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From Pariah to Professional? The Journalist in German Society and Politics, from the Late Enlightenment to the Rise of Hitler[†]

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I

Worthless fellows, these gentlemen of the quill! Cowardly, malicious, deceitful in their irresponsibility.¹

Gustav Freytag, *Die Journalisten*, act 3, scene 1

The historiography of German journalism has reached something of a plateau in its development. Although some of the most exciting new paths of research on nineteenth-century Germany intersect in the area of communications history, German journalists currently suffer a scholarly neglect that may have its roots in their inferior social status and contentious political function in the nineteenth century.

On the one hand, journalists are bypassed by scholars who, either continuing the Rankean tradition of privileging histories of the German state or hurrying ahead with the “history of society,” will not slow down to reintegrate these approaches. Instead the field has tended to grow through the proliferation of studies on individual journalists and press enterprises or on the repressive institutions of authority. With some notable recent exceptions,² these studies have too rarely enlightened us about how flesh-and-blood journalists actually functioned in society.

On the other hand, journalists are also neglected by those pursuing research on the German *Bildungsbürgertum* and the learned professions.³ These historians, too, tend to look right through journalists, refusing to welcome them on the journey because they did not adhere to accepted models of professional behavior. Journalists’ notoriously low socioeconomic status, their inability to restrict entry to their field, their lack of specialized training, and their failure to

achieve independence from patrons and clients are taken as evidence that journalism remained as Bismarck described it in 1862 — a dumping ground for those who had failed to find their calling in life.⁴

Nevertheless, important milestones have been reached along paths that might lead toward a new history of German journalism. In the 1970s and 1980s, the “social history of politics” began to highlight interrelationships between social, economic, and political change. This essay suggests how some of these relationships can be explored in more concrete terms through the history of German journalism. Current enthusiasm for cultural history is casting new light on another surprisingly persistent problem of German history: the interconnectedness of power, language, intellect, and identity. Thus the following analysis also addresses ongoing debates about bourgeois hegemony, the history of mass communications, the “contested terrain” of German national culture, and the rise of mass politics.⁵

Most ambitious of all, special attention is given to recent work on the German professions, to consider whether journalists might be included among those “frustrated” members of the German *Bildungsbürgertum* who, as Konrad Jarausch recently put it, “saw professionalism as an attractive alternative to fuzzy intellectual idealism, the tainted profit motive, or the anonymous government bureaucracy.”⁶ The aim here is *not* to argue one sidedly that German journalism was a full-fledged “profession” according to either the Anglo-American or German models. To be sure, historians seem very ambivalent on this point, and it will be demonstrated that by World War I, contemporaries’ reluctance to consider journalists as “professionals” did not necessarily render them immune to the idea that journalism had already evolved into a profession. Nevertheless, it is more important to integrate these developments into a broader picture of social and political modernization in central Europe over an extended period of time.

Relative to the literature on German doctors, lawyers, university professors, high school teachers, engineers, and entrepreneurs, surprisingly little systematic work has been done on the social history of German journalism since major studies were published in the mid-1960s.⁷ We remain extraordinarily ill informed about journalists’ social origins, education, employment prospects, career patterns, and efforts to foster a corporate ethos. Nor have historians directly addressed journalists’ perennial worries about three factors that still help determine professional status: specialized training, independence, and self-regulation. This helps to explain the neglect accorded to journalism’s remarkable history as one of the first bourgeois pursuits in Germany to generate acute professional *Angst* in the nineteenth century. The time has come to consider the journalist in society and the self-definition of the profession as two sides of a single coin. How did journalists police themselves, and to what extent

did they believe that the state or society should do the job for them? How were contemporary understandings of the journalist's social status and political function interrelated? And how close was the connection between attempts to define the limits of political discourse in nineteenth-century Germany and journalists' willingness to censure those "unprofessional" colleagues who in other fields came to be labeled quacks, charlatans, and ambulance-chasers?

To address these issues it is necessary to broaden the temporal scope of the analysis. In 1980 Geoff Eley noted that historians still faced a "massive problem" in integrating analyses of the Wilhelmine state and its political culture with "the history of mass communications . . . and the relation of propaganda to ideology."⁸ The same questions need to be asked for other periods as well. More recently, Gary Stark called for "a social history of reading, writing, and publishing" in nineteenth-century Germany,⁹ while Anthony La Vopa has identified the importance of addressing the social dimensions of *Beruf* even before the French Revolution. Such an inquiry, La Vopa has written, may help explain how "professional ideologies" (his term) "laid claim to a privileged realm of public authority, at once political and above mere politics, for the kind of knowledge peculiar to professional disciplines."¹⁰ This essay, therefore, stretches the frame of reference from the better-researched Wilhelmine era back to an age when members of the learned estate (*Gelehrtenstand*) in Germany first discovered that their quest for professional status might compel them to carve out their own political "space" — perhaps in direct opposition to the state, more often in an ambiguous relationship with it. That political "space" proved to be a vitally important component of what Jürgen Habermas identified in the 1960s as the "public sphere" (*Öffentlichkeit*).¹¹

The last principal theme of this essay is the degree to which formal political allegiances defined journalists' understandings of their own social status and function. Because their influence was greatest where society and the state came into closest proximity, journalists and their critics necessarily saw the role of the press in very different terms depending on whether they ascribed to conservative or liberal (or, later, socialist) convictions. Liberals who favored the abandonment of socioeconomic, cultural, and political residues from the premodern era tended to accord far greater status to journalists generally than did conservatives who defended the institutions and practices of a bygone age. As some journalists became wealthy, respected, and powerful in their own right, liberals generally applauded the structural changes in society and politics that allowed these men to exert unprecedented influence. Conservatives, in the main, condemned these changes. There is a certain irony that as the German *Bürgerium* increasingly defined itself in opposition to the working classes below it and the nobility above, its members came to see journalists as an "intellectual proletariat" or an "intellectual aristocracy" (or both). Yet because the actual

accomplishments of journalists spanned the broadest imaginable range of experiences, one must consider not only the lowly, anonymous journalist but also the giants of the nineteenth-century press. In the historical record, as in what follows, one will look in vain for a single, unitary image of “the” journalist.

Section II following this introduction launches the discussion: first, by describing the “reading revolutions” that transformed German culture between 1770 and 1920; second, by addressing the vexing question of how to separate journalists from other writers when discussing their social status; and third, by exploring the self-image of journalists within the public sphere in the half-century before 1830. Section III provides an overview of how the organization, function, and material rewards of journalism changed from the late Enlightenment to the advent of the Second Reich. Section IV considers the dilemmas that confronted *conservative* journalists in particular. The argument here suggests that neither journalists nor their patrons in the conservative establishment ever fully understood how structural changes in the organization of the German press were related to changes in German society tending to favor bourgeois values in the public sphere and, somewhat later, to accelerate the politicization of the masses. In Section V, the focus returns to the “professionalization project”¹² of German journalists during the Second Reich. Efforts to enhance the standing of the profession are examined through discussions of the rise of the *Generalanzeiger* press, the establishment of new organizations to represent the “professional” interests of journalists, and the role of women in the field. Some concluding remarks point to unresolved questions and suggest possible avenues for future research.

II

Adelaide. Journalists are, as I notice, dangerous people, and it is well to have their good-will, although I, an insignificant person, will take pains never to furnish material for a newspaper article.

Gustav Freytag, *Die Journalisten*, act 3, scene 1

The “professionalization project” of German journalists must be understood within the context of the transformation of the public sphere beginning in the late Enlightenment. Of the many events that transformed France and Europe between 1770 and 1815, cultural life in Germany was arguably most affected by a “revolution in print.” The number of German-language periodicals more than doubled during the last three decades of the eighteenth century, while in the same period the number of reading circles and societies — leaving aside lending libraries — increased from a mere dozen to some 200.¹³ Whereas only about 15 percent of the inhabitants of German-speaking territories could read in 1764, this figure had reached about 33 percent

by 1800 and 40 percent by 1830.¹⁴ Since each copy of a newspaper (*Zeitung*) was seen by an estimated average of ten readers (and was read aloud to many more), Germany's total production of about 300,000 newspapers in 1800 might have "reached" over 3 million citizens. To this can be added a "few hundred" journals (*Zeitschriften*) appearing at any one time in the late eighteenth century, reaching an audience of perhaps 300,000 to 400,000 readers.¹⁵

In this period Germans nonetheless witnessed only the first of several reading revolutions.¹⁶ Certainly periodical publishing took its largest leap forward between the 1770s and what the Austrian foreign minister Klemens von Metternich referred to in 1808 as "the Century of Words."¹⁷ But one could also point to the impact of revolutionary events in 1830 and (more obviously) 1848 as decisive. One estimate puts the number of newspapers appearing in the German Confederation before the revolution of 1848 at 1,000; of these, perhaps 100 could be considered political.¹⁸ An estimate for 1850, by contrast, puts the total figure at 1,500. In Metternich's Habsburg territories, the number of newspapers increased from 79 to 388 in a single year, though it then dropped again to 128 in 1856.¹⁹ Still another "revolution" occurred after unification in 1871, when literacy rates topped 70 percent and kept climbing. Within the borders of the German Reich, the number of newspapers rose from about 2,400 in the 1870s to over 4,200 in 1914; the number of journals rose from about 3,300 in 1890 to 6,500 in 1914. The total circulation of German newspapers and journals is notoriously difficult to estimate, in part because publishers' circulation statistics were so inflated; but one estimate suggests that between 1885 and 1914, the average newspaper edition rose from 2,600 copies to 8,600 copies.²⁰ During World War I and the period immediately after, Germany experienced two more reading revolutions of comparable magnitude, as the volume of available reading matter first plummeted then rose to new heights.²¹ In short, the scale as well as the character of German periodical publishing changed enormously from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth — whether one speaks of one reading revolution or many. It is only natural that the working conditions, the social image, and the political function of the journalist were transformed just as fundamentally in the process.

