *Tenfelde/Wehler*, *Wege*, S. 231–248, hier: S. 235. For other statements of Pohl's central thesis, see *ders.*, Die Nationalliberalen – eine unbekanntete Partei?, in: *Jahrbuch zur Liberalismusforschung* 3, 1991, S. 82–112; *ders.*, Sachsen, Stresemann und die Nationalliberale Partei. Anmerkungen zur politischen Entwicklung, zum Aufstieg des industriellen Bürgertums und zur frühen Tätigkeit Stresemanns im Königreich Sachsen, in: *ebd.* 4, 1992, S. 197–216; *ders.*, »Einigkeit«, »kraftvoll«, »machtbewußt«. Überlegungen zu einer Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus aus regionaler Perspektive, in: *Historische Mitteilungen* 7, 1994, S. 61–80; *ders.*, Die Nationalliberalen in Sachsen vor 1914. Eine Partei der konservativen Honoratioren auf dem Wege zur Partei der Industrie, in: *Lothar Gall/Dieter Langewiesche* (Hrsg.), *Liberalismus und Region. Zur Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus* (= HZ, Beih. 19), München 1995, S. 195–215; *ders.*, Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftsbürgertum im Königreich Sachsen im frühen 20. Jahrhundert, in: *Bramke/Heß*, *Sachsen*, S. 319–336; *ders.*, Politischer Liberalismus und Wirtschaftsbürgertum: Zum Aufschwung der sächsischen Liberalen vor 1914, in: *Lässig/Pohl*, S. 101–132; *ders.*, Kommunen, kommunale Wahlen und kommunale Wahlrechtspolitik. Zur Bedeutung der Wahlrechtsfrage für die Kommunen und den deutschen Liberalismus, in: *Lässig/Pohl/Retallack*, S. 89–126; *ders.*, Das sächsische Unternehmertum und der VSI: Ein »moderner Weg« industrieller Interessenvertretung zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts? (Ms.), *ersch. demn.* in: *Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte*; and *ders.*, Power in the City: Liberalism and Local Politics in Dresden and Munich, in: *Retallack*, *Saxony* (in Vorbereitung). It is not clear what is meant when Lässig, *Wahlrechtskampf*, S. 41, identifies a »städtisch-gewerbliches Milieu«.

130 Simone Lässig, Stagnation or Reform? The Political Elites in the Federal States of Wilhelmine Germany, in: *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 17, 1997, S. 195–208, hier: S. 206 f.; vgl. auch *dies.*, »Terror«; *dies.*, *Wahlrechtskampf*; *dies.*, *Wahlrechtskämpfe im Kaiserreich – Lernprozesse, Reformimpulse, Modernisierungsfaktoren: Das Beispiel Sachsen*, in: *NASG* 65, 1995, S. 137–168; *dies.*, *Wahlrechtsreformen in den deutschen Einzelstaaten. Indikatoren für Modernisierungstendenzen und Reformfähigkeit im Kaiserreich?*, in: *Lässig/Pohl/Retallack*, S. 127–169. Every restatement of Lässig's principal argument provides new evidence and new insights.

It is not by accident that the term »partial« appears frequently in these revisionist arguments.¹³¹ It signals that historians on both sides of the question may actually be looking at the same »glass«, which some see as half-full, others as half-empty. Such different perspectives will continue to fuel lively debate, bolstered by the reinterpretation of old sources – for example, memoirs and parliamentary debates – and the discovery of new ones. In pressing these investigations, however, historians would do well to keep in mind the following: First, clarity of definition will be paramount if historians are to move away from the unhelpful commingling of arguments based on concepts of milieus, cleavages, and camps.¹³² Second, historians will need to pay attention to the changing local and regional contexts of political conflict in order to determine when nationalist camps became not just »latent« but real. Third, more attention must be paid to regions of eastern Germany before we understand how »traditional« and »modern« political strategies infused the thinking of leaders within the nationalist camp.¹³³ Fourth, heavily quantitative analysis of elections must be better integrated with qualitative, even anecdotal, evidence. If this is not done, we are unlikely to gain a more nuanced picture of what it actually meant to live, work, campaign, and vote as a member of the nationalist camp. Fifth and lastly, the growing literature on the symbolic meanings of nationalism must be integrated into political culture research more satisfactorily. (See also Section VII below.)

How can this be done? One way may be to consider how larger cultural frameworks and formal rules of political conduct reinforced each other. Here Thomas Kühne has shown the way by suggesting that »electoral culture« (*Wahlkultur*) can reveal how corporatist habits of mind and other hidden meanings influenced the political mentalities that define camps. We might also consider areas of voting behaviour that until recently have not been central to electoral research. Such areas include campaign tactics, coalition-building, strategic non-voting, and protests against electoral chicanery. In any case, historians must press ahead with the task of discerning the »everydayness« of political activity in local and regional contexts.

The inability of scholars to live up to their own claims here is legion. Consider, for example, how Saxon citizens reacted to Sedan Day speeches, which year after year celebrated Germany's military victory over France in 1870 as the defining moment in Germany's odyssey to nationhood. Taking up this question, Alfred Kelly has asked:

»What did the audience *feel*? [...] I don't think we know how to get at that. We don't even know why the audience was there. Some, no doubt, were school children dragged by their teachers; some were attracted by free beer and games; some probably came to flirt. Without modern sound amplification most of them probably didn't hear a word of the speech anyway. [...] I think that what's going on in those crowds is a key to political culture [...]. How do we capture the feelings of people, not just in crowds, but at the voting urn, passing monuments, reading a manifesto, or getting a draft notice?«¹³⁴

131 Vgl. Kühne, *Wahlrecht*, S. 520–522, for the chief objections to the concept of camps.

132 Vgl. z. B.: »The *Bürgertum* [in Saxony] was by no means a homogeneous class; it was an ideological rather than a purely social category, characterised, above all, by a common hostility to socialism [...]; indeed, the term [*Bürgertum*] could apply to non-Marxist workers.« Lapp, *Revolution*, S. 2. This imprecision actually makes it more difficult to prove that Nazis profited disproportionately from the fact that »Saxon burghers [were] deeply fragmented along political, cultural, and class lines« (ebd., S. 225). Such criticism is *not* meant to suggest that Lapp's study is seriously flawed, for it remains an important and in many ways pioneering contribution.

133 Thomas Kühne, *Historische Wahlforschung in der Erweiterung*, in: *Lässig/Pohl/Retallack*, S. 39–67, hier: S. 47; besides echoing Hartmut Boockmann's plea for German history as something more than »rhein-donauländische Heimatkunde«, Kühne explains why a »west-bias« has led to a »democratic bias« in political culture research.

134 Taken from Alfred Kelly's prepared comment on a paper delivered by the reviewer to the annual meeting of the German Studies Association, Chicago, September 1995.

This common-sense critique has been cited because it asks students of political culture to defend their methodology by demonstrating that they can, indeed, penetrate to the level of individual »feelings«. But keeping Kelly's questions in mind also allows us to identify ways in which political culture research on Saxony is already breaking new ground. From newspapers and petitions we are learning why people gathered in public places. From election campaign reports written by local officials we are determining where teachers campaigned on behalf of favoured candidates. From arrest reports written in the wake of suffrage demonstrations we are discovering the age of demonstrators, the wounds they suffered, and the point at which crowds turned unruly and government troops panicked. From company records, church archives, and court transcripts we are learning about everyday resistance to the Nazis on shop-floors, in religious congregations, on theological faculties, and among youth groups.¹³⁵ From government files we are surveying the worries of civil servants charged with the task of determining what proportion of the population should be enfranchised. And from maps showing the location of Bismarck monuments in Saxony and the *Reich*, we are learning to measure the progress of the national idea – both abstractly and in the most concrete terms imaginable.

In the end, one can hope that these investigations will not distract researchers from questions about social-moral milieus, social cleavages, and political camps. Nor will they feed into studies of voting patterns alone. Instead, they will demonstrate that electoral research broadly conceived (»in der Erweiterung«¹³⁶) can help us reassess German political culture on many fronts.

VI. MODERNISATION, EMANCIPATION, DEMOCRACY

To extrapolate the contours of a national political culture from the feelings of individuals is a risky undertaking. What are the potential dangers of making such a bold leap? What are the potential rewards? This section focuses on Saxon studies that explicitly fuse micro- and macro-historical perspectives to examine how the modern world came into being – aiming, in other words, to juxtapose local experiences of modernisation¹³⁷ with what Charles Tilly playfully described as »big structures, large processes, [and] huge comparisons«.¹³⁸ To examine economic transitions to modernity, we will briefly survey some recent work on nineteenth-century Saxon industrialisation. To examine social and cultural transitions, we will consider some new publications on Saxony's Jews and the

135 Hans-Dieter Schmid (Hrsg.), *Zwei Städte unter dem Hakenkreuz. Widerstand und Verweigerung in Hannover und Leipzig 1933–1945*, Leipzig 1994; sadly, the comparative premise of this volume is relegated to a brief summing-up. Vgl. Ulrich Heß, *Leipzig – eine Großstadt im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, and Werner Bramke, *Kommunistischer Widerstand und linkssozialistisches Milieu in Leipzig*, both in: Marlis Buchholz u. a. (Hrsg.), *Nationalsozialismus und Region*, Bielefeld 1996, S. 201–226; Reiner Pommerin (Hrsg.), *Dresden unterm Hakenkreuz*, Köln etc. 1998; for a survey of regional studies of Nazism, see Claus-Christian Szejnmann, *The Missing Pieces are »Coming Home«: Nazism in Central Germany*, in: *German History* 15, 1997, S. 395–410.

136 Kühne, *Wahlforschung*; ders., *Entwicklungstendenzen der preußischen Wahlkultur im Kaiserreich*, in: Ritter, *Wahlen und Wahlkämpfe*, S. 131–167.

137 Sceptics who believe that even a flexible version of modernisation theory is irrelevant to political culture research may revise their view after consulting Peter Steinbach, *Deutungsmuster der historischen Modernisierungstheorie für die Analyse westeuropäischer Wahlen*, in: Otto Büsch/Peter Steinbach (Hrsg.), *Vergleichende europäische Wahlgeschichte*, Berlin 1982, S. 158–246; and Thomas Mergel, *Geht es weiterhin voran? Die Modernisierungstheorie auf dem Weg zu einer Theorie der Moderne*, in: ders./Welskopp, *Geschichte*, S. 203–232.

138 Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*, New York 1984.

rise of political antisemitism in the late nineteenth century. And to examine political transitions we will discuss why Saxon scholars are currently paying so much attention to suffrage struggles in order to consider questions of parliamentarisation and democratisation in larger German and European contexts.¹³⁹

1. Modernisation

Many regional historians are explicitly critical of attempts to write the meta-narrative of Germany's progress toward modernity. Yet there is no necessary contradiction between regional history and the study of modernisation.¹⁴⁰ Although regional historians – like micro-historians – tend to stress modernisation's costs at least as much as its benefits, they do not necessarily turn away from modernisation as a concept or as an heuristic device. Many are perfectly willing to examine modernisation's diverse forms, its constituent dilemmas, and its surface textures. This approach often yields a more »humanist« style of history based on the notion of the individual as an active subject. It also tends to see history as fractured, contradictory, and open to multiple readings. As Richard J. Evans has recently written, the »study of a small community, a single riot, a discrete event, a particular text, a historical family, a personal relationship, or an ordinary individual can often tell us more about the past than the wide-ranging teleologies of the 1960s and 1970s, from Marxism to modernisation theory, ever managed to do«.¹⁴¹

Regional historians can also concentrate attention on questions of identity that arise from the uneven (and sometimes reversible) processes of modernisation.¹⁴² On the one hand this allows them to rediscover cultural traditions, social ways of life, and other specificities among the statistical averages of historical social science.¹⁴³ On the other hand they can often discern hidden rules that underlie the apparent homogeneity of long trends and national patterns. Combining both skills allows regional historians to deploy another paradoxical couplet, »normal exceptionalism«, to bring the typical and the unique closer together.

Stripped of its teleological and normative premises, the concept of modernisation has direct relevance to Saxony's »predicament« in the 1990s, not least because it offers a

139 Vgl. *Peter Steinbach* (Hrsg.), *Probleme politischer Partizipation im Modernisierungsprozeß*, Stuttgart 1982; *Markus Mattmüller*, *Die Durchsetzung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts als gesamt-europäischer Vorgang*, in: *Beate Junker/Peter Gilg/Richard Reich* (Hrsg.), *Geschichte und politische Wissenschaft*, Bern 1975, S. 213–236; *Stefan Immerfall/Peter Steinbach* (Hrsg.), *Historisch-vergleichende Makrosoziologie (= Historical Social Research 20, 1995, H. 2)*; *Thomas Kühne*, *Parlamentarismusgeschichte in Deutschland. Probleme, Erträge und Perspektiven einer Gesamtdarstellung*, in: GG 24, 1998, (im Druck).

140 Vgl. *Rolf Lindner* (Hrsg.), *Die Wiederkehr des Regionalen*, Frankfurt/Main 1994, S. 7.

141 *Richard J. Evans*, *Rituals of Retribution. Capital Punishment in Germany 1600–1987*, Oxford 1996, S. IX. See also the exemplary study by *David Blackbourn*, *Marpingen. Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Bismarckian Germany*, Oxford 1993 (dt. u. d. T.: *Wenn ihr sie seht, fragt wer sie sei. Marienerscheinungen in Marpingen – Aufstieg und Niedergang des deutschen Lourdes*, Reinbek 1997).

142 Vgl. *Rainer Danielzyk/Rainer Krüger*, *Region Ostfriesland? Zum Verhältnis von Alltag, Regionalbewußtsein und Entwicklungsperspektiven in einem strukturschwachen Raum*, in: *Lindner*, S. 91–121; *Peter Steinbach*, *Neue Wege der regionalhistorisch orientierten Alltagsgeschichte*, in: *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte* 30, 1980, S. 312–336.

143 *Hans-Ulrich Wehler*, *Rückblick und Ausblick oder: arbeiten, um überholt zu werden?*, in: *Bielefelder Universitätsgespräche und Vorträge* 6, 1996, S. 8, concedes that German social historians of the 1960s took »half« of Max Weber's teachings and neglected his discussions of cultural traditions, perceptions, mentalities, and Habitus.

means to make the study of history relevant to a younger generation. It seems only natural that Saxons are looking for a home in the newly unified Germany. Yet as noted previously, the enthusiasm for local and regional history in post-1990 Germany has prompted some observers to criticise the reappearance of a kind of romantic parochialism (*Heimattümelei*). This is the same criticism that was levelled originally against historians of everyday life – that they identify too closely with their object of study. In order to avoid the Scylla of traditional sentimentality and the Charybdis of modernist censure, we have to work hard to explore the multiplicity of contingent German paths. Nevertheless, by exploring the diverse ways Saxons have appraised their path to modernity, historians are beginning to show that the »martinets of modernity«¹⁴⁴ were *not* assured of victory in their smaller homelands.

Saxon historical scholarship is also serving to redress what Geoff Eley labelled the »connotative continuum of ›bourgeoisie = liberalism = democracy«.¹⁴⁵ As an »implied causal chain« at the regional level, this continuum remains just that: implied, not proven. To postulate interdependence among the social, economic, cultural, and political components of modernisation should not imply a good fit. Keeping this in mind, historians of Saxony are reconsidering familiar questions about modernisation. Is a highly urbanised and industrialised society necessarily a highly secularised society? Does »more« modernity in one sphere imply »more« modernity in another? Can we even speak of the breakthrough of »the modern« in terms of a national pattern at all? Do patterns of modernisation tend to converge in similar ways at the local, regional, national, and international levels? Do similar paths to modernity imply uniform attitudes and intentions? Do quantum leaps in transportation and communication necessarily lead to a »virtualisation« of territorial allegiances – a virtualisation roughly analogous to the abstraction of time that followed the invention of the mechanical clock? Is a dynastic territory or an economic region more closely identified in the minds of contemporaries with the past or the future? Are »imagined« communities the only kind we find in the modern world?

On the whole, recent scholarship on Saxony has tended to answer these questions with a tentative »no«. But the valence of those answers is less important than the ambiguity of the questions themselves. It is this ambiguity that should be stressed. One should also note that very few recent studies focus squarely on a single person, a single event, or a single locality. On the contrary, many still run in grooves established by »old-fashioned« historical social science. Thus they address issues of power and domination (*Herrschaft*); of social upheaval and economic development; and of social, legal, and political inequality.

Seeing recent Saxon scholarship in these terms suggests that what Helmut Walser Smith recently identified as the »middle ground« between microhistory and structural history still exists.¹⁴⁶ Occupying this middle ground has allowed historians of Saxony to side-step what Jürgen Kocka referred to as the »small-small« premise of microhistory¹⁴⁷, but at the same time avoid the universalising tendencies of historical social science. By observing regional history through telephoto and wide-angle lenses at the same time, they offer the kind of analytical triangulation that brings familiar objects of study into sharper focus.

144 *Blackbourn*, Marpingen, S. 14.

145 *Geoff Eley*, German History and the Contradictions of Modernity: The Bourgeoisie, the State, and the Mastery of Reform, in: *ders.*, Society, S. 67–103, hier: S. 87.

146 *Smith*, Geschichte.

147 *Jürgen Kocka*, Perspektiven für die Sozialgeschichte der neunziger Jahre, in: *Schulze*, Sozialgeschichte, S. 34.

Economic development has always been key to any concept of modernisation. As elsewhere in the historical guild, Saxon economic history is experiencing an ebb tide. No one has surpassed the early work done by Rudolf Forberger (Dresden)¹⁴⁸ and Hubert Kiesewetter (Eichstätt).¹⁴⁹ Forberger was one of the first scholars to examine in detail the manner in which textile production in late eighteenth-century Saxony drove the earliest stages of industrialisation. Forberger presented a picture of regional industrialisation that was not dependent on the massive push-pull influence of railway building, as in Prussia. Kiesewetter shifted the focus of research to the period 1815–1871. Using the incomplete but still important occupational surveys conducted in 1849, 1861 and 1871 allowed Kiesewetter to leave behind problems of Saxony's proto-industrialisation and concentrate on the period when self-sustained growth was actually achieved. Since his monograph appeared in 1988, Kiesewetter has provided further insights on Saxon agrarian reforms from the 1830s to the 1860s, on population movements and social mobility, on the disparity of wages among German regions, and on the economic foundations of nation-building. He has also published surveys of German and European industrialisation in which his knowledge of Saxony frequently illuminates more general problems of development.¹⁵⁰

Many questions about Saxony's economic development nonetheless remain open. Citing just three examples shows the range of issues that merit reconsideration: Hartmut

148 *Rudolf Forberger*, *Die Manufaktur in Sachsen vom Ende des 16. bis zum Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin 1958, insb. S. 286–293; *ders.*, *Die industrielle Revolution in Sachsen 1800 bis 1861*. Bd. 1: *Die Revolution der Produktivkräfte in Sachsen 1800–1830*, 2 T., Berlin 1982; Forberger was hard-pressed to identify »new problems« in: *ders.*, *Zu einigen neuen Problemen der sächsischen Industriegeschichte*, in: *Reiner Groß/Manfred Kobuch* (Hrsg.), *Beiträge zur Archivwissenschaft und Geschichtsforschung*, Weimar 1977, S. 466–476. See also his engagement with Kiesewetter's partially divergent conclusions in *ders.*, *Sachsen als Pionierland der Industriellen Revolution in Deutschland im Spiegel der Fachliteratur*, in: *JbRegG* 14, 1987, S. 243–253. Still useful: *Heinrich Gebauer*, *Die Volkswirtschaft im Königreich Sachsen*, 3 Bde., Dresden 1893. Vgl. auch recent overviews by *Siegfried Gerlach* and *Willi A. Boelcke* in: *Gerlach*, S. 21–76 and S. 127–184.

149 Besides works previously cited, of which the most important is *Kiesewetter*, *Industrialisierung*, vgl. auch *ders.*, *Agrarreform, landwirtschaftliche Produktion und Industrialisierung im Königreich Sachsen 1832–1861*, in: *Fritz Blaiich* (Hrsg.), *Entwicklungsprobleme einer Region*, Berlin 1981, S. 89–137; *ders.*, *Staat und regionale Industrialisierung. Württemberg und Sachsen im 19. Jahrhundert*, in: *ders./Rainer Fremdling* (Hrsg.), *Staat, Region und Industrialisierung, Ostfildern* 1985, S. 108–132; *ders.*, *Regionale Industrialisierung in Deutschland zur Zeit der Reichsgründung. Ein vergleichend-quantitativer Versuch*, in: *VSWG* 73, 1986, S. 38–60; *ders.*, *Erklärungshypothesen zur regionalen Industrialisierung in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert*, in: ebd. 67, 1980, S. 305–333; *ders.*, *Bevölkerungswachstum während der Industrialisierung in Sachsen 1815–1871*, in: *Scripta Mercaturae* 16, 1982, S. 79–108; *ders.*, *Bevölkerung, Erwerbstätige und Landwirtschaft im Königreich Sachsen 1815–1871*, in: *Sidney Pollard* (Hrsg.), *Region und Industrialisierung*, Göttingen 1980, S. 89–106; *ders.*, *Regional Disparities in Wages. The Cotton Industry in Nineteenth-Century Germany – Some Methodological Considerations*, in: *Paul Bairoch/Maurice Lévy-Leboyer* (Hrsg.), *Disparities in Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution*, Basingstoke 1981, S. 248–258; *ders.*, *Regionale Lohn disparitäten und innerdeutsche Wanderungen im Kaiserreich*, in: *Jürgen Bergmann u. a.* (Hrsg.), *Regionen im historischen Vergleich*, Opladen 1989, S. 133–199; *ders.*, *Economic Preconditions for Germany's Nation-Building in the Nineteenth Century*, in: *Hagen Schulze* (Hrsg.), *Nation-Building in Central Europe*, Leamington Spa etc. 1987, S. 81–105; *ders.*, *Region und Nation in der europäischen Industrialisierung 1815 bis 1871*, in: *Helmut Rumpler* (Hrsg.), *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Frage 1815–1866*, Wien etc. 1990, S. 162–185; *ders.*, *Raum und Region*, in: *Gerold Ambrosius u. a.* (Hrsg.), *Moderne Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, München 1996, S. 105–118.

150 *Ders.*, *Industrielle Revolution in Deutschland 1815–1914*, Frankfurt/Main 1989; *ders.*, *Das einzigartige Europa. Zufällige und notwendige Faktoren der Industrialisierung*, Göttingen 1996.

Kaelble (Berlin) has argued that capitalist development in Germany was no more rapid, disruptive, or unbearable than industrialisation in other countries.¹⁵¹ Yet if extreme socio-economic dislocation is considered to be one reason for the appearance of political conflicts and polarised class mentalities, does the Saxon experience still represent the »worst-case scenario« we identified earlier? Hans-Ulrich Wehler has recast his original thesis about the impact of the »great depression« in the 1870s and 1880s, which he now labels a »great deflation«. Thomas Adam's work on Leipzig, however, suggests that Leipzigers experienced neither depression nor deflation in these years. The healthy upward trend in workers' wages and the scope of municipal building projects in Leipzig during the 1880s would seem to substantiate Adam's preliminary conclusions. Adam's work also undermines the long-held impression of Saxony as the classic land of low wages, suggesting instead that we should identify regions of high and low wages *within* Saxony and then set out to determine how these factors influenced labour protest or the »flight from the land«. ¹⁵² Christopher Harvie¹⁵³ and Gary Herrigel (Chicago)¹⁵⁴ have recently stressed the importance of regional factors in the long-term economic modernisation of Germany and Europe. Harvie's thesis is deceptively simple: »relations between political units,« he writes, »have not always been determined by national governments. Regional institutions stand behind the nation, can often intervene in its affairs with considerable effect, and may conceivably survive it.« But Harvie also notes that the concept of region, »once placed centre stage, threatens to invert the hierarchies of conventional history without (so far) putting anything coherent in their place«. Herrigel for his part aims to dismantle two shibboleths of German historiography: the view that the typical path of German industrialisation favoured large firms; and that, where a decentralised industrial order existed at all, it was the result of late industrialisation. Not surprisingly, examples drawn from the Saxon case abound in Herrigel's analysis – without, however, trapping the author into making unspecified and unsupported claims about the manner in which Saxony allegedly »showed the way« or »set the pattern« for German industrialisation.¹⁵⁵

Parallels and divergences between the Saxon and German paths of economic development are also found in the work of two scholars from different corners of the British Commonwealth: Richard J. Bazillion (Winnipeg) and Frank B. Tipton Jr. (Sydney).¹⁵⁶

151 *Hartmut Kaelble*, *Der Mythos von der rapiden Industrialisierung in Deutschland*, in: GG 9, 1983, S. 108–118.

152 *Adam*, *Arbeitermilieu*, S. 57–63. The proportion of employees in Leipzig who earned an average of 15 Marks or more per week rose by some 20 per cent between 1889 and 1896.

153 *Harvie*, *Rise*, makes frequent reference (e.g. S. 63) to cooperation between two »Elbe« states, Saxony and the Czech Republic.

154 *Gary Herrigel*, *Industrial Constructions. The Sources of German Industrial Power*, Cambridge 1996, S. 33–71. Herrigel notes that Kiesewetter and others focused too much on »narrowly economic variables (such as growth, income, consumption, productivity, industrial output, exports, etc.)« and insufficiently on forms and practices of governance, state legitimation, and *Herrschaft* (S. 6, S. 306).

155 *Richard J. Bazillion*, *Modernizing Germany: Karl Biedermann's Career in the Kingdom of Saxony, 1835–1901*, New York 1990, S. 13 f.: »Saxony completed its transition from a handicraft-based economy to an industrialised one between 1830 and 1861, thus [!] serving as a model for unified Germany in the years ahead.« Vgl. *Knut Borchardt*, *Regional Variations in Growth in Germany in the Nineteenth Century with Particular Reference to the West-East Developmental Gradient*, in: *ders.*, *Perspectives on Modern German Economic History and Policy*, Cambridge 1991, S. 30–47, S. 218–221.

156 *Frank B. Tipton Jr.*, *Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany During the Nineteenth Century*, Middletown 1976; vgl. *ders.*, *Technology and Industrial Growth*, in: *Roger Chickering* (Hrsg.), *Imperial Germany. A Historiographical Companion*, Westport 1996, S. 62–96.

Bazillion's many forays into the history of Saxon liberalism all use the concept of modernisation as their point of departure. Secondary themes range from Saxony's entry into the *Zollverein* to urban violence in the 1830s, from Beust's diplomacy in the 1860s to Karl Biedermann's ruminations on the social question in the 1890s.¹⁵⁷ This research agenda is nothing if not ambitious. To his credit, Bazillion avoids the type of chronicle that one encounters so often in Saxon economic history.¹⁵⁸ How many times, after all, must we read the same capsule biography or view the same oil portrait of Chemnitz's leading industrialist, Richard Hartmann?¹⁵⁹ However, much of Bazillion's work is uneven, unfocussed, or outdated.¹⁶⁰ There may indeed be merit, as Bazillion writes, in studying »obscure, dead politicians«. It may also be true that sagacious men are always worth rediscovering. But to build the story of »modernising Germany« around the figure of Karl Biedermann would require one of two things. *Either* it would have to offer a comprehensive study of this not-so-obscure politician, by examining Biedermann's career as an editor, a scholar, a liberal politician – and a *Bürger*.¹⁶¹ To do so would have required extensive research in Saxony's state archive, to which Bazillion paid an »all-too-brief visit« one summer.¹⁶² *Or* it might have taken Biedermann's career as a convenient vehicle to address larger questions about the rise of political liberalism in the 1830s and 1840s, the agonies of the liberal movement in 1848/49, the expansion of the political press, and the rise of Social Democracy in the 1870s. Each of these topics might have been addressed not from the perspective of national politics, where Biedermann's influence was fleeting, but from the perspective of Leipzig and Saxony, where Biedermann's political influence was felt most tangibly.

157 *Richard J. Bazillion*, Urban Violence and the Modernization Process in Pre-March Saxony, 1830–1831 and 1845, in: *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 12, 1985, S. 279–303; *ders.*, Liberalism, Modernization, and the Social Question in the Kingdom of Saxony, 1830–90, in: *Konrad H. Jarausch/Larry Eugene Jones* (Hrsg.), *In Search of a Liberal Germany*, New York 1990, S. 87–110; *ders.*, State Bureaucracy and the Modernization Process in the Kingdom of Saxony, 1830–1861, in: *German History* 13, 1995, S. 304–325; *ders.*, Saxon Liberalism and the German Question in the Wake of the 1848 Revolution, in: *Canadian Journal of History* (CFH) 13, 1980, S. 61–84; *ders.*, A Scholar in Politics in Pre-March Saxony: the Biedermann Case, in: *Societas* 5, 1975, S. 201–217; *ders.*, Social Conflict and Political Protest in Industrializing Saxony, 1840–1860, in: *Histoire sociale/Social History* 17, 1984, S. 79–92.

158 Vgl. contributions by *Herbert Pönicke* and *Richard Dietrich* in: *Herbert Helbig* (Hrsg.), *Führungskräfte der Wirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, 1790–1914*, 2 Tle., Limburg/Lahn 1973/77; ferner *Erich Dittrich* (Hrsg.), *Lebensbilder sächsischer Wirtschaftsführer*, Leipzig 1941; *ders.*, Zur sozialen Herkunft des sächsischen Unternehmertums, in: *NASG* 63, 1942, S. 130–152.