That a new role for journals and newspapers in the last third of the eighteenth century facilitated the emergence of both organized "public opinion" and the public sphere in Germany is a truism, obviating the need for a review of the vast and growing literature.²² It should be noted immediately that the public sphere constitutes much more than just the press (and certainly more than the overtly *political* press discussed in this essay). Bounded on one side by the "private sphere" and on the other side by the state, the public sphere also includes the network of voluntary associations, political parties, civil liberties,

and public customs that foster the formulation and communication of public opinion. This essay cannot address the many theoretical questions that have relevance here, nor is it possible to offer the sustained comparative analysis that has already provided important insights.²³ Nevertheless, as the German press evolved from “the journalism of private men of letters to the public consumer services of the mass media,”²⁴ it helped define the contours of the public sphere as a cultural phenomenon and as a class-bound product of social experience. In this process, writers, editors, and publishers all played key roles because they brought cultural and political insights to bear on the point where civil society and the state interacted most closely. Therefore, by sidestepping narrow or period-specific definitions of professional status that obscure the ways in which German journalists faced the same dilemmas confronting other middle-class Germans embarking on the historic journey from *Gelehrtenstand* to *Bildungsbürgertum*,²⁵ it may be possible to contribute in theoretical and interdisciplinary ways to what was recently identified as another of our postmodern “predicaments”: the social history of experience.²⁶

Historians continue to debate the relative contribution of “ideologically” vs. “commercially” motivated publishers in these processes, the role of “literary” vs. “political” journalism, and the need to disentangle journalists’ experiences from those of poets, dramatists, novelists, pamphleteers, and other writers. In many respects, though, it may actually be helpful to consider journalists as among those to whom the young poet Hermann Conradi addressed his call in 1884 for all German artists to become “protectors and guardians, leaders and comforters, pathfinders and guides, physicians and priests of humanity.”²⁷ The terms Conradi used remind us that journalists — like doctors, clerics, lawyers, and others imbued with a professional ideology — saw themselves from the outset as contributing to the good of society by both “enlightening” and “leading” the people. To describe this rhetoric as “ideology” is to note that it was self-serving, as La Vopa has written, but “*not* to imply . . . a calculated effort to hoodwink the public. Quite the contrary.”²⁸ Like other professionals, when journalists considered the relative merits of “talent” and “virtue” they generally concluded that “the legitimacy of talent [was] contingent on the primacy of virtue.”²⁹

These observations are relevant if we are to understand how Germans perceived the journalist’s multiple *political* roles in the public sphere around 1800. Most contemporaries probably agreed that journals and newspapers ought to have different functions: “newspapers report, journals reflect.”³⁰ But newspapers, intended originally for an audience that already had sufficient cultivation and political understanding to make sense of a bare reporting of facts, came increasingly into the “wrong” hands. These, of course, were the hands of the lower classes who were thought to lack the mature judgment for private political reflection and were unlikely to acquire it through reading the

daily press. This fear arose even before the French Revolution, and it continued to haunt Germans throughout the nineteenth century. Thus the “dreadful” and “vacuous” books that Jacob Grimm condemned in Hessian lending libraries in the 1830s and 1840s were dangerous principally because they appealed to popular tastes and modest budgets.³¹ King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia agreed, writing in a cabinet order of February 1843: “What I do not wish is the degradation of science and literature into journalism or that the latter should be placed in a position of equal dignity with the former.”³²

Public opinion and “published opinion” were both theoretically concerned with providing general and universal truths to the reader. But liberals always believed more fervently than conservatives that demagoguery and lies would vanish as more information became available — hence Johann Cotta’s *Allgemeine Zeitung* and Karl Biedermann’s *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.³³ Yet as Rudolf Vierhaus has observed, political journalism of all sorts involved a “complicated process of working over experiences, assimilating and passing on knowledge, becoming sensitized to what had hitherto either been taken for granted or gone unnoticed, recognizing contradictions, and becoming and making others receptive to opinion and the formulation of aims. It took place within the context of general intellectual shifts and changes in *mentalité*, which in turn were inseparable from concrete sociocultural and socioeconomic change.”³⁴ The politicization of the public sphere, in other words, was not a social situation but a social activity — one that in turn was always influenced by the process (not institution) of *Bildung*.³⁵

According to the editor of the *Vossische Zeitung*, Karl Philipp Moritz, the ideal newspaper of the 1780s was no longer a vehicle for the reporting of novelties and curiosities, but rather a “mouthpiece through which one can preach to the people and force the voice of truth into both the palaces of the mighty and the hovels of the lowly.”³⁶ In this enterprise, knowledge could not be “merely” communicated to the lower orders in neutral terms. It had to be general knowledge, but useful, comprehensible, served in manageable portions. And so the journalist took on the guise of other “professionals” in the public sphere — as “teacher, translator, distributor, and popularizer”; as advisor, neighbor, friend to humanity, reformer, and patron of the general welfare; and as discussant, evaluator, critic, litigator (*Räsonneur*), and judge (*Richter*).³⁷ The late Enlightenment passion for statistics was symptomatic here, for it implied a “professional” approach in the form of specialized knowledge combined with social altruism. Statistics provided the opportunity for drawing up a balance sheet of society’s virtues and ills. With them one could draft a better order for the world. Statistics, Hans Erich Bödeker has written, “became the method and

raw material of political reasoning, and hunger for statistics the tool with which to engineer social and political emancipation.”³⁸ Thus August Ludwig Schlözer, editor of the *StatsAnzeigen* and probably the most influential German journalist of the late 1700s, presumed the right to bring the veiled workings of the state into the light of day: as he once wrote, “Statistics and despotism are incompatible.”³⁹

As section IV will show, there were conservative journalists even in the 1790s who opposed such presumption with a vehemence that approached fanaticism. At this point it is important only to note that the goal of making the press a “fearsome tribunal” inspired only a small minority of journalists. Most agreed that it was not necessary to seek formal limits to the political power of the state or guarantees of popular participation in politics. Again, quite the contrary was true, for notions of a “bourgeois public” and advocacy of bourgeois reform were perfectly compatible with the holding of professional positions as servants of the state. The aim of the liberal publisher Johann Cotta was “to define, and institutionalize, a realm of action beyond the control of the state, but short of opposition to it — a ‘public’ realm in which intellectual independence and political loyalty would equally well be served.”⁴⁰ This aim inspired many journalists (and other writers) well into the mid-nineteenth century, as when a character in Karl Gutzkow’s *Die Ritter vom Geiste* (1850) claimed that “the basic rights of the people are basic duties of the knights of the spirit.”⁴¹ Yet it should not be forgotten that in the later era Gutzkow suffered state repression as a member of the Young Germany movement, whereas Cotta’s announced goals did not keep him from making his peace with Metternich and Friedrich von Gentz.