159 Vgl. z. B. *Kurt Ludwig*, Zu Problemen der Konstituierung des Proletariats in Chemnitz um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, dargestellt am Beispiel der Maschinenfabrik Richard Hartmann, in: *Beiträge zur Heimatgeschichte von Karl-Marx-Stadt* H. 24 (1980), S. 5–56.

160 *Bazillion*, *Modernizing Germany*, is based on *ders.*, *Karl Biedermann: The Making of a National Liberal, 1837–1871*, Diss. Madison/Wisconsin 1970.

161 For examples of terrain such investigations might cover, see *Renate Herrmann*, *Gustav Freytag. Bürgerliches Selbstverständnis und preußisch-deutsches Nationalbewußtsein. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des national-liberalen Bürgertums der Reichsgründungszeit*, Diss. Würzburg 1974; *Annette Jekosch*, *Die politische Haltung der »Grenzboten« zum Abschluß der bürgerlichen Umwälzung in Deutschland (1858/59–1866)*, 2 Bde., Diss. PH Dresden 1983; *Ruth Reichert*, *Die Haltung der sächsischen Bourgeoisie zur Arbeiterbewegung in der Zeit von 1868/69 bis 1878 im Spiegel der bürgerlichen Presse*, Diss. Leipzig 1972; *Dietmar Klenke*, *Zwischen nationalkriegerischem Gemeinschaftsideal und bürgerlich-ziviler Modernität. Zum Vereinsnationalismus der Sängere, Schützen und Turner im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, in: *GWU* 45, 1994, S. 207–223; *Biefang*, *Politisches Bürgertum*.

162 *Bazillion*, *Modernizing Germany*, S. XXI.

Bazillion thus falls between two stools. By trying to discuss large questions through Biedermann's own eyes, his biographer never overcomes the handicap that his subject inconveniently left no substantial collection of private papers. Indeed, from Bazillion's accounts one might imagine that Biedermann wrote extensively on few questions other than socialism, and even then mainly in the 1840s and 1890s, not in between. But contrasting any individual's views at the beginning and end of a fifty-year period certainly cannot »illuminate moderate liberalism's mounting hostility toward Germany's largest political party [the SPD] and the ideology it espoused«. Nor can it provide »an indicator of liberalism's philosophical and psychological development over the intervening decades«. ¹⁶³ When Bazillion does venture further afield, too often he oversimplifies complex questions about how and why Saxony »modernised«. Many of these questions – for example, the changing nature of Saxon parliamentarism after 1833¹⁶⁴, or Beust's struggle to reconcile economic ties to Prussia and diplomatic ties to Austria¹⁶⁵ – have been treated more satisfactorily elsewhere. On balance, then, neither Biedermann (the man) nor »modernising Germany« (his times) comes into focus in Bazillion's work.

For a more convincing picture we must turn to the work of Winfried Schulze.¹⁶⁶ Suggesting that Biedermann never fit comfortably within the modernising patterns of his day, Schulze argues that he must be viewed in the overlapping contexts that defined his life and political engagement – the contexts provided by his origins (humble), his upbringing (dependent on patrons known and rumoured)¹⁶⁷, his education (»aesthetic-philosophical«), his city (Leipzig), his state (Saxony; in exile: Weimar), his class (*Bildungsbürgertum*), his profession (professor, historian, publicist, parliamentarian), his public persona (awkward), and his party (liberal, later National Liberal). Viewed from these perspectives, both Biedermann and the Germany in which he lived defy easy categorisation. As Schulze has written: »Biedermann cannot be fit into any of the usual referential systems current in his day; he presents us, as he did his contemporaries, with a confusing collection of politically progressive ideas, which made it difficult for him to find a home in any one of the existing political groupings.«

163 *Ders.*, A German Liberal's Changing Perspective on the Social Question: Karl Biedermann in the 1840's and 1890's, in: *Laurentian University Review* 5, 1973, S. 67–81, hier: S. 67, S. 69.

164 Contrast the work of *Flügel*, discussed previously, with *Bazillion*, *Saxon Liberalism*, S. 66.

165 Empathizing with his Saxon protagonist Biedermann, Bazillion criticises Beust because he »refused to concede that political integration within the boundaries of the Customs Union was [...] inevitable«; *Richard J. Bazillion*, *Economic Integration and Political Sovereignty: Saxony and the Zollverein, 1834–1877*, in: *CJH* 25, 1990, S. 189–213, hier: S. 201. A very different view is presented in *Bazillion*, *Liberalism in Saxony*, S. 99. Vgl. auch *Wilhelm Thieme*, *Eintritt Sachsens in den Zollverein und seine wirtschaftlichen Folgen*, Diss. Leipzig 1914; *Helmut Rumpler*, *Die deutsche Politik des Freiherrn von Beust 1849–50*, Wien 1972; *Sabine Weinert*, *Wesentliche Gesichtspunkte der sächsischen Außenpolitik gegenüber Preußen in den 60er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Diplomarbeit PH Dresden 1983; *Hans-Heinz Thumann*, *Beusts Plan zur Reform des Deutschen Bundes vom 15. Oktober 1861*, in: *NASG* 46, 1925, S. 46–77; *Hans A. Schmitt*, *Count Beust and Germany, 1866–70: Reconquest, Realignment, or Resignation?*, in: *CEH* 1, 1968, S. 20–34.

166 *Winfried Schulze*, *Karl Friedrich Biedermann, Eine Studie zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft, Publizistik und Politik im deutschen Vormärz*, in: *Dietrich Kurze* (Hrsg.), *Aus Theorie und Praxis der Geschichtswissenschaft*, Berlin 1972, S. 299–326, for the following citations, S. 302, and S. 322.

167 See *Bazillion*, *Modernizing Germany*, S. 63–69, S. 135. Robert von Mohl hinted that the bastard Biedermann was Beust's natural half-brother; King Johann of Saxony believed this to be fact.

2. Emancipation

The theme of emancipation infuses virtually all aspects of Saxon historiography. In this section we take up this theme, first, by surveying recent work on Catholics, Sorbs, and Jews in Saxony. As we shall see, it is difficult to speak of breakthroughs toward a »culture of rights« benefiting any of these minorities.¹⁶⁸ Historians have so far tended to concentrate their attention on the backlash created by attempts to augment the rights of these groups. We also consider possible starting points – there are not many – for historians interested in taking up questions of gender and sexuality in Saxon history. This section would be the appropriate place to survey the vast body of work on Saxony's labour movement. But limits of space preclude this. Only a general observation can be offered about the wisdom of pushing ahead with further research in what might appear to be a distinctly over-developed field. As noted in the previous section of this review, the Social Democratic Party in Saxony has been intensively researched. Yet the other pillars of the labour movement – trade unions, the press, co-operatives and cultural associations – have suffered relative neglect. Much of the work published by East German historians prior to 1989 is doctrinaire. It would be wrong, however, to imagine that none of this work retains any value for researchers today. If we substitute the term »emancipatory« when we read about the »revolutionary« Social Democratic movement in standard GDR accounts; if we consider research that never reached the threshold of orthodoxy demanded by the SED and hence was never published; and if we examine the countless studies of local SPD associations in Saxon towns, we discover riches that should not be dismissed lightly.

Saxon historiography has yet to profit from renewed scholarly attention to the role of religion in modern society. But it stands ready to do so. For there is no reason that questions subsumed under the rubric of »everyday religion« cannot also be addressed via Saxon studies. Such issues as popular piety, ethnic conflicts, and patterns of Jewish and Gentile embourgeoisement (*Verbürgerlichung*) are clearly relevant here. As Beust noted long ago in his memoirs, religion had a powerful effect on popular sensibilities even in overwhelmingly Protestant Saxony:¹⁶⁹ »There are two words that cannot be uttered without causing a Saxon to become greatly agitated: Jesuit and Jew.«¹⁷⁰

On the rare occasions when Protestant-Catholic conflicts in Saxony are discussed at all in the literature, the issue is usually considered under one of four headings. Most commonly, notice is taken of the anomaly that Saxony's Protestant population owed allegiance to a dynasty that had converted to Catholicism in the eighteenth century in order to secure the Polish crown. One of the more important aspects of this relationship has been noted by those who ascribe the high level of religious toleration in Saxony to the fact that bourgeois state ministers stood atop the Protestant church hierarchy. Hartmut Zwahr, second, has studied the Catholic Sorb minority in Upper Lusatia and its

168 Vgl. *Pierre Birnbaum/Ira Katznelson* (Hrsg.), *Paths of Emancipation. Jews, States, and Citizenship*, Princeton 1995; *Manfred Berg/Martin Geyer*, *The Culture of Rights: Civil Rights, Participation Rights, and Social Rights in Germany and the United States from the Late 19th Century to the Present*. Conference of the German Historical Institute, Washington D.C., June 11–14, 1997, in: *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C.* 21, 1997, S. 14–17.

169 Besides data provided by Saxony's Royal Statistical Office, see *Erich Berger*, *Das nationale und konfessionelle Gefüge der Bevölkerung im Königreich Sachsen*, Halle 1912.

170 *Friedrich Ferdinand Graf von Beust*, *Aus drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten. Erinnerungen und Aufzeichnungen*, 2 Bde., Stuttgart 1887, Bd. 1, S. 178. Beust continued: »Actual experience provides proof of this. It was not very long ago that Jews in Saxony were forbidden from entering certain cities, especially the mining towns. One did not believe it possible that a Jew could walk by a specimen of ore without pocketing it. And for us the Jesuit was the devil incarnate.«

struggle for emancipation. Third, the prominent place of German Catholics (*Deutschkatholiken*) among Saxony's democratic movement has long been known.¹⁷¹ Here the violence and bloodshed associated with the *Leipziger Gemetzel* (August 1845), in which eight Saxons fell to government bullets, is correctly seen in two ways: as the spilling-over of tensions aroused elsewhere in Germany during the Catholic revival of the 1840s, and as the first step toward the consolidation of a liberal-democratic opposition in Saxony.¹⁷² The proportion of German Catholics among members of Saxony's Progressive Party remained very high in the 1860s. The fourth circumstance in which confessional tension in Saxony is cited brings to mind the famous Sherlock Holmes story about »the dog that didn't bark in the night«. Here the lack of a Catholic milieu is assumed to have pitted the socialist and nationalist camps more squarely against each other in Saxony than elsewhere.¹⁷³ Historians have displayed the same dubious logic in noting the absence of a strong left-liberal tradition in Saxony.¹⁷⁴

Space does not permit further elaboration on these points. Once again, though, there is reason to believe that Saxony will provide fertile territory for historians studying the role of religious conflicts on local and regional political cultures. One hopes that the *Alltag* of anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish sentiment identified by Beust will be explored for Saxony as it is for other German regions – for example, with reference to school policies.¹⁷⁵ It may even be possible to investigate the complex electoral coalition-building that involved Protestants, Catholics, and antisemites in some Saxon districts. Here one might observe that the only Saxon constituency that did not fall to the SPD in 1903 was the constituency of Bautzen in the south-east, where Catholics made up 8.9 per cent of the population. In this *Wahlkreis* a Centre Party candidate participated actively in the 1903 *Reichstag* campaign that resulted in the victory of an antisemitic German Reform Party candidate.¹⁷⁶ This double anomaly was only the tip of the iceberg upon which the nation-

171 The starting point is *Günter Kolbe*, *Demokratische Opposition in religiösem Gewande und anti-kirchliche Bewegung im Königreich Sachsen*, 2 Bde., Diss. Leipzig 1964. Robert Blum and Franz Wigard were among the staunchest defenders of German Catholicism in Saxony. I have not yet been able to consult *Hans-Eckhard Dannenberg*, *Publizistik und Parteibildung bei Robert Blum*, Diss. Hannover 1991, but see *ders.*, Robert Blum und die Leipziger Unruhen, in: *Maiaufstand*, S. 18; for contemporary views vgl. *Josef Gabriel Findel*, *Der Deutschkatholizismus in Sachsen. Ein Menetekel für das deutsche Bürgertum*, Leipzig 1895; and *Karl Biedermann*, *Deutsche Volks- und Kulturgeschichte*, 4. Aufl., Wiesbaden 1901, insb. S. 238 ff. with its strong anti-Catholic subtext.

172 *Zwahr*, *Revolutionen*, S. 109 f., S. 160–163; *Bazillion*, *Modernizing Germany*, S. 105–108.

173 Vgl. z. B. *Lapp*, *Revolution*, S. 1: »The antagonism between Left and Right was compounded by the confessional makeup of the state; the largely Protestant Saxony lacked a Center party which might have otherwise acted as a mediating force, as it did in Prussia.«

174 A large gap in Kaiserreich historiography will soon be filled by *Alastair P. Thompson*, *The Strange Survival of German Liberalism. Left Liberals, the State and Popular Politics in Wilhelmine Germany* (in Vorbereitung).

175 *Johannes Georgi*, *Die politischen und geistigen Kämpfe um die sächsische Volksschulgesetzgebung von 1830–1873*, Emsdetten 1931; *Jakob Kral*, *Die katholischen Kirchen und Schulen im Königreich Sachsen*, Dresden 1876; *Julius Richter*, *Geschichte der sächsischen Volksschule*, Berlin 1930; *Otto Uhlig*, *Die Volksschule. Eine Materialsammlung zur Schulreform*, hrsg. v. Landesverband der SPD Sachsens, Dresden 1913; *Werner Lesanovsky*, *Die bildungspolitische Tätigkeit der sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im sächsischen Landtag von 1877 bis 1890*, Diss. PH Zwickau 1976; *Cornelia Krolík*, *Zu ausgewählten Problemen des Wirkens August Bebels im Sächsischen Landtag in den Jahren 1885–1888*, Diplomarbeit PH Dresden 1990, S. 39 ff.; *Burkhard Poste*, *Schulreform in Sachsen 1918–1923. Eine vergessene Tradition deutscher Schulgeschichte*, Frankfurt/Main 1993; *ders.*, *Von der Volks- zur Einheitsschule. Demokratisch-sozialistische Schulreform in Sachsen 1918–1923*, in: *Grebing/Mommsen/Rudolph*, S. 226–236; *Heidenreich*, *Arbeiterkulturbewegung*, S. 179–203.

176 Vgl. *Berger*, *Gefüge*, Karte III (1905).

alist parties foundered in 1903, however, as they admitted themselves. A close reading of their reactions to electoral defeat suggests the powerful effect of religion in bundling together resentments found in a variety of milieus. Among the factors identified for the defeat of the nationalist forces were popular resentment against the Wettin dynasty due to its public relations mishandling of Prinz Max's activities as an ordained priest and the Crown Princess's divorce from her husband.¹⁷⁷

At least one Protestant Conservative in Saxony believed that to focus on the Catholic threat was to ignore an immeasurably greater danger facing Christian believers.¹⁷⁸ Like so many of his Conservative Party comrades, Baron Heinrich von Friesen-Rötha was no friend of Catholics. But in a literary and political career spanning more than two decades, Friesen was unrelenting in his attempt to focus attention on the »Jewish problem«. ¹⁷⁹ In 1900 he warned against what he believed to be a dramatic increase in Jewish immigration into Saxony. As he wrote in a political broadside addressed to the »Evangelischer Bund« (Protestant League), Jews »appear to have mistaken our smaller fatherland of Saxony for the promised land of Canaan, and the Elbe for the Red Sea«. Strong evidence suggests that Friesen's extreme antisemitic views were anything but anomalous among Saxon conservatives.¹⁸⁰

In Section III we saw that the Saxon government did not score high marks for its toleration policies between 1763 and 1832. By the end of the nineteenth century, much had changed in the situation of Saxony's Jews, both objectively and subjectively. The number of Jews living in Saxony had risen dramatically, from about 850 in 1834 to about 14,700 in 1905. And whereas these Jews were still concentrated in Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz, their country of origin was increasingly eastern Europe.¹⁸¹ To understand these changes we have had to rely too long on Adolf Diamant's chronicles of local Jewish communities¹⁸² and on occasional biographical sketches of leading Jews within the

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- 177 Non-scholarly accounts include *Prinz Ernst Heinrich von Sachsen*, *Mein Lebensweg vom Königsschloß zum Bauernhof*, Dresden etc. 1995, S. 43–55; *Luise von Toscana*, *Mein Lebensweg*, ND Dresden 1994; *Walter Fellmann*, *Prinzessinnen. Glanz, Einsamkeit und Skandale am sächsischen Hof*, Leipzig 1996, S. 206–252; *ders.*, *Sachsens letzter König, Friedrich August III.*, Berlin etc. 1992, S. 41–72. See also *Helmut Walser Smith*, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, Princeton 1995, S. 99, S. 222.
- 178 For the following, see *Heinrich Freiherr von Friesen-Rötha*, *Ueber die Notwendigkeit des Zusammenwirkens der kirchlichen und der staatlichen Factoren auf dem ethisch-socialen Gebiete*, Rötha o.D. [1886], S. 15; *ders.*, *Ein Glaubensbekenntniß welches auch »Ernste Gedanken« enthält*, Leipzig o.D. [1890]; *ders.*, *Antwort an den evangelischen Bund in Sachsen auf dessen Zugschrift*, Rötha o.D. [1900], zit. S. 4–6; *ders.*, *Ein Bekenntniß*, Dresden, o.D. [1901]; *ders.*, *Schwert und Pflug*, T. 1, Berlin 1907.
- 179 After rallying Leipzig Conservatives out of their political lethargy in the mid-1870s, Friesen financed and contributed to some of Saxony's most scurrilous antisemitic newspapers in the 1880s. He grabbed national headlines in 1891–92 by proposing that the Conservative Party adopt an antisemitic program.
- 180 Vgl. *Konservativer Landesverein im Königreich Sachsen* (Hrsg.), *Die Konservativen im Kampfe gegen die Übermacht des Judentums und für die Erhaltung des Mittelstandes*, Leipzig 1892; *Carl Paul Mehnert*, *Wider das Actienwesen*, Dresden 1877, insb. S. 16 f.; *Talmi-Antisemitismus. Von einem zielbewußten Antisemiten*, Großenhain 1895, S. 5; *James Retallack*, *Anti-Socialism and Electoral Politics in Regional Perspective: The Kingdom of Saxony*, in: *Jones/Retallack*, *Elections*, S. 49–91.
- 181 *Alphonse Levy*, *Geschichte der Juden in Sachsen*, Berlin 1900; *Bruno Blau*, *Die Entwicklung der Juedischen Bevölkerung in Deutschland von 1800 bis 1945* (Ms.), New York o.D. [1950], S. 181–196. *Jacob Segall*, *Die Juden im Königreich Sachsen von 1832 bis 1910*, in: *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden* 10, 1914, H. 3, S. 33–46.
- 182 *Adolf Diamant*, *Chronik der Juden in Chemnitz, heute Karl-Marx-Stadt. Aufstieg und Untergang einer jüdischen Gemeinde in Sachsen*, Frankfurt/Main 1970; *ders.*, *Zur Chronik der Juden in Zwickau. Dem Gedenken einer kleinen jüdischen Gemeinde in Sachsen*, Frankfurt/Main 1971;

Saxon SPD.¹⁸³ Only recently have historians begun to sketch in other dimensions of the Jewish experience in nineteenth-century Saxony. Two significant advances are found in a richly illustrated volume from the Society for Christian-Jewish Co-operation in Dresden, and a special issue of »Dresdner Hefte« on Dresden's Jews.¹⁸⁴

In these works, attention still falls disproportionately on Jews in business, the professions, and the arts. A more general analysis of the Jews' partial emancipation in 1837 is provided by Simone Lässig. Lässig argues that Saxony's Jews effectively leaped from the middle ages into modern times in 1837, when the Saxon government first permitted the founding of Jewish congregations in Leipzig and Dresden and the purchase of land for the construction of synagogues and schools.¹⁸⁵ Further ordinances in 1849 foresaw full Jewish emancipation. But it was not until 1869 that Jews in Saxony (and elsewhere in the North German Confederation) were actually awarded equal civil rights. These latter stages in the emancipation process have received less attention from Saxon historians than they have from other scholars.¹⁸⁶ Nor are we particularly well-informed about

ders., Chronik der Juden in Dresden. Von den ersten Juden bis zur Blüte der Gemeinde und deren Ausrottung, Darmstadt 1973; *ders.*, Chronik der Juden in Leipzig. Aufstieg, Vernichtung und Neuanfang, Chemnitz 1993; these self-described »chronicles« are very weak analytically. As its publication date would suggest, *Johannes Georg Hartenstein*, Die Juden in der Geschichte Leipzigs, Berlin 1938, is highly tendentious.

- 183 Vgl. z. B. *Mike Schmeitzner*, Georg Gradnauer und die Begründung des Freistaates Sachsen 1918–1920. Parlamentarisierung und Demokratisierung der sächsischen Revolution, in: *Aurig u. a.*, S. 249–270.
- 184 *Dresdner Hefte* 14, 1996, H. 45, Themenheft: Zwischen Integration und Vernichtung: Jüdisches Leben in Dresden im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (zit. als: Integration); *Gesellschaft für Christlich-Jüdische Zusammenarbeit Dresden e. V.*, Juden in Sachsen. Ihr Leben und Leiden, Leipzig 1994. The latter volume sprang from an exhibit of the same name, sponsored by the Dresdner Arbeitskreis »Begegnung mit dem Judentum«, which opened in Dresden's Kreuzkirche in October 1988.
- 185 *Simone Lässig*, Von Mittelalter in die Moderne? Anfänge der Emanzipation der Juden in Sachsen, in: *Integration*, S. 9–18; vgl. *Ingrid Kirsch*, Das Ringen um die rechtliche Gleichstellung der Dresdner Juden von 1830–1871, in: ebd., S. 19–26; *Heidrun Laudel*, Die Synagoge in Dresden – ein früher jüdischer Kultbau des 19. Jahrhunderts erbaut von Gottfried Semper, in: ebd., S. 27–36; and *Rudolf Muhs*, Verfassungsgebung und Judenfrage, in: *Dresdner Hefte* 8, 1991, H. 26, S. 31–35.
- 186 *James F. Harris*, The People Speak! Anti-Semitism and Emancipation in Nineteenth-Century Bavaria, Ann Arbor 1994; *Helmut Walser Smith*, Alltag und politischer Antisemitismus in Baden 1890–1900, in: *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 141, 1993, S. 280–303; *ders.*, Religion and Conflict: Protestants, Catholics, and Anti-Semitism in the State of Baden in the Era of Wilhelm II, in: *CEH* 27, 1994, S. 283–314; *Till van Rahden*, Juden und andere Breslauer. Die Beziehungen zwischen Juden und Nichtjuden in einer deutschen Großstadt 1870–1923 (Dissertationsprojekt Bielefeld); *Rainer Erb/Werner Bergmann*, Die Nachtseite der Judenemanzipation. Der Widerstand gegen die Integration der Juden in Deutschland 1780–1860, Berlin 1989. Yet vgl. *Simone Lässig*, Regionale Spezifika und grenzüberschreitende Beziehungsgeflechte. Juden in Böhmen und Sachsen am Beginn des Emanzipationsprozesses, in: *Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte* 130, 1994, S. 111–141; *dies.*, Juden und Mäzenatentum in Deutschland. Religiöses Ethos, kompensierendes Minderheitsverhalten oder genuine Bürgerlichkeit?, in: *ZfG* 46, 1998, S. 211–236; *dies.*, Emancipation and Cultural Embourgeoisement: Jews and the State in Saxony and Anhalt-Dessau, in: *Retallack*, Saxony (in Vorbereitung); *Hugo Jensch*, Juden in Pirna, in: *Integration*, S. 85–90. Jensch's essay is based on a larger unpublished Ms. Other recent studies illustrate the kind of analysis that might be extended to Saxony: *Inge Schlotzhauer*, Ideologie und Organisation des politischen Antisemitismus in Frankfurt am Main 1880–1914, Frankfurt/Main 1989; *Karl Friedrich Watermann*, Politischer Konservatismus und Antisemitismus in Minden-Ravensberg 1879–1914, in: *Mitteilungen des Mindener Geschichtsvereins* 52, 1980, S. 11–64; *Anthony Kauders*, German Politics and the Jews: Düsseldorf and Nuremberg, 1910–1933, Oxford 1996; *David Feldman*, Englishmen and Jews. Social Relations and Political Culture, 1840–1914, New Haven 1994.

the fate of Saxony's Jews in the Third Reich.¹⁸⁷ It is not until we reach the GDR period and post-unification Germany that we again find any significant attention to Saxon Jewry.¹⁸⁸ One can hope that the publication of new memoirs¹⁸⁹ and archival guides¹⁹⁰, together with increasing public interest¹⁹¹, will continue to drive new research on this front.

The historian of Saxon antisemitism will also have to consider whether the Saxon government deserved its reputation as »the chief agent of political anti-Semitism in the kingdom«.¹⁹² This judgement cannot be substantiated without considering the role of Saxony's semi-official press, the intent of government legislation that restricted Jewish immigration, and official discrimination against the cultural practices of Jews already living there. It cannot have been coincidental that the Saxon government's decision to ban kosher slaughtering came into effect (1. October 1892) at the very peak of a short-term wave of antisemitic agitation. Ten years later, a contributor to »Der Israelite« believed that Saxony stood alone among German states in its hostility to the Jews:

»From the Jewish standpoint, unfortunately, nothing very positive can be said about the government of King Albert [1873–1902]. In no other land is a coarse antisemitism thriving as strongly as in Saxony, and in no other land are so many complaints raised about the police state and the administration of justice as in Saxony [...]. Despite [civil emancipation in 1869], which was constitutionally approved and to which the King of Saxony swore compliance, a host of rights are reserved for [non-Jewish] religious dissidents who do not belong to the state church. It has been many decades since the last Jewish judge was appointed in the Kingdom of Saxony.«¹⁹³

Such perceptions of acute persecution by the state must be considered in the context of the Jews' actual role in economic and political life. But existing accounts offer little guidance as to how to weigh such factors. Until recently they have been just as silent about the subjective experiences of Jews as about the attitudes of the state to which they looked for support.

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- 187 I have not yet been able to consult *Solvejg Höppner/Manfred Jahn*, *Jüdische Vereine und Organisationen in Chemnitz, Dresden und Leipzig 1918–1933*, 1998 (im Druck), or *Roland Otto*, *Die Verfolgung der Juden in Görlitz unter der faschistischen Diktatur 1933–1945*, Görlitz 1990. Vgl. u. a. *Nora Goldenbogen*, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Dresden nach 1938 – ein Überblick*, in: *Integration*, S. 76–84; *Simone Lässig*, *Nationalsozialistische »Judenpolitik« und jüdische Selbstbehauptung vor dem Novemberpogrom. Das Beispiel der Dresdner Bankiersfamilie Arnhold*, in: *Pommerin*, Dresden, S. 129–191.
- 188 Vgl. u. a. *Robin Ostow*, *Jews in Contemporary East Germany*, Basingstoke 1989; *Adolf Diamant*, *Materialien zur Geschichte der Juden in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, Frankfurt/Main 1984.
- 189 Vgl. z. B. *Helmut Eschwege*, *Fremd unter meinesgleichen. Erinnerungen eines Dresdner Juden*, Berlin 1991; *Victor Klemperer*, *Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten. Tagebücher 1933–1945*, hrsg. v. *Walter Nowojcki*, 2 Bde., Berlin 1995; vgl. *Günter Jäckel*, *Victor Klemperers Botschaften vom Tage (Januar 1933 bis Dezember 1945)*, in: *Integration*, S. 2–8.
- 190 *Rena R. Auerbach* (Hrsg.), *The »Jewish Question« in German-Speaking Countries, 1848–1914. A Bibliography*, New York etc. 1994; *Stefi Jersch-Wenzel/Reinhard Rürup* (Hrsg.), *Quellen zur Geschichte der Juden in den Archiven der neuen Bundesländer. Eine Bestandsübersicht*, Bd. 1, bearb. v. *Andreas Reinke/Barbara Streng*, München 1995.
- 191 See the magnificent reproductions in *Klaus Arlt u. a. [Texte]/Constantin Beyer u. a. [Fotografien]*, *Zeugnisse Jüdischer Kultur. Erinnerungsstätten in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Berlin, Sachsen-Anhalt, Sachsen und Thüringen*, Berlin 1992 (S. 213–254 on Saxony, for which most articles were written by *Wolfgang Madai*). English readers will profit from *Hermann Kurthen u. a.* (Hrsg.), *Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany after Unification*, New York 1997.
- 192 *Richard S. Levy*, *The Downfall of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties in Imperial Germany*, New Haven 1975, S. 95.
- 193 *Der Israelite*, Ausgabe vom 23. 6. 1902, cited in *Diamant*, Leipzig, S. 129; vgl. ebd., S. 127 f., for unsuccessful Jewish protests in 1892.

Of recent studies that explore antisemitism through language, literature, and satirical cartoons¹⁹⁴, none has focused on the Saxon case, despite the copious printed materials available in Saxon libraries. This relative neglect is all the more surprising because more than twenty years ago Richard S. Levy (Illinois) provided preliminary evidence about Saxony's role as a proving ground for many of the most influential politicians and publicists within the German antisemitic movement. In a way that recalls Frank Tipton's use of Saxony to demonstrate why regional disparities were *not* »ironed out« during German economic development, Levy illustrated the range of factors that determined whether antisemitic appeals did or did not resonate locally.