Certainly conservatives in the Napoleonic Era did not need to challenge every conclusion reached by liberals who sought to expand the power of the press. What they more often criticized was the logic that led to those conclusions. They worried, for example, that not reading but “excessive” reading (*Zuviel-Lesen, Zeitungsleserei, Lesesucht*) was to blame for social and political unrest. By catering to a half-educated public, newspapers foisted prefabricated opinion on readers too ignorant to distinguish between objectivity and partisanship, or between substance and superficiality. And by supplying the masses with compelling accounts of the world, they fueled the “pretentious” and mistaken belief of the common people that they were well-informed about the world and, hence, should be allowed to participate in changing it. As James Sheehan has written, in the wake of the French Revolution many intellectuals began to see *Lesesucht* as a symptom of social upheaval and moral decline, “an epidemic of compulsive reading leading to physiological, psychological, and social disabilities, to which disrespectful servants, overtrained teachers, nervous youths, and loose women were especially susceptible.”⁴²

Journalists' assessments of their own role in society became more problematic as they were forced to show their political colors after 1789. For unlike other nobilities (or professions) of service and culture, the expansion of the public sphere brought journalists little material compensation: they did not fit into the "comprehensive social theory" glorifying the *Bildungsbürgertum* in the *Vormärz*.⁴³ As successive waves of change swept across Germany in the form of invasion, occupation, and liberation, their forced entry into the world of politics brought journalists' nascent feelings of self-confidence and social importance into conflict with what one historian has described as their equally strong feelings of "astonishment, disaffection, anxiety, and even fear."⁴⁴ "It was truly a poetic epoch," wrote Ernst Moritz Arndt in his memoirs, "when, after long, dull dreams, our dear Germany awoke to a new literary and political existence."⁴⁵ Daniel Moran, Cotta's biographer, has also noted the centrality of politics in the transformation of German journalism in these years: "the newspapers Cotta read as a young man were remotely and inconsequentially *about* politics; those he published in his maturity would be most decidedly *in* politics — a development whose consequences, even for him, were difficult to judge."⁴⁶ To this one might add only that the particular *mix* of self-confidence and anxiety registered by Cotta (and by all others who reflected on the role of the journalist) was itself conditioned by politics. After all, a predisposition toward change, positive or negative, is what allows us to distinguish between liberals and conservatives. If these two forces opposed each other in the sphere of public opinion, it was natural that liberals and conservatives should look on the enlargement of the public realm in different ways as well. If *Politikum* and *Publikum* could each be consensual in theory, they were also each divisive in practice.

III

Enemies? Who does not have them! But journalists have nerves like women. Everything stirs you up, every word that is said against you agitates you! I know you, you are sensitive people.

Gustav Freytag, *Die Journalisten*, act 1, scene 1

Against this evidence that German journalists developed an early corporate ethos similar to those developed by other members of the *Bildungsbürgertum*, one must weigh the factors that prevented the emergence of journalism as an acknowledged profession until at least the beginning of the twentieth century. Chief among these were the impossibility of limiting the number of recruits entering the field, the failure to develop a standard pattern

of career advancement (the so-called “career ladder”), and the slow emergence of journalism as a full-time or lifetime pursuit. In examining these impediments to professionalization, it is always necessary to consider the divergence between actual career patterns and *perceptions* about why individuals sought “refuge” in the field.

How many journalists lived in Germany at the beginning and end of the nineteenth century? Only the roughest guess can be attempted for the late Enlightenment, when perhaps a few thousand writers (*Schriftsteller*) had one foot planted firmly enough in the world of politics to allow them to call themselves “publicists” (*Publizisten*).⁴⁷ Yet writing of any sort was still most commonly a secondary occupation, or *Nebenberuf*, that almost never yielded sufficient income on its own. Of these publicists, only a small proportion worked regularly for the periodical press and thus can be considered journalists in the narrow sense. A journalist’s time, moreover, was typically divided between writing fiction and book reviews, contributing articles for encyclopedias, translating foreign texts, perhaps even checking page proofs or setting print. It is hardly surprising therefore that for most of the nineteenth century no reliable figures exist for the number of journalists in Germany. Thomas Nipperdey has estimated that about 4,600 journalists were active in Germany in 1904.⁴⁸

Before 1848, the educational background of those journalists who became editors (always a minority) actually differed little from that of other professionals. Sources are very scarce, but a study of ninety editors active before 1848 indicates that almost all of them had attended an institution of higher education, and a high proportion held a doctorate.⁴⁹ On the other hand, through much of the nineteenth century it was said that every journalist in Leipzig used the *Dokortitel* whether it was deserved or not. Gradually higher education became less, not more, important as an entrée to the field, increasing the social distance between journalists and doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other professionals.⁵⁰ This trend accelerated with the sudden emergence after the 1880s of the *Generalanzeiger* press, which was based on (relatively) non-partisan reporting, extensive advertisements, and mass circulations. Thus by 1923 another survey of editors revealed that 61 percent classed themselves as “academics” but only about 30 percent had actually completed their studies.⁵¹ Nonetheless, through much of the previous century most journalists had once been active (or still were) as “educators” in the broad sense, or in an occupation where they handled printed matter as part of their daily routine: as librarians, officials, lawyers, book printers, and postmasters, for example.

Over time, the ability to earn a living exclusively from journalism increased gradually, so that by 1848 the proportion of those who listed journalism as their principal occupation to those who pursued it secondarily was, by one estimate, about three to one.⁵² Meanwhile, specialization accelerated.

New and increasingly diverse functions came to be performed by publishers, managing editors, department editors, foreign, trade, and book review editors, reporters, parliamentary and foreign correspondents, theater critics, and so on. Ordinarily the number of people who were employed by others to sit and work “on location” — that is, where the newspaper or journal was actually produced — remained surprisingly small. The proportion of those who made journalism a lifetime pursuit was smaller still.

Other changes in the technical division of labor within the field mirrored these developments. In the eighteenth century many publishers composed, edited, and even printed their own material; but from about 1800 onward publishers began to conceive of their function increasingly in managerial and commercial terms. In 1825, long before writers of any sort (let alone journalists) had their own professional association, German publishers formed the *Börsenverein der deutschen Buchhändler* to represent their interests; by 1845 it included half of all publishers.⁵³ In cities where the political press was expanding rapidly, the organization of publishers was sometimes followed more quickly by the organization of writers. Leipzig, for instance, was the center of Germany’s publishing industry and allegedly a “mother lode” of opportunities for writers and publishers in the 1830s and 1840s. There the founding of a *Leipziger Buchhändlerverein* in 1833 preceded the founding of a *Leipziger Literatenverein* by only nine years.⁵⁴ It would be wrong, however, to assume that the structural expansion of the German press automatically augmented the status or rewards of journalism, in the eyes of journalists themselves or of other Germans. In many cases, it did the exact reverse.⁵⁵

Because journalists were so sensitive to the charge of partisanship, whenever possible they tried to fudge the issue of where politics and reportage intersected. Local political circumstances often determined whether they were successful. Again the case of Leipzig is revealing. The founders of the *Leipziger Literatenverein* were fully aware of Saxony’s repressive press policies, and so their statutes (§1) claimed that the purpose of their organization was moral — not “aesthetic,” still less “political,” and certainly not designed to provide a “comprehensive opinion [*Gesamtmeynung*]” about “general matters of state.”⁵⁶ However, when the first *Deutsche Schriftstellerversammlung* was held in Leipzig in 1845, probably many of the 110 writers in attendance agreed with a contributor to *Die Grenzboten* that this tactic had not been successful. As an accurate reflection of current trends in the field, this contributor wrote disapprovingly that the “political and material” tendency was more strongly represented at the Leipzig gathering than the “artistic, ideal” element.⁵⁷

The social status of German writers in general had improved slowly since the mid-eighteenth century, when to be labeled a novelist (*Romantiste*) was still an insult.⁵⁸ Journalists benefited from this trend, if only marginally. Yet

from the 1790s onward, journalism allegedly began to demand more work and offer fewer rewards. It was not uncommon to hear references to the Roman slave trade when working conditions for ordinary newspaper writers were discussed; parallels were also drawn between journalists and conscripted soldiers or forced laborers.⁵⁹ Friedrich Schiller, after working briefly (and obviously under duress) for the periodical press, wrote to a friend in 1788: “May heaven protect you from the desperate thought of putting yourself in chains in the writer’s galley [*Schriftstellergaleere*]. That I can warn my friend is the only real profit I derived from this experience.”⁶⁰ Many other famous writers who tested the waters of journalism — Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Gutzkow, Ferdinand Freiligrath, Theodor Mommsen, Heinrich von Treitschke, and Karl Marx — came to the same conclusion. As editor of the *Schleswig-Holsteinische Zeitung* in 1848, Mommsen was perhaps typical in the bitterness of his reflections. After writing some sixty newspaper articles in the space of a few weeks during the revolution, Mommsen described journalism as so “disreputable” and “spiritually dissipating” that he would have come to ruin had he been forced to endure it any longer.⁶¹ Mommsen’s fellow historian Treitschke agreed when, in the 1870s, just one year before being called to the University of Berlin, he turned down a financially lucrative offer to edit the renowned *Spenerische Zeitung*. Treitschke reflected afterward: “To write a lead editorial immediately upon receiving the latest telegram, and then to have to write the exact opposite eight days later — that is a business for other people.”⁶²