Since Levy's book appeared, studies of German antisemitism have often alluded to, but never investigated in detail, the role of Saxon antisemites in shaping the national movement.¹⁹⁵ With a few recent exceptions¹⁹⁶, historians have not attempted to disaggregate information about the state-wide antisemitic movement. This neglect is especially galling for the 1870s and 1880s, when Saxon antisemites, not unlike Saxon Social Democrats, achieved their breakthrough. Just as August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht made Saxony their early »lobbying grounds«, and just as the liberals Friedrich Naumann and Gustav Stresemann used Saxony as springboards for national careers, a long list of antisemitic leaders perfected their agitational techniques and their rhetoric in Saxony. These leaders include Theodor Fritsch, Diederich Hahn, Max Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Alexander Pinkert, Ernst Schmeitzner, and Oswald Zimmermann. It was no accident that Dresden was chosen as the venue for the first international Anti-Jewish Congress in September 1882, nor that the second congress was held in Chemnitz the following year. Dresden was the first German metropolis whose municipal council was dominated by an overtly antisemitic faction, and Chemnitz proved to be particularly fertile ground for the recruitment of master artisans and tradesmen. The University of Leipzig was more thoroughly imbued with antisemitic sentiment in the early 1880s than any other university (with the possible exception of Berlin and Breslau).¹⁹⁷ Many of the most important antisemitic presses were established in Leipzig, Dresden, or Chemnitz, and several prominent Conservative publicists completed their journalistic apprenticeship in Saxony.¹⁹⁸ As elsewhere in Germany, these men identified and tried to correct the lia-

194 For an excellent overview see *Till van Rahden*, *Ideologie und Gewalt. Neuerscheinungen über den Antisemitismus in der deutschen Geschichte des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert*, in: NPL 41, 1996, S. 11–29; the grotesque »Politischer Bilderbogen« originated with Max Brewer, who lived in Laubegast near Dresden from 1891 to 1921, vgl. *Juden in Sachsen*, S. 19–20; *John C. G. Röhl*, *Kaiser Wilhelm II and German Anti-Semitism*, in: *ders.*, *The Kaiser and his Court*, Cambridge 1994, S. 190–197; *Till van Rahden*, *Von der Idee zur Praxis. Zum Verhältnis von Sprechen und Handeln im Breslauer Antisemitismus des Kaiserreichs*, in: ÖZG 9, 1998 (im Druck).

195 Vgl. u. a. *Rosemarie Leuschen-Seppel*, *Sozialdemokratie und Antisemitismus im Kaiserreich*, Bonn 1978; *Peter J. Pulzer*, *The Rise of Political Antisemitism in Germany and Austria*, 2. Aufl., Cambridge/Mass. 1988, S. 98–101; *Robert Gellately*, *The Politics of Economic Despair*, London 1974; *Dieter Fricke*, *Antisemitische Parteien 1879–1894*, in: *ders. u. a.*, *Lexikon*, Bd. 1, S. 77–88.

196 *Gerald Kolditz*, *Zur Entwicklung des Antisemitismus in Dresden während des Kaiserreichs*, in: *Integration*, S. 37–45; *Nonn*, *Hintergründe*; *Thomas Kühne*, *Der politische Antisemitismus in Leipzig 1880–1914* (Projekt Magisterarbeit Leipzig).

197 *Notker Hammerstein*, *Antisemitismus und deutsche Universitäten 1871–1933*, Frankfurt/Main etc. 1995, is of little help. A narrow institutional focus is also found in *Siegfried Hoyer*, *Universitätsreform in sächsischen Farben? Zur Diskussion an der Leipziger Universität vor dem 1. Weltkrieg*, in: *John/Matzerath*, S. 627–638.

198 So z. B. *Dietrich von Oertzen*, *Eduard von Ungern-Sternberg*, and *Georg Oertel*. Other shadowy figures active in Saxony include *Ottomar Beta*, *Max Brewer*, *Gustav Hartwig*, *Hermann Lucko*, *Heinrich Pudor*, *Julius Reichardt*, *Ernst Schmeitzner*, and *Eduard Ulrich*. A sampling of the literature includes *Malcolm B. Brown*, *Friedrich Nietzsche und sein Verleger Ernst Schmeitzner*,

bilities of elitist politics.¹⁹⁹ But it would be unwise to say they simply took over where *Honoratiorenpolitik* left off. The symbiosis between political insiders and outsiders was much more complex than that. A brief profile of Fritsch has recently been published²⁰⁰, and a longer one has been promised by Richard Levy. What requires further attention is the mix of personal and political motives that induced Saxon *Mittelständler* to join one of the groups catering to Saxon antisemites – and not another.

The theme of emancipation in Saxon historiography is nowhere more grossly underdeveloped than with reference to gender.²⁰¹ Historians have identified many instances in Saxon history where prominent women played key roles; invariably they pause to mention Louise Otto Peters and Rosa Luxemburg.²⁰² We also have basic information about the proportion of women within the Saxon SPD. Constituting just 7.5 per cent of party membership before 1908, female membership reached about 20 per cent before 1914.²⁰³ Social historians of particular industrial branches have occasionally considered women's experiences in the workplace.²⁰⁴ Yet even now, Saxony's *Frauenalltag* has been explored only narrowly, mainly with reference to working-class experiences in Leipzig and Upper Lusatia. Otherwise there are few signs that scholars are generalising outward from the findings of Michèle Schubert (Leipzig)²⁰⁵ and Jean Quataert (Binghamton/New York).²⁰⁶

Frankfurt/Main 1987; *Eduard Ulrich*, Staatserhaltende Demagogie und staatsgefährdende Leisetreterei, Dresden 1893; [*Heinrich Pudor*], Dr. Heinrich Pudor, ein Vorkämpfer des Deutschtums und des Antisemitismus, Leipzig 1934.

- 199 Vgl. *Dieter Fricke*, Die Organisation der antisemitischen Deutschsozialen Reformpartei 1894 bis 1900, in: *ZfG* 29, 1981, S. 427–442; on Ludwig Fahrenbach and Theodor Fritsch, see *Dirk Stegmann*, Vom Neokonservatismus zum Proto-Faschismus. Konservative Partei, Vereine und Verbände 1893–1920, in: *ders. u. a.* (Hrsg.), *Deutscher Konservatismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Bonn 1983, S. 199–230, insb. S. 207.
- 200 *Andreas Herzog*, Das schwärzeste Kapitel der Buchstadt vor 1933. Theodor Fritsch, der »Altmeister der Bewegung«, wirkte in Leipzig, in: *Leipziger Blätter* H. 30 (1997), S. 56–59; vgl. *Moshe Zimmermann*, Two Generations in the History of German Antisemitism: The Letters of Theodor Fritsch to Wilhelm Marr, in: *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 23, 1978, S. 89–99.
- 201 Vgl. *Susanne Schötz*, Historische Frauenforschung in Ostdeutschland, in: *Konrad H. Jarausch/Matthias Middell* (Hrsg.), *Nach dem Erdbeben. (Re-)Konstruktion ostdeutscher Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft*, Leipzig 1994, S. 177–194.
- 202 Vgl. *Friderun Bodeit* (Hrsg.), *Ich muß mich ganz hingeben können. Frauen in Leipzig*, Leipzig 1990; *Gerlinde Kämmerer/Anett Pilz* (Hrsg.), *Leipziger Frauengeschichten. Ein historischer Stadtrundgang*, Leipzig 1995; vgl. *Sonja Brentjes/Karl-Heinz Schlote*, Zum Frauenstudium an der Universität Leipzig in der Zeit von 1870 bis 1910, in: *JbRegG* 19, 1993/94, S. 57–75. The gendered dimension of Saxon associational life cries out for analysis in the manner of *Roger Chickering*, Casting their Gaze More Broadly. Women's Patriotic Activism in Imperial Germany, in: *Past & Present* Bd. 118 (1988), S. 156–185; and *Jean Quataert*, German Patriotic Women's Work in War and Peace Time, 1864–90, in: *Stig Förster/Jörg Nagler* (Hrsg.), *On the Road to Total War*, Cambridge 1997, S. 449–477.
- 203 *Rudolph*, *Sozialdemokratie*, S. 65. This increase becomes even more significant when one considers that roughly one of every two party members in 1914 (177,659 members) had joined the Saxon SPD in the previous four years; party membership totalled just 25,500 in 1901.
- 204 Vgl. *Siegfried Sieber*, *Studien zur Industriegeschichte des Erzgebirges*, Köln 1987, S. 79–85.
- 205 *Michèle Schubert*, *Soziale Lage und politisches Handeln Leipziger Dienstmädchen während der industriellen Revolution*, in: *JbRegG* 18, 1991/92, S. 107–123, which draws on *dies.*, *Zur Erwerbstätigkeit von Frauen und zu ihren ersten Aktivitäten gegen kapitalistische Ausbeutung und Unterdrückung im Königreich Sachsen zwischen 1848/49 und 1871*, Diss. Leipzig 1986.
- 206 *Jean Quataert*, *Social Insurance and the Family Work of Oberlausitz Home Weavers in the Late Nineteenth Century*, in: *John Fout* (Hrsg.), *German Women in the Nineteenth Century*, New York 1984, S. 270–294; *dies.*, *Teamwork in Saxony Homeweaving Families in the Nineteenth Century: A Preliminary Investigation into the Issue of Gender Work Roles*, in: *Ruth-*

Schubert's study of domestic servants in Leipzig during the revolution of 1848 offers an opportunity to break down the mass of female servants into distinct categories. Though focused on the »Dienstmädchenverein« (Female Servants' Association) and its activities in 1848, Schubert also examines the counter-organisations that sought to control female servants in different ways during the 1850s and 1860s.²⁰⁷ Jean Quataert, by contrast, abandons the city and examines gender relations in rural environments. While Quataert has not yet mustered her evidence in monographic form, her many essays demonstrate how local demographic data can reinforce broad reassessments of modernisation. Drawing upon data concerning wages, fertility, and family lifestyles, all of which were gathered by a state that felt obliged to discover the »true« story of rural employment, Quataert examines what she calls an »officially solicited political discourse« about modernisation itself. Even Quataert's analysis of childbirth data allows her to explore several layers of information at the same time. In this enterprise Quataert combines the empirical sure-footedness of the »splitter« with the broad vision of the »lumper«, holding up a single variable – gender – against a multitude of backdrops. These include generational conflict, languages of labour, home-work, proto-industrialisation, sexuality, religion, collective protest, and the delivery of welfare by the state. That no other social historian of Saxony has attempted such an ambitious investigation is regrettable. For Quataert's research illustrates the payoff historians can expect from studies of modernisation »with the state put back in«.²⁰⁸

A recent collection of essays edited by Susanne Schötz also brings into view both the everydayness and the overlapping political contexts of female experiences – this time in Leipzig.²⁰⁹ One merit of this collection is that each contributor is able to combine structural analysis with real-life examples drawn from individual cases. Ulrike Kugel's study of Leipzig seamstresses, for example, follows Eleonore Fiedler's endless odyssey through local regulatory practices.²¹⁰ Other accounts describe the pitfalls encountered by a woman who tried repeatedly to settle in Leipzig; the coming and going of residents in the Frauenheim Borsdorf; and a typical day in a Leipzig bordello during the Nazi period.²¹¹

Ellen B. Joeres/Mary Jo Maynes (Hrsg.), *German Women in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, Bloomington 1986, S. 3–23; *dies.*, *Combining Agrarian and Industrial Livelihood. Rural Households in the Saxon Oberlausitz in the Nineteenth Century*, in: *Journal of Family History* 10, 1985, S. 145–162; *dies.*, *The Politics of Rural Industrialization. Class, Gender, and Collective Protest in the Saxon Oberlausitz of the Late Nineteenth Century*, in: *CEH* 20, 1987, S. 91–124; *dies.*, *Workers' Reactions to Social Insurance. The Case of Homeweavers in the Saxon Oberlausitz in the Late Nineteenth Century*, in: *IWK* 20, 1984, S. 17–35; *dies.*, *Demographic and Social Change*, in: *Chickering, Imperial Germany*, S. 97–130. Vgl. auch *Elizabeth Bright Jones*, *Women and Children First: Family Labor in Saxon Agriculture, 1918–30*, unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Seattle, January 1998.

207 *Schubert*, Lage, S. 119 f. Schubert does not miss the irony that the »Vereine zur Hebung und Förderung der Sittlichkeit und Pflichttreue unter den Dienstboten« were open to anyone *except* servants.

208 *Quataert*, Change, S. 118.

209 *Susanne Schötz* (Hrsg.), *Frauenalltag in Leipzig. Weibliche Lebenszusammenhänge im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Böhlau Verlag, Weimar etc. 1997, 367 S., geb., 78 DM.

210 *Ulrike Kugel*, *Leipziger Näherinnen in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Weibliche Erwerbsarbeit im Widerstreit mit der Schneiderinnung*, in: *ebd.*, S. 79–100, insb. S. 89 f.

211 *Susanne Schötz*, »und möchte künftig ein Putz- und Modewarengeschäft auf eigene Rechnung betreiben.« Zur Geschichte weiblicher Handelstätigkeit im neuzeitlichen Leipzig; *Beate Klemm*, Der Verein für Innere Mission Leipzig für, wider und mit den Frauen 1870–1914. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel des Frauenheims Borsdorf; *Sabine Haustein*, Zur Geschichte von Prostituierten in Leipzig in der NS-Zeit; all in: *ebd.*, S. 101–141, S. 207–235, S. 237–270.

Occasionally such descriptions of the *Alltag* veer too close to ideal-typical models. But on balance one can applaud the effort here to integrate individual cases into analyses of occupational structure, career- and life-cycles, and the legal constraints on individual initiative. In this way the often absurdly gender-specific restrictions of the old order come clearly into view. Readers of this collection are certain to ask whether contemporaries actually perceived the larger dilemma of modernisation as they battled municipal and guild authorities. One is tempted to conclude that the individuals profiled here were perfectly aware that they were »trespassing« on traditional rights and practices. Nevertheless, taking into account the interplay between individual moral codes, personal expectations, and structural limitations on individual action illuminates socio-economic modernisation as a two-edged sword. For these women, the breakdown of the old order presented new opportunities, but also new dangers. Revised meanings of (gendered) work – for example, the codes of industriousness, religiosity, and order found in the Frauenheim Borsdorf – implied freedom, but also responsibility. Leipzig's widows and midwives, too, discovered a degree of social, financial, and legal security as Saxon society approached a *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. But simultaneously, other opportunities (e.g. occupational independence, professionalization) were being successively closed off. Nevertheless, Schötz notes in her own contribution that the erosion of female independence in the economic sphere after the middle of the nineteenth century may have had less to do with guild or state restrictions than with the penetration of bourgeois expectations about gender roles into lower- and lower-middle-class society. Even so, argues Schötz, only a minority of women in these ranks of society actually accepted the ideal-typical model of women's roles as (house-)wife and mother. Hence Schötz sees her own work and that of other authors in this volume as contributing to a reassessment of German gender history on two fronts. Schötz is in good company in refusing to see women exclusively as oppressed victims. She breaks more new ground in mustering this evidence in opposition to a view depicting Leipzig's lower-middle classes as tending toward anti-modernism. In this sense Schötz's volume fits with other works – discussed in Section VII – that see no inherent contradiction between localism and modernity.