As publishers and editors began to reassess the relationship between profitability, political independence, and literary excellence, it was more often the rank-and-file journalist who experienced the downside of an undersupply of conviction and an oversupply of manpower. By the 1850s, Gustav Freytag’s readers would have been familiar enough with this to appreciate the tragicomic quality of Schmock’s famous lament: “My editor is a dishonest man. He cuts too much and pays too little. . . . How can I write pure brilliance for him at five *Pfennige* per line?”⁶³ Yet Lenore O’Boyle has written that in the 1830s and 1840s, journalists and other writers were poor not because it was difficult to get into print but because it was too easy. Contemporary complaints from impoverished writers generally substantiate this view, as do reports from less partisan foreign observers. The small journals that proliferated in these years were willing to accept almost anything as long as they did not have to pay for it. And whereas the potential readership of political journals rose swiftly after 1840, production costs also soared and the risk of offending Metternich’s stable of censors discouraged investment. As a result, holding the line on honoraria

proved an effective way to reduce costs. This consideration continued to limit the number of salaried writers on the staffs of newspapers and journals well into the twentieth century, as is indicated by Hans Delbrück's constant worries about the level of honoraria paid to writers who contributed to his *Preußische Jahrbücher*.⁶⁴ Hence, although there may have been what Heinrich Laube referred to as "universal literary conscription"⁶⁵ in the nineteenth century, there also arose fine and increasingly oppressive distinctions of rank within the journalistic profession. Theodor Fontane, who marshaled a national reputation as a writer of great works but also served as a literary foot soldier for the conservative *Neue Preußische (Kreuz-) Zeitung*, understood how social antagonism, economic calculation, and different perspectives on the creative process prevented the emergence of a corporate ethos among journalists: "Only he who serves as his own editor," Fontane observed once, "can live from what he writes."⁶⁶

Although the relationship between editors and unsalaried journalists was not simply exploitive, early in the nineteenth century or later, editors were generally far better rewarded for their labors, and this gap appears to have grown over time. At mid-century, relatively senior editors often worked eighteen hours per day, and even in 1920 a poll conducted in Cologne estimated the average workweek for editors at sixty hours.⁶⁷ Yet what information we have about salaries in this and earlier periods also suggests that more than a small elite of editors earned relatively high remuneration, most notably in large urban centers. Around 1900 an editor of a small or medium-sized newspaper in a provincial capital might have earned somewhere between 3,000 and 10,000 marks annually. This salary would almost surely have placed such an editor among a small town's circle of notables: one thinks of the editor Nothgroschen in Heinrich Mann's *Der Untertan*, whom Diederich Heßling described disparagingly but inaccurately as a "broken-down scholar" and "a starving penny-a-liner."⁶⁸ Correspondents and editors with many years' experience might have earned between 10,000 and 20,000 marks, while a chief editor on the staff of a large national daily might earn a salary of 40,000 to 50,000 marks. These higher salaries, however, were almost invariably tied to rigorous administrative responsibilities.

To what extent does this information about the working conditions and socioeconomic status of journalists correspond with contemporaries' *perception* of the journalistic vocation, at least as reflected in the political, scholarly, or fictional literature of the day? With what criteria did Germans try to appraise the worth of a journalist's "product" according to its literary merit, political influence, or market value? And why in particular did they equate journalism

with such a wide range of occupations, many of which were exceedingly low in status but some of which commanded as much respect as any learned profession?

One handbook for journalists (1901) observed that most Germans liked to complain about the government, the police, and the weather — but they all complained about the newspapers of the day.⁶⁹ Because literary excellence did not always distinguish the nineteenth-century press, the number of critics who concentrated their attacks on the “untrained” language of journalists is legion. Just as sports writers in today’s newspapers are cited widely for their abuses of grammar and syntax, well before 1848 and well after 1900 German journalists were being chided for their “*Zeitungsdeutsch*,” “*Journalistendeutsch*,” and “*Kellerdeutsch*.”⁷⁰ Nor was Gustav Freytag in the 1850s the first to recognize the dramatic potential of journalism. Other German playwrights had been leveling criticism against journalists for at least a century, and the titles of their dramas make it abundantly clear that they associated newspaper work with hypocrisy, cant, parochialism, and the basest of personal motives.⁷¹ Given that many of these observations sprang from an age when princely patronage was still indispensable to those who sought literary fame, when Germany lacked a national capital or intellectual center equivalent to London and Paris, and when the low life of literature was colliding with the High Enlightenment (to borrow from Robert Darnton and French circumstances),⁷² is it any wonder that early images of journalists’ literary shortcomings, political naïveté, and crass self-interest persisted so long? “Exaggeration of every sort,” wrote the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer in 1851, “is as inherent in journalism [*Zeitungsschreiberei*] as in the dramatic arts; for it is a matter of making as much as possible out of every action. That is why all newspaper writers, because of their craft, are alarmists. This is their way of making themselves interesting.”⁷³

It was also said that journalism was a fine career — as long as you got out of it. But Germans always harbored grave suspicions about why certain types got into it. Bismarck’s remark about journalism as a refuge for those who could not succeed in other walks of life was only one among many such observations. Indeed, there has been an open season on German journalists for so long now that two scholars recently collected these potshots and filled a book.⁷⁴ Were all these snipers off the mark? It hardly seems possible. Gotthold Lessing, one of the most prominent writers and editors in Germany after 1750, wrote that “today, every young man who is only passably competent in the German language and who has read the odd thing here and there, is editing a weekly journal.”⁷⁵ A long line of other critics emphasized the same connection between social and professional misdevelopment. Adolph von Knigge complained in 1785: “the fools are everywhere; whoever cannot do anything

else writes [for] a journal,”⁷⁶ while the conservative social historian and journalist Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl noted in the mid-nineteenth century that “whoever wants to reap without having first sown becomes a *Literat*.”⁷⁷

Riehl believed that German journalism had been born “socially premature [*ein soziales Siebenmonatskind*],” but he was not the last to label journalists members of an “intellectual proletariat,” comparing them to such other frustrated careerists as unsalaried lecturers, virtuosos, and comic actors.⁷⁸ Others claimed that journalists functioned entirely outside the social organism, likening them to gypsies, tinkers, actors, shepherds, ballad-mongers, and barrel-organists. Still others conceded that the press played a decisive role in modern society, but noted that journalists were, like “other” free professionals, impossible to locate precisely on the social scale. More often both viewpoints were mixed. Max Weber, in his famous 1919 lecture on “Politics as a Vocation,” tried to defend the honor of journalists and their sense of responsibility as professionals, but he probably conveyed in stronger terms his notion of journalists as “demagogues” and as a “pariah caste” in society.⁷⁹ A last group can be identified as those who postulated the indispensability of journalism but at the same time equated it with occupations that may be functionally necessary for society but whose practitioners often bring “bad news”: postal clerks, schoolmasters, lower officials, and — perhaps most revealingly — dentists.⁸⁰ The simple ascription of negative status to journalists, in other words, while at the same time partially obscuring the problem and hinting at its complexity, does not resolve the question of how and why journalists were so often judged according to standards established by other professional groups.

Something else is often missed by historians who cite these well-known observations: the political subtext that underlay them. To take just two examples, Riehl and Bismarck clearly equated journalism with the growing challenge of liberalism at mid-century.⁸¹ The frequency with which journalism was identified as the chosen profession of young, rootless, and poorly trained (or overtrained) school-leavers “on the make” reveals an important dimension of this problem. It is not always possible to distinguish categorically between liberal and conservative perceptions here. The liberal writers Karl Gutzkow and Heinrich Laube were among those who identified the key ingredient of “independence” that accorded “outsider roles” to both journalism and liberalism. Whereas most of the ambitious and strong-willed students these men knew in their student days (the late 1820s and 1830s) desired a position connected with the state, “every free activity that depended only on one’s own independent strength was considered adventurous, even suspect.”⁸² From a perspective even further left, Ferdinand Lassalle wrote that newspaper writers were “a band of

men who are unqualified to be elementary school teachers and too lazy to be postal clerks.”⁸³ Decades later Kaiser Wilhelm II was even more blunt. He described German journalists in 1890 as degenerate types destined to starve (*Hungerkandidaten*) before they found gainful employment. In Wilhelm’s view, German society was burdened by an “over-production of educated persons,” and journalists formed part of a new “proletariat of school-leavers [*Abiturientenproletariat*].”⁸⁴ Max Weber’s analysis in 1919 was of course more sophisticated and less negative than the Kaiser’s, but his conclusion also pointed to journalists’ desperate need to earn a living and the lack of alternatives open to them. Thus he noted that journalists were among those professionals who now pursued politics as a vocation, not as a kind of voluntary service to society, as notables had (allegedly) pursued it in the nineteenth century. Journalists and other “professionals” lived “from” politics, Weber wrote, not “for” politics. Each of these observations provides a clue to why the “independence” of the journalist was not generally seen in the same positive light as the more universally acknowledged “free professions.”