3. Democracy

Few historians ever believed in the teleology described by critics of modernisation theory – the one alleging a straight line from industrialisation to emancipation to parliamentarisation to democracy. If any confirmation were needed that such a teleology is untenable, Saxon history surely provides it. Early and thorough industrialisation did not foster parliamentarisation. The rapid rise of Social Democracy in the 1860s and 1870s contrasts sharply with its almost total exclusion from power before 1918. And Saxon political elites showed not only that they could slow the tide of democratisation; they could actually reverse it, as with the introduction of the three-class suffrage in 1896. In short, when critics of modernisation theory and the *Sonderweg* look to Saxony, they find plenty of ammunition. Why then would a recent collection of essays that focuses on the long-term problems and short-term complexities of political development in central Germany take »Demokratie und Emanzipation« as its title? Why has Saxony been the focus of one historian's effort to show the remarkable strength of liberalism in German cities?²¹² And why has Simone Lässig, interested in appraising the balance of forces between »stagnation« and »movement«, found in Saxon history such overwhelming evidence for »movement«?

212 See the works of *Pohl*, cited previously.

Part of the answer lies in the effort to overcome the »west-bias« in German historiography.²¹³ It is only natural that historians should look to central and eastern Germany to discover the same liberal vitality that has been studied so intensively for Baden, Württemberg, Hessen, and the Rhineland. But another part of the answer lies in the centrality of suffrage issues to questions of democracy. Volker Knüpfer has noted that liberals in the 1830s already regarded the *Landtag* suffrage as the »real point of leverage in the constitutional system«.²¹⁴ Almost all recent studies of Saxony's political modernisation after 1866 confirm this point. Gerhard A. Ritter's initial foray into Saxon electoral statistics demonstrated the richness of sources available to consider the impact of changing suffrage laws. Not all historians agree with Ritter's conclusion that elections conducted under vastly different suffrage provisions reflected stable social-moral milieus. Nor has his thesis about the durability of the anti-socialist *Kartell* in Saxony won unanimous approval. But everyone agrees that Ritter has demonstrated the potential payoff of using voting returns in innovative ways. Historians have good reason to believe that analysis of returns from *Landtag* elections conducted under a system of plural balloting may answer many questions about the size (and shape) of Saxony's social-moral milieus.²¹⁵

Christoph Goldt (Münster) and Wolfgang Schröder (Leipzig) have enhanced our understanding of Saxony's party spectrum and parliamentary system in other ways. Goldt has studied such issues as the rules of procedure in the *Landtag*, the nature of committee work, and the passage of state budgets.²¹⁶ Schröder's work has explored the structure of party associations at the local level and the changing character of *Landtag* elections. Schröder has also introduced us to a number of key individuals – like Baron von Friesen – who embodied the life-blood of politics.²¹⁷ Neither Goldt nor Schröder covers

213 A western orientation in the literature, if not always a »bias«, is readily apparent in the reviews by Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Dieter Langewiesche, and Hellmut Seier in: *Lothar Gall* (Hrsg.), *Bürgertum und bürgerlich-liberale Bewegung in Mitteleuropa seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (= HZ Sonderh. 17), München 1997. For the following, see especially the superb résumé by *Karl Heinrich Pohl*, *Liberalismus und Bürgertum 1880–1918*, in: ebd., S. 231–291, insb. S. 270–283.

214 *Knüpfer*, *Presse*, S. 98. Ninety years later the same view prevailed: *Vollzugsausschuss des Arbeiter- und Soldatenrates Groß-Dresden* (Hrsg.), *Die Revolution 1918 in Sachsen, ihr Sieg und ihre Aufgabe*, Dresden 1918, S. 3 f. Pre-1918 Saxony was characterised by »privilege, injustice, arbitrariness, and compulsion«, this broadside stated, but »the primary source of political privilege was the electoral system«.

215 Under the plural system introduced just before the 1909 *Landtag* elections, Saxon voters were granted one basic ballot and up to three supplementary ballots, depending on such criteria as land-ownership, tax exposure, age, etc. On the one hand we can determine how many voters with 1, 2, 3, or 4 ballots voted for each of the political parties. On the other hand we know what proportion of ballots were cast by different occupational groups. However, it is not yet clear whether even a combination of sophisticated statistical analysis and anecdotal evidence drawn from individual constituency races will allow us to make reliable guesses about what proportion of workers, artisans, teachers, etc. supported the candidates of any particular party. See *Ritter*, *Wahlrecht*, S. 90–95. For consideration of the hypothesis that the SPD may have reached its electoral potential in 1903, see *Peter Steinbach*, *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie im Kaiserreich im Spiegel der historischen Wahlforschung*, in: *Ritter*, *Aufstieg*, S. 1–36.

216 *Christoph Goldt*, *Parlamentarismus im Königreich Sachsen. Zur Geschichte des Sächsischen Landtages 1871–1918*, Münster 1996. Vgl. auch *Thomas Klein*, *Reichstagsgeschichte und Landesgeschichte. Die Wahlprüfungsverhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags und das Königreich Sachsen 1867–1918*, in: *John/Matzerath*, S. 583–596; *Kühne*, *Wahlrecht*, S. 547, and *Schmeitzner/Rudloff*, *Geschichte*. Major studies based on the *Reichstags Wahlprüfungsberichte* are expected soon from Margaret Lavinia Anderson (University of California – Berkeley) and Robert Arsenschek (München). The Saxon *Landtag* undertook similar, if less intensive, investigations of electoral abuse.

217 *Wolfgang Schröder*, *Wahlrecht und Wahlen im Königreich Sachsen 1866–1896*, in: *Ritter*, *Wahlen*, S. 79–130; *ders.*, *Die Armee muß organisiert sein, ehe der Krieg beginnt. Die Entste-*

all the bases. Goldt's account is under-theorised and weakened by lack of archival sources. Because he was unable to spend significant time in Dresden, he had to rely on the small selection of holdings that could be borrowed on microfilm. Schröder's vastly superior knowledge of the archives and his penchant for empirical detail do not always serve him well, either: too often he cannot see the forest for the trees. Hence neither author has taken us as far as we might like in our attempt to grapple with the multiple dimensions of Saxony's political culture over the long term. But let us not withhold from these historians the credit they deserve. For they have equipped us with important preliminary evidence to compare the progress of parliamentarism in Saxony and in other German states.

If Ritter, Goldt, and Schröder have all tended to emphasise the polarisation of socialist and anti-socialist parties within the Saxon political system before 1900, and if they all agree that suffrage questions were instrumental in perpetuating that polarity, the work of Simone Lässig has moved in a different direction. While she does not seriously question the consensus that a great divide separated the SPD and *bürgerlich* parties before 1896, Lässig shifts the time-frame forward to 1896-1909 and draws a picture of Saxon political culture in a state of extreme flux. Equally important, Lässig does not base her investigation on election analysis alone. Instead she considers how the suffrage reform debate during these years reveals contemporaries' perceptions of change on a broader front. Among many other questions, Lässig asks: Were Saxon voters perhaps more willing than their parliamentary representatives to accept the idea that Saxony's political system had to adapt to modern times? How did contemporaries perceive the »legitimate« relationship between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressures for change? Did the leaders of Saxony's mass parties differ from *Honoratioren* in their estimates of the state's capacity for conflict regulation and crisis management?²¹⁸ Did other Germans look to Saxony for clues about the advisability of reforms in their own homelands?

Without steering too close to counter-factual history, Lässig opens up these questions in ways that have not previously been attempted. For example, Lässig considers the possible outcome if the SPD had launched a massive protest movement to wring suffrage reform from the government, not in late 1905 – when working-class interest had already crested and when socialist leaders were fearing violence – but immediately after the June 1903 *Reichstag* election, when SPD confidence was at its peak.²¹⁹ As a second example, Lässig notes the larger significance of Saxon »models« of peaceful protest, including the non-violent revolution of 1989: »Is non-violence to be equated with the repudiation of political influence, or can the street demonstrations be considered an indirect indicator of political power *because* they were peaceful?« Rather than jumping to conclusions,

hung des Conservativen Vereins für den Leipziger Kreis, in: Leipziger Kalender 1996, S. 140–165; *ders.*, Die Genese des »Conservativen Landesvereins für das Königreich Sachsen«, in: *Lässig/Pohl*, S. 149–174; *ders.*, »... zu Grunde richten wird man uns nicht mehr«. Sozialdemokratie und Wahlen im Königreich Sachsen 1867–1877, in: *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* 36, 1994, H. 4, S. 3–18; *ders.*, Wilhelm Liebknecht und die »Mitteldeutsche Volks-Zeitung«. Zur Rolle der Leipziger Arbeiterbewegung und ihrem Verhältnis zur I. Internationale im Krisenjahr 1866, in: *Museum für Geschichte der Stadt Leipzig* (Hrsg.), Leipzig. Aus Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (= *Beiträge zur Stadtgeschichte* Bd. 4), Leipzig 1986, S. 131–165; *ders.*, Liebknechts »Fünf-Thaler-Affäre« 1870/71. Vom steinigen Weg, Freiraum für die Arbeiterbewegung zu erstreiten, in: *Grebing/Mommsen/Rudolph*, S. 54–72; *ders./Inge Kiesshauer*, Die Genossenschaftsbuchdruckerei zu Leipzig 1871–1881, Wiesbaden 1992; *ders.*, Unternehmer im sächsischen Parlament 1866–1909. Ein vorläufiger Überblick, unpublished paper delivered at the colloquium »Unternehmer in Sachsen«, Leipzig, April 1997. Schröder is preparing a major study of Saxon parliamentarism (1866–1896).

218 Vgl. *Schmeitzner/Rudloff*, *Geschichte*, S. 36 ff.

219 *Lässig*, *Wahlrechtskampf*, S. 123; for the following: *ebd.*, S. 181, S. 223.

Lässig considers how the options for suffrage reform in 1905 were viewed from three perspectives: that of the demonstrators themselves, who appeared to draw strength from their ability to move (metaphorically and literally) from working-class neighbourhoods on the periphery of Dresden inward toward the very centre of power in the Saxon capital; that of other Germans, who in 1905 were »quite unexpectedly moved« by the power of Saxon protests but who in 1910 were already aware that suffrage demonstrations in Prussia were unlikely to threaten state authority; and that of the Bavarian envoy stationed in Dresden, who reported to his superiors that the weight of morality seemed to lie with the SPD, not with the Saxon state. Lässig does not try to force these observations into a single all-embracing explanation. Consequently we are willing to follow her conjectures about the ambiguous values these cultural »codes« conveyed to contemporaries.

In contrast to Pohl, Lässig believes that one should *not* identify Saxony's liberals as the principal »motor« of change in the decade prior to 1914. The SPD and the Saxon government, she believes, deserve at least as much credit as the chimerical National Liberals for pressing the cause of reform.²²⁰ In Lässig's opinion, the real novelty in the suffrage reform debate was not the role of the National Liberals in facilitating a compromise outcome, but the willingness of the SPD to use the state's own weapons – order *and* discipline – against itself. In attempting to demonstrate the reciprocity between »spontaneity« and »organisation« on the SPD's part, Lässig paradoxically overestimates the Saxon SPD's flexibility and its decisiveness. It may be that confusion and hesitation influenced the SPD's mindset just as strongly.²²¹ Nevertheless, it is difficult to disagree with Lässig's conclusion that the SPD's willingness to take its protests to the very steps of the royal palace represented »a political-cultural innovation«. That innovation, she continues, »affected not only the hegemonic but also the oppositional culture itself«.²²² While this may not provide the last word on the »prevailing »cultural codes« and the »experiential aspects« of this episode, Lässig's study represents a large step forward in the effort to define what is really distinctive about regional political cultures.

In the spirit of critical engagement that suffuses Lässig's own work, a fundamental question of interpretation needs to be posed at this point. Is it possible that the search for healthy strains within German liberalism has inclined historians of Saxony to abandon the bird's-eye view for the worm's-eye view – and thereby lose their way? Lässig has set out to uncover »the learning processes, the reform impulses, and the modernising factors« that undercut the influence of traditional conservatives. But she and Pohl may be treading too lightly, precisely because they are in the vanguard. Let there be no mistake: Historians who are interested in exploring Saxony's political modernisation owe more to Lässig and Pohl than to anyone else writing in the 1990s (with the possible exception of Gerhard A. Ritter). The work of these two scholars is theoretically sophisticated and empirically unimpeachable. Nevertheless, an argument can be made – it has been made²²³ – that Lässig and Pohl are missing the bigger picture. In the processes of historical revisionism, it is not uncommon that familiar pieces of the puzzle get shuffled out of view. But one important piece must not be pushed to the margins: the

220 Ebd., S. 141, S. 148; for the following: ebd., S. 146.

221 Ebd., S. 146. Lässig (S. 179) puts considerably more emphasis on the »oppositional culture« in Saxony than its »hegemonial culture«.

222 Ebd., S. 161. Vgl. a very different »take« on cultural reform found in *Dresdner Hefte* 11, 1993, H. 36, Themenheft: Reformdruck und Reformgesinnung – Dresden vor dem 1. Weltkrieg.

223 *Nonn*, Hintergründe; *Retallack*, Die »liberalen« Konservativen?; *Hans-Ulrich Wehler*, Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, sozialer Wandel, politische Stagnation: Das Deutsche Kaiserreich am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges, in: *Lässig/Pohl*, S. 301–308. It is unclear whether Wehler believes one can extrapolate from »the power elites in the antidemocratic bulwark Prussia« to other German elites.

simple fact that liberalism never bloomed as fully in Saxony as it did in south-western Germany. Therefore historians must continue to take note of features in the political landscape that reflected unfairness, self-interest, and narrow-mindedness. It would be wrong to describe this as the landscape of conservatism. Conservatives in Saxony were by no means totally hostile to modernisation. On the contrary: liberalism's most determined enemies showed that they, too, could innovate, tack with the wind, and thrive in alien political environments. But for all that, their ideology remained a brutish one: by turns tyrannical and servile, occasionally without mercy, and unwilling to concede the principles of liberty that liberals held most dear.