Ten years ago Cecelia von Studnitz attempted to draw up a balance sheet between journalists’ social standing “in reality” and the way they were portrayed in works of fiction (not quite all works in her sample were German).⁸⁵ A thorough consideration of Studnitz’s innovative study cannot be included here, but her conclusions can be summarized under five points. (1) In 62 percent of the 183 cases where a journalist appeared as a fictional protagonist, Studnitz found that the journalist was presented in a generally positive light. In a limited sense this may reflect the self-image of German journalists as well, because in over half of these cases the author of the work was (or had been) active as a journalist (Freytag is one of her examples). (2) Studnitz’s study confirmed that journalists in fiction generally held liberal views and belonged to the middle classes. More than half of the fictional journalists had middle-class origins, whereas only 6 percent came from the upper classes. On the other hand, Studnitz noted that almost 30 percent of fictional journalists came from the lower classes; in reality, she notes, this proportion was far lower. In addition, although most fictional journalists came from small towns or the countryside, the majority of them earned their living in big cities. This led Studnitz to conclude that the image of the journalist as a *Spießbürger* who made up for limited cultivation and narrow horizons with unbounded ambition may not have been unfounded. (3) The relative socioeconomic position of fictional journalists appears to have declined during the Second Reich over what it had

been in the period 1789-1870 and was again to be during the Weimar Republic. In the earlier and later eras, 43 percent and 50 percent of journalists are portrayed as “comfortably situated” (*wohlsituiert*), while in the Second Reich only 32 percent fell into this category. Lumping together those who were either “poor” or who lived “on the edge” with an *Existenzminimum*, the results for the earlier and later periods were 57 and 50 percent respectively, while 66 percent of fictional journalists in the Second Reich were described this way. (4) Studnitz also concluded that “whereas one finds in works of fiction dependent, mercenary, starving journalistic protagonists who are striving for success,” in reality these types corresponded principally to those journalists who as “*Statuswechsler*” pursued other occupations, including the more general designation *Schriftsteller-Publizist*. After 1870, the “self-made journalist” [sic] appeared more frequently in reality, claimed Studnitz, though in works of fiction this figure was often portrayed — not always negatively — as a parvenu or arriviste (*Emporkömmling*). Studnitz used this term in part because she believed that salary scales for journalists probably rose after 1890, when the emergence of the *Generalanzeiger* press increased demand for journalists and devalued higher education — not to mention literary talent — as a qualification for entry into the field. In so far as this hypothesis about rising salaries appears to contradict fictional evidence about the journalist’s *declining* socioeconomic status during the *Kaiserreich*, Studnitz may have identified an interesting but not yet fully substantiated lag between reality and fiction. (5) Lastly, Studnitz suggested that although journalists in fictional works spanned the full range of positive and negative figures that we find personified by Bolz and Schmock in Freytag’s *Die Journalisten*, on balance these journalists’ ethics and their motives for entering the field were neither as high-minded as one would expect (in theory) of modern professionals, nor as suspect as many nineteenth-century observers charged. The “egoistic” aim “to shock or destroy,” for example, like the “idealistic” aim “to enlighten” the people, each characterize only 5 percent of Studnitz’s journalists, while the less easily categorized goals of “earning money” or “self-advancement” motivated far more.

The following table derived from Studnitz’s study summarizes these conclusions.⁸⁶

Professional Images of the Journalist (Pre-1900)

<u>Characteristics</u>	<u>Positive Protagonist</u>	<u>Negative Protagonist</u>
<i>Label</i>	• "independent"	• "dependent"
<i>Social origins</i>	• upper or middle classes	• middle or lower classes
<i>Social mobility</i>	• none	• declining, seldom ascending
<i>Actual preparatory training</i>	• "academic journalist"	• "Statuswechsler"
<i>Fictional preparatory training</i>	• academic — higher education completed	• academic — higher education usually interrupted; seldom nonacademic
<i>Financial circumstances</i>	• independent	• dependent
<i>Principal activity</i>	• writing	• editing
<i>Field of activity</i>	• <i>Gesinnungspresse</i>	• mainly <i>Gesinnungspresse</i> , seldom nonpartisan press
<i>Political engagement</i>	• yes	• no
<i>Preferred target group</i>	• the people	• lobby groups
<i>Imagined characteristics of readership</i>	• positive: elite	• negative: elite
<i>Perceived professional abilities</i>	• talented	• untalented
<i>Professional motives</i>	• idealistic, political: to implement progressive ideas	• materialistic: to secure one's own material existence
<i>Professional ethics</i>	• yes	• no
<i>Professional motivation</i>		
(a) "material"		
• to earn money		27 %
(b) "egoistic"		
• self-advancement		21 %
• to exert power		12 %
• to shock or destroy		5 %
(c) "idealistic"		
• to change things	21 %	
• to enlighten	5 %	
• to educate	4 %	
• to control	3 %	
• to help	1 %	

Source: Based on Cecilia von Studnitz, *Kritik des Journalisten* (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1983) 71, 129-33; percentage figures for "Professional motivation" refer to period 1789-1980s (N=170 cases).

Studnitz's study and some of the preceding argument might be regarded as being either too conjectural or not conjectural enough. At the very least, the issues raised here bring together social and political questions in ways that provide a link between this section and the next. Three observations of a methodological nature can demonstrate this further.

First, in trying to avoid overly schematic conclusions and yet give meaning to contradictory information, one must frequently rely on what journalists said about themselves — always a rather risky enterprise — as much as what others said about them. In both cases, the problem is: just how much of the rhetoric about journalists' place in society can be taken at face value? In the end, it is impossible to distinguish categorically between the journalist's actual status in society, descriptions of the status that journalists would have *liked* to enjoy, and ascriptions of relative status based on comparisons with other groups against which Germans also ritually inveighed (the schoolteacher, the Catholic priest, the *Spießbürger*).⁸⁷

Second, we need to keep political biases constantly in view. Here the *readers'* point of view should be considered. To what degree did the sharp polemical tone of political journalism in Germany contribute to public distaste for the journalist as an individual? What relative value was put on information, opinion, and style? Some readers voted with their feet when they selected a "cheese and sausage rag" over a party organ because it offered more up-to-date stock prices; others registered their opposite preference when they looked for a lead editorial spiced with a "salty style." But did readers consider journalists in their multiple identities — as public advocates, as employees in a commercial undertaking, as simple reporters of everyday events, and as *Berufspolitiker*? Would such readers have agreed with Max Weber, who distinguished between "experts" (*Fachbeamte*) and "political functionaries" (*politische Beamte*) but who also recognized that in modern society both functions often go together?⁸⁸

As noted previously, there are many reasons liberals saw a quintessentially "modern" brand of journalism as a good thing. They tended to argue, for example, that political differences were anything but a handicap to the development of journalism as an institution and, perhaps, even as a profession. Could this explain the willingness of liberal writers to satirize *themselves* — not only because it seemed both laudable and inevitable that they should do so, but also because it underscored their particular understandings about talent, commitment, and professionalism? Conservatives, on the other hand, found far less comfort in the fact that a lively, up-to-date brand of journalism accurately reflected an anxiety-ridden age. Polemical journalism, by magnifying differences and divisions, could never appeal to those who prized social harmony and political stasis above all else. Polemical journalism, in their eyes, could never be truly "professional" journalism. Maximilian Harden

acknowledged the power of this conservative outlook in 1902 when, in an open letter to a New York journalist, he bitterly attacked the German establishment for its attitude toward journalists:

Every year the Verein Berliner Presse holds a public ball; in attendance are dignitaries who perceive their own weakness and who hope for assistance from the great Babylonia [*Babylonierin*] in discreet matters; but as with visits to houses of ill-repute, they don't bring their wives with them. . . .

This is the position of the press in the land of poets and philosophers. Every day a thousand examples would show you how everyone here — not only the class of mandarins — disdains the institution and its servants. . . . Looked down upon is not only the true journalist, who nimbly hauls in reports and toils away at them in editorial offices with pen, scissors, and pencil: no, [the same is true for] everyone who is associated with the press; and it has come to the point that the disreputable social designation [*anrühige Standesbezeichnung*] [of journalism] is avoided whenever possible, and people who have no idea about law or political economy call themselves — both shamelessly and proudly — publicists.⁸⁹

Third, both liberals and conservatives found that their vested interests were closely tied up with the fate of journalism. As a reflection of the division of power within political society, the press became a potent symbol that both political groups had to fight over in order to maintain political hegemony, to wrest it from others, or at least to preserve the appearance of legitimacy.⁹⁰ For this reason, we should be aware of a presentist, liberal bias if we assume that journalism *should* proceed on a trajectory toward an institutionalized profession, that journalists *should* have uniform goals, that journalists *should* resist becoming “merely” a part of popular culture,⁹¹ or indeed that professionals of any sort *should* prove themselves capable of “consolidating liberty through reform.”⁹² Again Anthony La Vopa has provided a perspective on this, drawn from the eighteenth century but relevant to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries too: “within a political definition of a social category, various kinds of mobility into the intelligentsia and through its ranks tend to be collapsed into a single bourgeois ‘ascent’, in turn marking a single species of emancipatory consciousness.”⁹³ Here La Vopa is lodging many of the same complaints that were registered by David Blackburn and Geoff Eley some years ago: that the social designation “*Bürger*” and the political designation “liberal” should not be conflated; and that members of a bourgeoisie may be able to realize their economic, social, cultural (and, presumably, professional) goals within a political regime that falls far short of a liberal democracy.⁹⁴

IV

Bolz. What do you desire from us, Roman slave? . . . You want us to outrage your political convictions? To make you an apostate? . . .

Schmock. Why do you bother yourself about that? I have learned . . . to write in all directions. I have written left and again right. I can write in all directions.

Bolz. I see you have character. You cannot help but succeed on our newspaper.

Gustav Freytag, *Die Journalisten*, act 2, scene 2

When Gustav Freytag published *Die Journalisten* in 1854, he already had considerable journalistic experience as editor of the influential Leipzig journal *Die Grenzboten*. Yet Freytag chose to explore journalism's dramatic potential by portraying German society as confronting the dual threats of political activism and journalistic irresponsibility. Early in his drama Freytag established the link between the "maddening potion" of politics and the "wicked spirit" of journalism. The noble heroine Adelaide at one point expresses the preference for security and tradition that so frequently colored conservative criticisms of the press: "These politics!" exclaims Adelaide, "If I ever happen to take any man into my heart, I would place on him only once condition. . . : Smoke tobacco, my husband, perhaps it does destroy the carpet; but don't ever dare to read a newspaper, that will ruin your character."⁹⁵ Yet at the end of the story, Adelaide clandestinely purchases a liberal newspaper and sets herself up as publisher. Left standing in the wings are her hapless rivals: Schmock and his conspiratorial coterie of reactionary editors. Like so many others before and since, they have proved unable to balance the conflicting demands of political conservatism and modern journalism.

For many reasons, conservative journalists were more ambivalent than their liberal colleagues about their perceived tasks in the public sphere. Conservative journalists had special difficulty reconciling the need to write "for the moment" with their faith in organic development and tradition. Though they sought to defend existing institutions, they were attacked for hastening change. Though empowered to cry out and tell all, they were expected to write cautiously and reveal nothing. When they composed polemical tracts for royal patrons or signed their names to an occasional journal article, they won personal recognition from those who were reluctant to arouse expectations about the future of public communication. But when they contributed anonymous articles to daily newspapers that promised more revelations on a continuing basis — they were damned. Conservative journalists were seen everywhere and welcomed nowhere.

Against this portrait of disappointed hopes and frustrated ambitions, one can also find in the historical record a compelling counterimage that stressed the tangible and (more often) the intangible rewards of journalism. But that counterimage was primarily a liberal one. Attempting to convince others that their calling deserved respect and they preferment, liberals more often than conservatives tended to blur distinctions between their role in the literary and political spheres; indeed, they often claimed that their contribution was decisive in both.⁹⁶ Liberals tended to claim that they shouldered lightly the burden of their rootless existence, because such isolation was a necessary (if hardly welcome) guarantor of cultural creativity and political independence. From this perspective, liberal journalists wrote on their feet because they could never rest. They traveled without refuge because their home was the world. They accepted humble compensation for their labors because they did not pander to authority. And they belonged to no estate — much less a class — because they spoke for “the people.”⁹⁷

It is no accident, therefore, that the great figures of the nineteenth-century press were liberals. The Wielands, the Cottas, the Sonnemanns, the Mosses — these men were no pariahs. Neither of course were Karl and Julius Bachem, Maximilian Harden, or Hans Delbrück, whose politics cannot easily be labeled but who might be described as moderate (or reformist) conservatives. On the other hand, one is hard pressed to think of a comparable “giant” in the world of conservative journalism at all, let alone one who was not tainted with scandal. Leopold Alois Hoffmann in the 1790s, Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg in the 1830s and 1840s, Hermann Wagener after 1848, and Wilhelm von Hammerstein-Schwartow in the 1880s and 1890s are only the most prominent among many such examples. Little wonder, then, that those Germans who steadfastly refused to concede the legitimacy of the press on principle tended to regard *all* journalists as pariahs, no matter under which political banner they fought.

One of the most vehement representatives of this viewpoint was a hack writer who became editor of the first explicitly conservative journal in German lands, the *Wiener Zeitschrift* (1792-94). Leopold Alois Hoffmann has attracted more than his share of attention by virtue of the unrestrained diatribes he unleashed against rationalism and the French Revolution.⁹⁸ Rather more interesting, however, are Hoffmann’s reflections on the function of political journalism itself, because they help us avoid the mistake of reading back into the eighteenth-century circumstances and attitudes that prevailed in the period 1819-48. One historian has argued that in *Vormärz* Germany, periodicals had not progressed very far down the road from “reflection” to “criticism”: still only barely “political,” they were not yet either fully “politicized” or overtly “politicizing.”⁹⁹ This is misleading. Because the antirevolutionary press was not a flower that could be nurtured carefully in the 1790s, but instead was brought

to full bloom in the hothouse of revolutionary excitement, there developed strains of German journalism that were politically (and aesthetically) less pleasing than some historians would believe. For this reason a brief account of Hoffmann's contribution to the genre can illuminate the reciprocal relationship between the combating of a "dangerous" press, the early growth of negative images of German journalism, and the genesis of political conservatism — all at decisive stages of their development.

The style of the *Wiener Zeitschrift* in both tone and substance was set by Hoffmann in the first issue.¹⁰⁰ That issue covered almost every article of faith espoused by conservative journalists for decades to come, attacking the "intoxication with liberty" and "the general atmosphere of political fermentation" in the wake of the French Revolution. More pointedly, Hoffmann also attacked the practitioners of "unbridled enlightenment"—the "horde of cosmopolitan and 'philanthropic' authors" and "subversive political assassins [*Mordbrenner*]" who took Mirabeau as their model. Public opinion was "completely in their hands," he argued, because their "brazen loquaciousness [and] their flair for intrigue and manipulation"—combined with the "terrifying omnipotence" of secret societies — lent prestige to their "disastrous principles."

The quantity as well as the quality of reading material available to the reading public concerned Hoffmann deeply. He believed that since the basic truths of religion, philosophy, and ethics had been discovered long before and found expression in existing books, they did not need to be repeated, revised, or reflected upon. Identifying both the vulgar reading habits of the masses and the profit motive among publishers that forced authors to prostitute themselves in order to survive, Hoffmann believed that "the good cause" would be served if books were once again — as in the Middle Ages — published only in Latin. Thus, public education was itself an enemy of true understanding, because it promoted only "freshness, obtrusiveness, wild manners, [and] insolence."¹⁰¹ Hoffmann was also in favor of strict censorship of the press. He once wrote that Germany need never fear "intellectual despotism."¹⁰² On the other hand, he advocated the subsidization of conservative publicists, proposing that the state appoint a tribunal to review the credentials of every person who sought to enter the guild of writers. Here, too, he anticipated later conservative views of "legitimate" journalistic qualifications when he declared that such a body must be composed only of men "of known integrity, religious convictions, and solid learning." Yet Hoffmann could never have appreciated how decisively his own writing had called into question the integrity of political journalism itself.

After Hoffmann's journal collapsed, Robespierre, Napoleon, and the Prussian reformers provided conservative journalists with immeasurably more vivid images to mobilize their readers in new ways. Predicting the very worst if the "excesses" of rationalist and egalitarian thought should win new adherents, these writers set about the business of conservative journalism — still earning

meager honoraria but honing their craft and giving the conservative ideology a recognizable profile. To be sure, after 1815 conservative publishing became both more auspicious and more precarious. When the state officially endorsed conservative principles and then backed them up with the repressive Carlsbad Decrees of 1819, the conservative journalist's claim to independence was less willingly accepted by the reading public — usually with good reason. Pro-establishment journalists between 1819 and 1848 tended to write official notices and translations rather than report events in the modern sense. Most of them offered “citations” instead of “opinion,” novelties taken from the press of foreign lands rather than analyses of events in Germany. In 1825, for example, it was said that the two important newspapers in Berlin, the *Vossische Zeitung* and the *Spenersche Zeitung*, could be relied on only to report on foreigners who lived beyond their one-hundredth birthday and on women who gave birth to triplets.¹⁰³ Hence an English observer wrote in 1844 that Germany's political press in general was “without interest — without influence — without character — without sympathy.”¹⁰⁴

Yet again one must question whether Germany's political press, for all its immaturity, was not more piquant on the eve of the 1848 Revolution than this English writer believed. Certainly some conservatives were aware well before 1848 that their newspapers had to take on a sharper political profile to be effective.¹⁰⁵ In 1842, Leopold von Gerlach wrote to Hengstenberg, editor of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, that it was mistaken to remain silent about political affairs that were uncomfortable to discuss or that could not be refuted: “If an antirevolutionary newspaper is to be successfully established,” Gerlach observed, “no report can be passed on in a neutral manner [*gesinnungslos nacherzählt*], but rather must always be cast in the correct political light. This accomplishes more than treatises, it awakens faith in the truth of our politics and allows one to preach positive Christianity in a practical way.” Nonetheless, Gerlach conceded that the conservative press suffered from the same stigma that afflicted the conservative journalist in society. “The difficulty is to find coworkers,” Gerlach wrote, “because many will not devote themselves to the maligned press, many believe it to be incompatible with their office and estate, [and] many shrink from the defamation [*Verleumdung*], the insults [*Schimpfe*], a[nd] the scorn [*Spott*]. It is always more difficult to find coworkers than money.”¹⁰⁶