Pohl, it is true, has warned against »an over-interpretation of the significance of Saxon liberalism«. Lässig at one point suggests tentatively that even after 1909, the cultural codes that underlay Saxon political culture did not change dramatically.²²⁴ Yet on balance both authors consistently emphasise »the strength of the pressure for modernisation«, »the capacity for change and adaptation of the political system«, and the fact that Saxony was able to modernise its suffrage in 1909 in ways that went »much further than small cosmetic adjustments«. ²²⁵

Further research is needed to confirm or undermine these conclusions. This reviewer, for one, is sceptical whether such investigations will reveal a »third path« running »well into the twentieth century«. ²²⁶ If the pressure for change was so strong, one must explain why the capacity to resist such pressure was so large before opting for a »third« explanation. Nor is it clear how the government's attempts to span conflicts between liberals and conservatives after 1909 demonstrate the viability of a »third way« either. Instead one can discern signs that the political extremism so evident in Saxony after 1918 was already an important part of the region's political culture before 1914. Therefore, to neglect those liberals who drew back from meaningful co-operation with the SPD, or to overlook the many nationalists who wanted nothing to do with liberal principles, is to ignore individuals, structures, and trends that pushed historical developments in other (not necessarily opposite) directions. Put another way, it is necessary but not sufficient to discuss the fate of emancipation and democratisation in Saxony »with the liberals put back in«. We need to consider Saxony's evolving political culture from the widest possible vantage point. Hence conservatives, left liberals, socialists, antisemites, and the state must also be »put back in«. Pohl conceded this point when he wrote that the relationship between German liberals and the urban political cultures in which they operated »has on the whole hardly been researched«. ²²⁷ Pohl went on to identify exactly the kinds of questions that such research will have to address:

»Were the fundamental assumptions about the political world that influenced political thoughts, feelings, and actions [in the cities] any different from those at the Reich level? What was the significance of co-operation among Social Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, and Catholics organised in the Centre [Party] on numerous standing bodies at the communal level? Was there a connection between the reformism that grew steadily within Social Democracy and the reformism of municipal liberalism, which increased the likelihood that such a policy might succeed, despite the preservation of suffrage restrictions? Were regional distinctions a factor here – a north-south divide, perhaps?«

It is only by asking such questions that a new picture will emerge, showing more clearly the real prospects for German liberalism and democratic reform. Such a picture will have to strike a delicate balance in historical composition: weighing the long-term significance of periods when contemporaries were confident that the quest for parliamen-

224 Lässig, Wahlrechtskampf, S. 243 ff.

225 Dies., Stagnation, S. 197, S. 204.

226 This is the argument found in Pohl, Liberalismus, S. 288.

227 Ebd., S. 282.

tary democracy was about to be achieved, against periods when the disappointing outcome of that search was obvious to all.²²⁸ This picture is already beginning to look very different from still-life depictions of Saxony as the »model land of reaction«. But historians must also avoid the error of over-compensating for the one-sidedness of previous studies.

In the end, there is no reason to suppose that Saxony's inability to meet the challenges of emancipation and democracy is best told in the style of Thomas Mann's »Buddenbrooks« (1901), where decline into irrationality is graceful and where a bustling metropolis – for Lübeck read Leipzig – provides the setting for patricians jostling quietly for power. No, Saxony had plenty of Netzigs, too: the nasty little town caricatured by Heinrich Mann in »Der Untertan« (1918), which was filled with little emperors, boisterous socialists, and more parochial sycophants than Heinrich von Treitschke ever dreamed of. This is *not* to suggest that scholarly contention over the fate of democracy in Saxony is not healthy. It is healthy. After all, as Gordon Craig has recently written, Heinrich and Thomas Mann first became aware of their own creative gifts by quarrelling over »the nature of the creative task, the social responsibility of the intellectual, and their country's role in modern history«. These remarks, rather, are intended to convey a point made by Thomas Mann himself after Germany's self-destruction in 1945, when he wrote that it was his brother, Heinrich, who »knew the score earlier and suffered no disillusionment«.²²⁹

VII. LOCALISM, REGIONALISM, NATIONALISM

As historians have become increasingly interested in questions of identity, experience, and perception, they have devoted more attention to the local idioms of nationalism and, conversely, to the national textures of localism. In this enterprise the »regional« dimension still gets lost from view too often. Yet there is now a significant body of literature that has applied this double perspective to such historical problems as Germany's *Heimat* movement, the celebration of national holidays, religious and nationality conflicts, and the Nazis' appropriation of local customs. In these studies it has become clear that local and national allegiances were anything but mutually exclusive. Hence scholars have discarded the idea that local identities necessarily disappear as more »modern« ideas of nationalism take hold in the popular imagination. As Jennifer Jenkins (St. Louis) has suggested with her concept of »provincial modernity«, it is historians who have constructed the notion that a polarity existed between localist ideas and modernity.²³⁰ In the minds of contemporary Germans, it was perfectly natural that a modern, cultivated citizenry could be built upon the foundations of civic pride, community feeling, and stable home environments. A heightened sense of local identity, in short, was not necessarily parochial or traditional; it could just as easily be national and modern.

The task of the historian becomes one of exploring how this latent tension (not contradiction) between localism and nationalism actually played out in cultural terms.

228 Vgl. *Lässig*, Wahlrechtskampf, S. 249.

229 *Gordon A. Craig*, The Other Mann, in: *New York Review of Books* Nr. 6, 9. 4. 1998, S. 21.

230 Like the reference to David Potter at the outset of this essay, these observations owe a debt to David Blackbourn's opening remarks and Alon Confino's prepared comment at a panel entitled »Regionalism in Modern German History: Local Identity, Political Mobilization and Provincial Modernity« at the Annual Meeting of the German Studies Association, Chicago, September 1995. This panel included *Jennifer Jenkins*, Regional Identity and Provincial Modernity in Hamburg, 1890–1914, which in turn drew on *dies.*, Provincial Modernity: Culture, Politics, and Local Identity in Hamburg, 1885–1914, Diss. Ann Arbor 1997.

Whereas we know a good deal about how centre-periphery conflicts determined certain idioms of political activity and social conflict; more attention is needed to image representations, conceptions of the future, and what Detlev Peukert described as the »emotional approval« (*affektive Zustimmung*) citizens give to states.²³¹ In other words, it may be in the cultural realm rather than the strictly political or social realms that we should look for new evidence about how localists redefined, subverted, and delegitimised centralised authorities.

This trend toward more intensive investigation of the *overlapping* identities of Germans in their local, regional, and national contexts is salutary. It falls in line with efforts to move beyond the narrowness suggested by David Potter's rejoinder: »Yes, but not in the South!« Twenty years ago, regional studies were embarked upon mainly with that same negatively empirical approach. The aim was to disprove generalisations about the centre. Today, by contrast, historians study the ways in which the »peripheral« concerns of »marginal« groups are disputed and renegotiated between hegemonic and non-hegemonic cultures. These conflicts are not only interesting in their own right; they are now seen to constitute, rather than just modify, our conclusions about what was happening at the »centre«. ²³²

Still we might ask: Are we satisfied that historians mine Saxon history for nuggets of gold that find their way into larger studies? Or do we yearn for the scholar with enough ambition to emulate Rudolf Kötzschke and Helmut Kretzschmar²³³ and produce a critical survey for the 1990s? Do historians even want a survey that claims to be comprehensive, and could anyone actually deliver on that claim? No consensus is readily apparent here. Some scholars look for more meta-narratives of German exceptionalism, others for micro-histories of modernisation. Some favour *histoire totale*, others *histoire pointilliste*. Neither the »micro« nor the »macro« alternative is entirely satisfactory. Yet the prospects for a study that might fall in between – examining the »meso«, as it were – are not assured either.

The preceding sections have tended to highlight scholars' uncertainty about whether Saxon development actually differed from more general patterns and, if so, what the significance of that difference might be. We have discovered that enlightened absolutism in Saxony, introduced at the end of the Seven Years War, was not as enlightened as we once imagined (although it provided peace, security, and prosperity to Saxony's citizens during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). The revolutions of 1830, 1848, and 1989/90 were caused partly by Saxony's inability to implement timely reforms; but were they distinctively *sächsisch* or generically *kleinstaatlich* in character? Economic development in Saxony was »anomalous«: it was export-driven, it was dispersed throughout the land in both urban and rural settings, and it was based mainly on small- and medium sized firms. But was that development really so anomalous as we once thought? Hatred of Prussia, which Treitschke believed simmered in every Saxon heart, may have

231 Bernd Weisbrod, Political Violence and Political Culture in Weimar Germany, unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the German Studies Association, Chicago, September 1995.

232 For evidence that regional historians are sharing new »ways of seeing« with economists, political scientists, geographers, and others, see the insightful tour d'horizon by Celia Applegate, *A Europe of Regions. Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times*, in: AHR 104, 1999 (im Druck). Wilhelm Ribhegge, *Europa – Nation – Region. Perspektiven der Stadt- und Regionalgeschichte*, Darmstadt 1991, is disappointing. More satisfactory is Günter Lottes (Hrsg., unter Mitwirkung von Georg Kunz), *Region, Nation, Europa. Historische Determinanten der Neugliederung eines Kontinents*, Heidelberg etc. 1992, insb. Günter Lottes, *Zur Einführung: Staat, Nation, Region – Zu drei Prinzipien der Formationsgeschichte Europas*, S. 10-43; vgl. auch Kühne, *Cultures*.

233 Rudolf Kötzschke/Helmut Kretzschmar, *Sächsische Geschichte* (zuerst 1935), ND Würzburg 1995.

lent distinctive elements to Saxony's political culture after mid-century. But anti-Prussian emotions and sympathies for the federal ideal experienced a regular ebb and flow, depending on specific issues and perceived alternatives.

Saxony also seems to have been peculiarly susceptible to the geo-political dangers inherent in its central European position.²³⁴ The convergence of east-west and north-south axes contributed to ambivalent feelings in Saxony about such issues as foreign trade, in- and out-migration, the place of ethnic minorities in society, and the perennial problem of *Groß-* or *Kleindeutschland*. Yet these tensions afflicted other German states too, including those that were geographically much more »central« than *Grenzland Sachsen*. The political polarisation between the socialist and nationalist camps seems to have been more extreme in Saxony than anywhere else. Yet the permeability of social-moral milieus, the lack of a strong Catholic presence, and the alleged irrelevance of (left-)liberalism complicate the story. Lastly, Saxony had a long line of relatively weak monarchs, and Saxony's state ministers exhibited a collective ethos that was based squarely on bourgeois codes (most notably fiscal parsimony). But did these factors play a role in allowing particularly positive and particularly negative features of modern (mass) politics to percolate upwards in political society? Did the lack of a strong hand from above, for example, set the stage for the surge of bourgeois civic-mindedness »from below«, which Lässig, Beachy, and Hammer have scrutinised for the pre-1830 era? Perhaps the same factor was at work in allowing radical nationalism, antisemitism, and bourgeois panic to bubble up, as it were, from wellsprings of popular sentiment, to poison even the rarefied atmosphere of *Honoratiorenpolitik* that still prevailed in the burgher leagues of the 1920s. If so, did this poison deliver Saxony to Nazism? Or might we just as legitimately point to the persistence of civic pride and the ongoing struggle for local autonomy at the municipal level? These factors undoubtedly played some part in reinforcing moral resistance to the Nazis, for example by two of Saxony's mayors: Wilhelm Külz of Dresden and Carl Goerdeler of Leipzig.²³⁵

Further variations could be attempted on similar themes, bringing »region« as an independent variable into proximity with »monarchy«,²³⁶ »class«,²³⁷ »electoral culture«,²³⁸ »memory«,²³⁹ and other issues. In lieu of such an exercise it is perhaps sufficient to identify one theme currently of great interest to historians. The theme is actually a dual one. On the one hand it concerns the cultural symbols of nationhood and what Roger

234 This is a perennial theme of conservative/nationalist historiography; see u.a. *Konrad H. Jarausch*, Normalisierung oder Re-Nationalisierung? Zur Umdeutung der deutschen Vergangenheit, in: GG 21, 1995, S. 571–584; *Hans Mommsen*, Die Nation ist tot. Es lebe die Region, in: *Guido Knopp u. a.* (Hrsg.), *Nation Deutschland?*, Paderborn 1984, S. 35–38; *Berger*, *Historians*.

235 *Armin Behrendt*, Wilhelm Külz. Aus dem Leben eines Suchenden, Berlin 1968; vgl. *Thomas Klein*, Die Bürgermeisterversammlungen im Königreich Sachsen, in: NASG 67, 1996, S. 147–162.

236 Vgl. *Zwahr*, *Revolutionen*, S. 29; *Manfred Hanisch*, Nationalisierung der Dynastien oder Monarchisierung der Nation? Zum Verhältnis von Monarchie und Nation in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert, in: *Adolf M. Birke/Lothar Kettenacker* (Hrsg.), *Bürgertum, Adel und Monarchie*, München etc. 1989, S. 71–91.

237 Vgl. Wilhelm Liebknecht's description of Christian Hadlich, cited in *Zwahr*, *Revolutionen*, S. 268.

238 *Fairbairn*, *Democracy*, emphasises the degree to which party support was increasingly concentrated by region.

239 Vgl. *Alon Confino*, The Nation as a Local Metaphor. *Heimat*, National Memory and the German Empire, 1871–1918, in: *History and Memory* 5, 1993, S. 42–86; *ders.* The Nation as Local Metaphor. Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918, Chapel Hill 1997; *Dagmar Freist*, Collective Memory in Debate. The Politics and Culture of Remembrance in Post-1989 Germany, in: *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London* 19, 1997, S. 91–95; *Volker Sellin*, Nationalbewußtsein und Partikularismus in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert, in: *Jan Assmann/Tonio Hölscher* (Hrsg.), *Kultur und Gedächtnis*, Frankfurt/Main 1988, S. 241–264.

Chickering has described as the struggle to define them.²⁴⁰ On the other hand it concerns the way those symbols found specific representations in the form of national festivals²⁴¹, monuments²⁴², public spaces²⁴³, and museums.²⁴⁴ Perhaps fittingly, one stands in awe of the number of books and essays recently published on the *Völkerschlachtdenkmal*.²⁴⁵ Yet such work urgently needs to be extended to a wider range of symbolic representations. Moreover, it needs to make more tangible the linkages it draws between struggles to control national symbols and struggles that fall within the more traditional interests of political historians.²⁴⁶ Very little research on Saxon political culture has even attempted to take account of such struggles. For the historian who chooses to address this deficit, an opportunity exists to counter the arguments of those who charge that »politics« and »culture« cannot be brought together in happy union.²⁴⁷

VIII. DOING HISTORY IN TODAY'S SAXONY

One could dwell on the ways that possible over-concentration on such topics as the *Völkerschlachtdenkmal* neglects other issues in Saxon history – for example, newspaper readership, court life, patronage of the arts, non-organised leisure activities, and, until very recently, health-care reform.²⁴⁸ But we must also note the sustained attention that local

240 Roger Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German. A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914*, Boston 1984. Vgl. also the important book by Pieter Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries. Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848–1914*, Ann Arbor 1996.

241 Katrin Keller (Hrsg.), *Feste und Feiern. Zum Wandel städtischer Festkultur in Leipzig*, Leipzig 1994, insb. *dies.*, Vorwort, ebd., S. 7–16, and Axel Dossmann, *Zwischen »alter Sachsenliebe« und »deutschem Gesamt Vaterland«: Die Leipziger Konstitutionsfeste im 19. Jahrhundert*, S. 136–149; Dieter Düding u. a. (Hrsg.), *Öffentliche Festkultur*, Reinbek 1988; Manfred Hettling/Paul Nolte (Hrsg.), *Bürgerliche Feste. Symbolische Formen politischen Handelns im 19. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 1993.