In addition to taking a stand on the increasingly dramatic political issues in this era, conservative journalists continued to identify and attack the abuses of German journalism. Two examples suffice to suggest that the political press, well before 1848, had recaptured some of the partisan spirit of Leopold Hoffmann's day. The first example is an essay entitled “*Die gute und die schlechte Presse*,” published in the *Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland* in 1840.¹⁰⁷ In this piece the anonymous essayist identifies the press

as a “power” — albeit an “often demonic” power — even in his (or her) day. The press, properly understood, was not an organ of public opinion, this writer continued, but rather “a very significant means for the fabrication, seduction, and demagogic abuse” of public opinion. The reasons for the success of the “bad press” were not hard to identify. The “unreflective reading appetite” of the lower classes demanded exciting reading materials: the most popular newspapers were those that “best indulge the lusts of the masses, their wild ideas, and their *Schadenfreude*, that . . . spread slander and rummage for scandal, [and] that dish up gossip [*Klatschereien*] of all sorts.” To their greater discredit, the German masses ignored the “good” press — those newspapers “that combat lies with calm, that convincingly point up the contradictions of the spokesmen of the day, and that make it their business to rectify [!] public opinion with intellect and, no less, with an appealing style.” More restraint, this essay concluded, was what separated the “good” press from “the spiritual plague” and “poisoning” of “*Schnappsliteratur*.”

The second example is from the New Year’s *Testament* of 1847 published by Karl Peter Berly, editor of Frankfurt’s conservative *Oberpostamts-Zeitung*. Here Berly sought to distinguish between what he called the “organic” and the “chaotic” press in Germany.¹⁰⁸ Journalists contributing to the “organic” press, he suggested, worked from historical principles and investigated their stories with truth and insight. Their work was thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the times. Those who wrote for the “chaotic” press, on the other hand, “scraped together” the events they encountered, inquired only about consequences and ignored causes, and were satisfied with the temporary effect. Focusing on the failings of society, they also espoused the passions of the political parties — a double indictment. Berly recognized that “the ideal of the organic press” could never be attained, but only because the chaotic press “wins the applause of the masses.”

Berly’s political testament accurately reflected how most conservative journalists saw their world. Conceived in dichotomous terms, their sort of journalism demanded a statement of principle for or against the masses, for or against contemporary public opinion, for or against the careful exercise of the journalistic profession. Yet it remained impossible to separate — to “quarantine” — the worlds of *Publikum* and *Politikum*. As Berly stated later in his testament, the “weapon of the word” had to be used carefully: “speaking to the public daily,” he noted, “is a rash, perhaps a presumptuous, beginning.” Newspapers should not “anticipate [*vordenken*]” the thoughts of their readers. Nor should they presume to advise statesmen, because unsolicited advice “is of no use and is usually rejected.” (One supposes that Berly was given the title *Hofrat* because he never sought to give the *Hof* his *Rat*.) Berly hated the term “*Leitartikel*” because he believed newspapers should never lead; instead he boasted that over his career he had written some 4,000 “*Eingangsartikeln*.” Similarly, under the

rubric “*Schwebende Fragen*,” Berly liked to write essays with question marks at both the outset and the conclusion. In short, he never answered the stirring questions of the day — nor did he seek to. As Riehl remarked some years later, this conservative journalist would likely have preferred the Sphinx to the trumpeting courier on the masthead of the *Oberpostamts-Zeitung*.

The quantum leap in periodical publishing in 1848 and then again after 1871 is a subject that far exceeds the bounds of this essay. Nor can the literature on Bismarck’s manipulation of the press be considered due to limits of space, even though it is of obvious relevance because it gave tangible advantages to conservative publicists for the first time while simultaneously reinforcing images of the journalist as a Byzantine sycophant.¹⁰⁹ Arguably, however, more pressing questions can be addressed by carrying forward this twin discussion, about conservatives’ attacks on the abuse of the press and about their efforts to increase the standing, readership, and quality of their own newspapers.

Throughout the Second Reich, conservative journalists continued to analyze the shortcomings of their press in terms of what it offered, or failed to offer, to the reading public. A few of them noted that their colleagues were too quick to disparage sensationalism and *Klatsch* in the liberal press. Such criticism, they charged, disregarded the fact that liberal newspapers provided their readers with well-written material of daily interest while conservative organs put their readers to sleep. This point was only part of what eventually became a long litany of complaints about the conservative press:¹¹⁰ that it was too high brow in language and expensive for the common man; that it neglected domestic politics; that it had no *Feuilleton* writers of any merit; that it offered few affordable newspapers in non-Prussian territories and none in the countryside; that its efforts to establish new organs were ill-prepared and ill-funded; that its leading editors displayed no sense of collegiality; that its publishers lacked business sense; and that it offered younger journalists neither “schooling” nor “placement.”

Condescension mixed with suspicion undermined all efforts to reform the conservative press. Nothing less than a gulf of sympathy and understanding divided the first and fifth estates. Theodor Fontane observed this firsthand when he was invited as a novice reporter to an aristocratic wedding celebration in 1847: “One could read on most faces: Yes, now he will probably want to write about it — which everyone fervently hopes for, but which each individual nonetheless regards as something lowly and almost vile.”¹¹¹ One can say that there existed a gulf of both sympathy *and* understanding because of the remarkable ignorance displayed by members of the upper classes who only occasionally came into contact with the world of journalism. Rudolf Stratz, theater critic for the *Kreuzzeitung* in the early 1890s, seemed to imply that much more than just class prejudice was involved when in his memoirs he recalled an encounter with an aristocratic lady on the streets of Berlin:¹¹²

A woman said to me:

“Who were the gentlemen with whom you were walking yesterday in the Tiergarten?”

I: “The chief editor of the ‘Kreuz-Zeitung,’ for which I am theater critic, Baron [Wilhelm von] Hammerstein; the writer of the lead editorials, Baron [Eduard von] Ungern-Sternberg; Court Preacher [Adolf] Stöcker; plus a few other Reichstag deputies — all co-workers with the ‘Kreuz-Zeitung’.”

The women, knowingly: “Oh, I see! And thus you go through the streets, to see what has happened in the way of news, and write it up for the newspaper?”

Social haughtiness, proximity to political power, and narrow intellectual horizons all contributed to conservatives’ neglect and ignorance of their own press. Given the antidemocratic and elitist prejudices of most of them, it is hardly surprising to find that they agreed with the negative picture of journalists drawn by other critics. But what is even more noteworthy is that conservative journalists themselves deliberately undercut the importance of their own calling. Adam Röder, former editor of the conservative *Badische Post* and, in 1914, editor of the *Süddeutsche Conservative Correspondenz*, once observed that it was misguided to believe that “the people could be influenced in a decisive way politically by mass newspapers.” Röder reflected even deeper conservative prejudices when he added that the farmer typically abandons newspaper reading altogether for a good third of the year — “for he has *important* things to do.”¹¹³

Considering the role of the press as a critic of contemporary society — as a conveyor of novelties in the present that conservatives have denied as possibilities in the past — it is understandable that conservatives greeted with the utmost suspicion any attempt on the part of their own journalists to win mass appeal. Paradoxically, they were relatively uninterested in attempts to raise the intellectual content of their press either.¹¹⁴ They never recognized the potential value of injecting humor into their press or embracing the powerful literary device of satire. In 1848 conservatives had seen how decisively the liberal press benefited from satirical propaganda, but the lesson never stuck.¹¹⁵ Instead, the disinclination to “pander” to the rabble, already evident in 1792 and 1850, remained as explicit as ever. In a typical (but unfortunately anonymous) broadside against all those who wished to appear “popular” before the masses, one conservative critic observed:¹¹⁶ “Most writers who want to be popular are true beggars and toadies before the people: they stoop and submit, they try their

best to affect the people's language and flatter the people, [and] in particular they have to adorn their title and contents with plenty of the word 'Volk.' Where there is real talent, the popular writer confronts the people as lecturer [*Lehrer*] and lord [*Herr*]!" While it is difficult to see how conservative journalists could have expected success in their attempt to win the masses by speaking to them as "lecturer and lord," it is even more remarkable that so few conservatives were aware of this dilemma.