242 Vgl. Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum*, Göttingen 1995; Reinhard Alings, *Monument und Nation. Das Bild von Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal*, Berlin 1996; Heinz-Gerhard Haupt/Charlotte Tacke, *Die Kultur des Nationalen. Sozial- und kulturgeschichtliche Ansätze bei der Erforschung des europäischen Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, in: Hardtwig/Wehler, S. 255–283; Stephan Waetzold (Hrsg.), *Kunst, Kultur und Politik im deutschen Kaiserreich*, 9 Bde., Berlin 1981/89.

243 Björnsson, *Liberalism*; Keller.

244 Penny, *Germans' Others; ders.*, »Beati possedentes«; Christine Klecker, *Der Anteil des Adels an Sammlungen und Museumsgründungen in Sachsen* in: Keller/Matzerath, S. 225–256.

245 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, *Mythos und Geschichte. Leipziger Gedenkfeiern der Völkerschlacht im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert*, in: Etienne François u. a. (Hrsg.), *Nation und Emotion*, Göttingen 1995, S. 111–132; *ders.*, *Sakraler Monumentalismus um 1900. Das Leipziger Völkerschlachtdenkmal*, in: Reinhart Koselleck/Michael Jeismann (Hrsg.), *Der politische Totenkult*, München 1994, S. 249–280; vgl. Katrin Keller/Hans-Dieter Schmid (Hrsg.), *Vom Kult zur Kulisse. Das Völkerschlachtdenkmal als Gegenstand der Geschichtskultur*, Leipzig 1995; Peter Hutter, »Die feinste Barbarei«. *Das Völkerschlachtdenkmal bei Leipzig*, Mainz 1990; Steffen Poser, *Zur Rezeptionsgeschichte des Völkerschlachtdenkmal zwischen 1914 und 1989*, in: Keller/Schmid, S. 78–104; *ders.*, *Die Jahrhundertfeier der Völkerschlacht und die Einweihung des Völkerschlachtdenkmal zu Leipzig 1913*, in: Keller, S. 196–213.

246 For one idea of how this might be done, vgl. the promising work of Siegfried Weichlein, *Sachsen zwischen Landesbewußtsein und Nationalbildung 1866–1871*, in: Lässig/Pohl, S. 270.

247 For further reflections vgl. Retallack, *Politische Kultur*.

248 Leipzig and Dresden were two of six cities examined in Beate Witzler, *Großstadt und Hygiene. Kommunale Gesundheitspolitik in der Epoche der Urbanisierung*, Stuttgart 1995; ferner Ewald Frie, *Wohlfahrtsstaat und Provinz. Fürsorgepolitik des Provinzialverbandes Westfalen und des*

historians in Saxony *do* give to culture. Very few historians outside Saxony have any idea of the broad front on which such research is being undertaken or the diversity of cultural themes addressed in such journals as the »Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte«, »Comparativ«, the »Sächsische Heimatblätter«, and the »Dresdner Hefte« (to mention only four of the most important). This discrepancy – between the quantity and quality of work being conducted *vor Ort*, and outsiders' familiarity with that work – is not unique to Saxony. But the discrepancy ought nonetheless to be acknowledged. Otherwise the outsider has difficulty understanding why it appears that only older scholars (for example Blaschke and Zwahr) regularly discuss the richness of Saxony's cultural heritage in their work.²⁴⁹ And otherwise the outsider cannot guess why a younger generation of Saxon scholars seems to focus on topics that actually cover a rather narrow field of human endeavour. Although those younger scholars are tackling subjects that span the social-political divide and demand interdisciplinary and comparative skills – e.g. *Bürgerlichkeit*, milieu formation, voting rights – these subjects bracket out more traditional cultural pursuits. Yet one must also take into account the work conducted by the more well-heeled among »barefoot« historians, whose principal activity has always resided within Germany's strong local-history tradition.

The excitement of »doing history« in Saxony today brings with it the joys and pitfalls that so often accompany journeys into uncharted territory. The elimination of previous barriers to scholarly research imposed by the SED is of course welcome. The suddenness with which those restrictions were lifted produced a flood of scholarship, not all of which measured up to the highest scholarly standards. Yet when we discover that, of all the authors who contributed to Susanne Schötz's collection of essays on Leipzig women, not one (other than the editor) was born before 1965, allowances can be made. A number of other authors have perpetuated a pre-1989 tradition that filled too many pages with facsimiles of original documents, chronicles, statistics, verbatim parliamentary transcripts, photographs, and capsule biographies.²⁵⁰ Yet outsiders can be grateful that continued publication of such materials makes the *teaching* of Saxon history rewarding for students and faculty alike. To those looking for high-quality photographs²⁵¹, instructional maps²⁵², and World Wide Web sites, or for those bored by the traditional

Landes Sachsen 1880–1930, Paderborn 1993; *Ingrid von Stumm*, Gesundheit, Arbeit und Geschlecht im Kaiserreich am Beispiel der Krankenstatistik der Leipziger Ortskrankenkasse 1887–1905, Frankfurt/Main 1995. I have not yet been able to consult *Paul Brandmann*, Leipzig zwischen Klassenkampf und Sozialreform. Kommunale Wohlfahrtspolitik zwischen 1890 und 1929, Weimar etc. 1998; *Julia Paulus*, Kommunale Wohlfahrtspolitik in Leipzig 1930 bis 1945, Weimar etc. 1998 (im Druck).

249 Vgl. *Michel Espagne/Matthias Middell* (Hrsg.), Von der Elbe bis an die Seine. Kulturtransfer zwischen Sachsen und Frankreich im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, Leipzig 1993.

250 An illustrative example might be *Schmeitzner/Rudloff*, Geschichte. The unparalleled »Zeitschrift des Königl. Sächsischen Statistischen Bureaus/Landesamts« (1855 ff.) is found in many libraries around the world. The complete stenographic reports of both chambers of the Saxon Landtag (1850–1933) are available in print at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin and on microfilm elsewhere. Vgl. *Hubert Kiesewetter*, Quellen zur historischen Statistik des Königreichs Sachsen im Industriezeitalter (1750–1914), in: *Andreas Kunz/Wolfram Fischer* (Hrsg.), Grundlagen der historischen Statistik von Deutschland, Opladen 1991, S. 145–174; *Karlheinz Blaschke*, Historisches Ortsverzeichnis von Sachsen, 4 Bde., Leipzig 1957; *Hartmut Zwahr*, Das deutsche Stadtadressbuch als orts- und sozialgeschichtliche Quelle, in: *JbRegG* 3, 1968, S. 204–229; Adress- und Auskunftsbuch der Vereine und Gesellschaften im Königreiche Sachsen, Leipzig 1891.

251 Vgl. *Tilo Richter*, Industriearchitektur in Dresden, Leipzig 1997; *Peter Guth/Ulrich Heß/Ulrich Krüger*, Industriearchitektur in Leipzig, Leipzig 1998.

252 *Sächsische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig* (Hrsg.), Atlas zur Geschichte und Landeskunde von Sachsen, Lieferungen A 1 – H 20, Leipzig 1998 ff.; *Simone Lässig*, Beiheft zur Karte D IV 2: Die Reichstagswahlen im Königreich Sachsen (1871–1918) (to be published in this

production values and dreary appearance of the typical German monograph, the Saxon publishing landscape looks refreshingly unconventional.²⁵³

The prospects have also brightened for on-the-spot research in Saxon archives and libraries. The major institutions of historical research in Saxony have updated their catalogues, and many of them are nearing the end of major restructuring and rebuilding phases.²⁵⁴ Detailed guides to newspapers and journals in Saxon libraries are now readily available.²⁵⁵ The relocated state archive in Leipzig has state-of-the-art facilities. Delivery and reproduction services at the Saxon Central State Archive in Dresden are currently being upgraded. The reinvigoration of local history societies in Dresden and elsewhere is consolidating the initial resurgence of interest from the early 1990s, and anniversaries between 1998 and 2006 – when Dresden turns 800 – ensure continued public involvement.²⁵⁶ Saxon historians are rapidly being integrated into world-wide networks

series); *Klaus Breinfeld*, Karlheinz Blaschke und der Historische Atlas von Sachsen, in: *Aurig/Herzog/Lässig*, S. 315–336.

- 253 Vgl. u. a. *Stadtmuseum Dresden* (Hrsg.), *Dresdner Geschichts-Buch*, Bd. 2, Altenburg 1996; that this is not just a coffee-table book is demonstrated u. a. by the analysis in *Karlheinz Kregelin*, Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Dresden. Friedrich Wilhelm Pfothner und Paul Alfred Stübel, S. 56–68. Among collections of paintings, photographs, line drawings, and etchings in Saxony, the most important include: Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staatsbibliothek, Dezernat Deutsche Fotothek, Dresden; Staatliche Kunstsammlungen (Kupferstichkabinett), Dresden; Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, Bildstelle; Stadtarchiv Dresden (Karten, Pläne, Risse; Bildarchiv); Stadtmuseum Dresden; Verkehrsmuseum Dresden; Museum für bildende Künste, Leipzig; and Museum für Geschichte der Stadt Leipzig. Among many pictorial works see *Louis Oeser*, Album der Sächsischen Industrie, 2 Bde. o.O. o.J. [Neusalza 1856–1858]; Die Abgeordneten der Ständeversammlung und des Sächsischen Landtags in Photographien [um 1870] bis 1933, o.O. o.J.; *O. E. Schmidt/J. L. Sponzel*, Bilder-Atlas zur Sächsischen Geschichte in mehr als 500 Abbildungen auf 100 Tafeln, Frankfurt/Main 1909 (ND 1977); [*Oscar Rothe*], Zur Erinnerung an die Einweihung des neuen Rathauses zu Dresden am 1. Oktober 1910, Dresden o.J.; *Martin Lauckner/Wolfgang Weidlich* (Hrsg.), Sachsen. Kultur- und landesgeschichtliche Beiträge über die sächsischen Landschaften, Würzburg 1988; *Hans Philippi*, Die Wettiner in Sachsen und Thüringen, Limburg 1989; *Manfred Bachmann/Harald Marx/Eberhard Wächtler* (Hrsg.), Der Silberne Boden. Kunst und Bergbau in Sachsen [exhibition catalogue on CD-ROM], Stuttgart etc. 1990; *Karl Czok* (Einl.), Leipzig. Fotografien 1867 bis 1929, Leipzig 1991.
- 254 *Historische Kommission der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig* (Hrsg.), Die Bestände des Sächsischen Hauptstaatsarchivs und seiner Außenstellen Bautzen, Chemnitz und Freiberg, bearb. v. *Bärbel Förster u. a.*, Bd. 1: Die Bestände des Sächsischen Hauptstaatsarchiv, 2 T., Leipzig 1994; *Ingrid Grohmann* (Hrsg.), Archive im Freistaat Sachsen. Archiv- und Bestände-führer, Dresden etc. 1995; *dies.* (Hrsg.), Archiv – Geschichte – Region, Leipzig 1994; *Landeshauptstadt Dresden/Stadtarchiv Dresden* (Hrsg.), Das Stadtarchiv Dresden und seine Bestände, Dresden 1994; Katalog der Handschriften des sächsische Landesbibliothek, 4 Bde., [Dresden] 1979/83; *Manfred Kobuch/Ilse Langer* (Bearb.), Zeitschriftenkatalog der Sächsischen Landesbibliothek, 2. Aufl., Dresden 1964; *Beate Berger u. a.* (Bearb.), Überblick über die Bestände des Stadtarchivs Leipzig, Leipzig 1992; *Rudolph/Weuster*; *Historische Kommission der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig* (Hrsg.), Geschichtsforschung in Sachsen. Von der Sächsischen Kommission für Geschichte zur Historischen Kommission bei der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig 1896–1996, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, 203 S., geb., 78 DM.
- 255 *Hans-Dieter Wüstling* (Bearb.), Sächsische Zeitungen in Dresdner Bibliotheken und Archiven. Ein Katalog der Bestände bis 1945, Dresden 1966; *Jan Pepino* (Bearb.), Sächsische Zeitungen in Bibliotheken, Archiven und Museen des Bezirkes Dresden, Dresden 1971; *ders.* (Bearb.), Sächsische Zeitungen in Bibliotheken, Archiven und Museen des Bezirkes Karl-Marx-Stadt, Dresden 1973; *Regina Jacob/Gertrud Höhnel* (Bearb.), Der Zeitungsbestand des Stadtarchivs Leipzig 1730–1963, Leipzig 1964.
- 256 *Thomas Kübler*, Archive und Stadtgeschichtsschreibung. Die 800-Jahr-Feier Dresdens im Jahre 2006, in: *Aurig/Herzog/Lässig*, S. 337–346.

of scholars and research teams, many of them based on interdisciplinary and comparative methodologies. Support from the »Sächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung« and new series published by the Böhlau-Verlag and the Leipziger Universitätsverlag are also contributing to the efflorescence and dissemination of home-grown research.

Not all difficulties have been swept aside. The fate of the three Chairs of (Saxon) Regional History in Dresden, Leipzig and Chemnitz is not yet clear. Frustration is occasionally heard that scholars in Saxony's major research institutions do not co-operate more fully. Funding for new research projects is always inadequate. And one wonders whether Saxon scholarship can continue to bloom unless similar advances are made in the other four new federal states. Nevertheless, these afflictions are arguably not very different from those found elsewhere. The general sense is that an important new start has been made in Saxony. Confidence in the future compensates for the institutional, financial, and personal obstacles that remain.

Pulling together these reflections, we can conclude that when historians have asked the big question – Why Saxony? – they have done a better job establishing the legitimacy of the regional perspective itself than they have in identifying specific ways in which Saxon history forces us to reassess national paradigms. This is not to say that historians today are sticking close to prevailing assumptions about a unitary political culture in Imperial Germany. On the whole, they reject the accepted concentration on the »Prusso-German state« as the sole outcome of German unification. As one commentator put it: Why Saxony? Because Saxony's history shows, first, that the received image of a Prussianised Germany emerging from 1870/71 was not necessarily the way things had to turn out; and second, that it was not *in fact* the way things turned out either. Today, historians of Saxony are contributing decisively to the revision of a model that over-stressed Imperial Germany's imperviousness to reform, both from below and from above. They offer convincing reasons why historians need to pay greater attention to the diversity of German blueprints for reform, and they are attuned to the contingency of struggles for liberty, democracy, social fairness, and regional identity. Nevertheless, one sees on the horizon no synthesis, no overarching explanation of where either Saxony or Germany was headed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For this reason we should welcome signs that new approaches and new themes are being taken up by a younger generation of scholars. The excellence of their preliminary work holds great promise for the future.