Most journalists sought to steer between what the liberal journalist Theodor Barth identified in 1888 as the "Scylla of boredom" and the "Charybdis of sensationalism."¹¹⁷ But for conservative journalists this required treading a much narrower path than for others. It revealed their most basic problem: how to defend authority, morality, and honest judgment, but at the same time capture the interest of the masses? Some conservative critics merely attacked such popular features of the modern press as the reporting of crime in local newspapers, saying that such reports themselves undermined respect for authority and inevitably led to sensationalism and public hysteria. Others feared that Germany was threatened by what they described as the "revolver press," which forced its victims to choose between losing their money or their honor.¹¹⁸ Thus some conservatives advocated the abolition of anonymous authorship of newspaper articles. This proposal, tellingly, provoked a bitterly divisive debate among conservative journalists, often with ideological and class overtones.¹¹⁹ Richard Nordhausen wrote in 1908 that if political journalists allowed themselves to be denigrated as "coolies" and "writing-slaves," "then anonymity is to blame."¹²⁰ Other conservative journalists labeled such demands misguided and unworkable.

The 1890s also witnessed mounting attacks from the right against the *Generalanzeiger* press.¹²¹ A number of conservative writers suggested that paid advertisements should be banned from the political press altogether. Others argued for the taxation or state control of advertising. Though these were obvious ploys to compensate for the conservatives' poor record in attracting advertisers and making their publishing houses efficient, they revealed an underlying moral imperative. On the one hand, advertisements were believed to contribute to the reading of newspapers for all the wrong reasons. By the end of the nineteenth century these reasons no longer needed to be spelled out explicitly: readers would have understood one writer's cryptic attack on newspapers that accepted advertisements for "secret sciences," "rubber products," and apartments with separate entrances.¹²² On the other hand, the campaign against advertisements also condemned the confusion of "business" and "principle" in the newspaper industry, which it labeled an "American" import.¹²³ But the conservative attack against the *Generalanzeiger* press was doomed to fail. Although the Verein deutscher Zeitungsverleger was founded in 1894

partly to unite those who feared the challenge of the nonpartisan publishers, it was a sign of the times that by 1901 this organization had had to open its ranks to these publishers as well.

In the age of organization, individual virtue and prohibitive legislation could be supplemented with other sorts of collective action in defense of the “good” press. As well as supporting a variety of activities to suppress the socialist press both before and after 1890, the conservative parties undertook organizational initiatives to strengthen their own press.¹²⁴ The results varied greatly, however, and most practical initiatives occurred rather belatedly in the final years before World War I. Catholics, for instance, founded a Central-Auskunftsstelle der katholischen Presse in 1900 that annually investigated some 900 to 1,000 cases of false reports in the non-Catholic press and published rebuttals.¹²⁵ In the 1880s and 1890s a number of auxiliary organizations also appeared with the aim to increase the readership of Christian newspapers and journals.¹²⁶ These included the Verein zur Verbreitung konservativer Zeitschriften, founded in 1883; the Verein zur Förderung des Volkswohls, founded in 1884; the Verein zur Verbreitung guter volkstümlicher Schriften, founded in 1892 and numbering about 1,200 members in 1911; the Volksbund zur Bekämpfung des Schmutzes in Wort und Bild, with about 1,600 members in 1910; and — outstripping all others in scale and influence — the Christlicher Zeitschriftenverein.¹²⁷ These organizations supplemented the patriotic efforts of the more overtly political groups like the Alldeutscher Verband and, later, the Reichsverband gegen die Sozialdemokratie, providing a model for countless smaller initiatives to combat the “subversive” press in all its forms.¹²⁸ Some of these groups displayed a clear understanding of the journalistic resources that could be mobilized in defense of the “good” press. Others, however, dissipated enormous amounts of capital — financial and political — by continuing to address the masses as lecturer and lord.

To sum up this part of the discussion, it seems clear that conservative journalists were hamstrung in their efforts to expand their own press by two sorts of “neglect,” both of which were inherent in the development of political journalism itself: on the one hand, the more obvious and galling neglect accorded their efforts by readers, party leaders, and statesmen; and on the other hand, their own failure to confront the implications of pursuing antidemocratic strategies in political and cultural environments that heralded the “coming of age” of the masses. On each count, one can only guess the psychological costs to conservative journalists, their career frustrations, and the temptations they faced to embrace radical political ideologies.

When such journalists attacked the legitimacy of a critical reporting of events, they found themselves in the paradoxical situation of questioning their own status and function. As a result they remained deeply ambivalent about the legitimate bounds of political discourse. To this was added a second paradox

when these conservatives attacked liberal journalists who were, by turns, portrayed as dangerous revolutionaries who threatened the very existence of the state and as hack writers who represented no one. Just as it was difficult for conservative journalists to concede that their many opponents included talented writers and publishers, it was equally difficult for them to determine when one of their own publishing ventures might be considered a “success.” The winning of a mass readership was often considered less essential than selfless service to a higher ideal (as when one conservative writer compared his martyrdom to that of Christians in Rome and Protestants in France). Due to these ambivalent attitudes toward status, ideology, and the relationship between means and ends, conservative journalists were never able to provide their parties with a propaganda apparatus that approached that of liberal and socialist opponents in scope, sophistication, or influence.

V

It is possible that sometime in the future I, too, . . . will put a low value on our political rags, our party broils, and all that goes along with them. . . . Yes, it is highly possible that my own share in the fight will often be painful, wearying, and not at all what one would call a rewarding occupation; but all that does not restrain me from dedicating my life to the struggle of the age to which I belong; for in spite of everything, this fight is the highest and noblest that one finds today; . . . not every century is fitted to make the men who live in it distinguished and happy.

Gustav Freytag, *Die Journalisten*, act 3, scene 1

Leaving aside the question of politics, it remains to examine the proposals and achievements that together allow one to speak of a partial consummation of journalists’ “professionalization project” after 1900. What reforms were initiated, what organizations were founded, and what mentalities were changed? To what degree (if at all) did these developments sharpen the professional profile of journalists? Did efforts to improve the moral and ethical standards of journalism as a whole pay off by measurably improving journalists’ social prestige, salaries, or job security?

On one level, appeals for a more “truthful,” “patient,” and “principled” approach to journalism persisted from earlier in the century, with only the occasional new wrinkle.¹²⁹ One section of an 1883 handbook, for instance, was devoted to “the honor of the journalistic estate.”¹³⁰ It stated that many modern newspapermen regarded principles and convictions as uncomfortable ballast to be discarded before a successful career was possible. However, the honor of the estate demanded that individual journalists resist the temptations of “indiscretion,”

“scandal-seeking,” “*Klatsch*,” and “dogmatism.” To help steady the will of those who might be so tempted, the author of this handbook felt the tone of Polonius was most appropriate: “Be truthful, be fair, be tolerant of the convictions of others and hold your own high; respect the law and what is right. Yours is indeed an estate of honor that stands second to none. You alone will illustrate that in the present organization of society, journalism is a moral factor of the highest power.”

On another level, however, the sheer number of handbooks promising “practical tips” and “professional advice” to journalists after the 1880s — as well as their growing size, their frequent reprintings, and their authors’ effort to engage each other in debate — attests to the fact that a new level of “professional” (self-) consciousness had been reached.¹³¹ Exactly the same conclusion is reached by examining one of the most underutilized sources on the history of the German press: the many professional organs that addressed the material, intellectual, and ethical concerns of journalists.¹³² To be sure, practical collective action by journalists on their own behalf was only partially successful. As one observer wrote in 1902, the number and diversity of organizations representing the interests of journalists reflected the field’s weakness, not its strength,¹³³ and in 1902 the splintering of the “profession” had barely begun. Yet arguably great strides had been taken during the previous century — strides that are unfairly and inaccurately measured by yardsticks calibrated exclusively to the experience of other professional groups.¹³⁴

Twentieth-century difficulties in rallying journalists as a group had actually been anticipated decades before when Karl Biedermann launched his semiregular *Deutsche Journalistentage* in the 1860s and 1870s; at these gatherings journalists formally represented their individual newspapers, not themselves or their peers.¹³⁵ There is evidence, nonetheless, that the lobbying effort undertaken at these congresses had a significant impact on the liberalization of Germany’s press laws in 1874.¹³⁶ Local initiatives were even more successful: Viennese journalists founded their association “Concordia” in 1859, while the Verein Berliner Presse — representing mainly liberal journalists and publishers — was founded in 1864.¹³⁷ Efforts to establish pension funds and other material benefits for journalists, on the other hand, initially came to naught, in part because politics always intruded. Thus the Augustinus-Verein zur Pflege der katholischen Presse was founded in 1878; by 1911 it allegedly numbered over 1,000 members.¹³⁸ The socialist Berliner Arbeiterpresse was founded in April 1900; it too allegedly included about 1,000 members in 1911. Meanwhile, an Allgemeiner Deutscher Schriftsteller-Verband was established in 1878 and a rival Deutscher Schriftsteller-Verein in 1885. The latter more explicitly sought to represent journalists, and amalgamated with the former in 1887 to form the Deutscher Schriftsteller-Verband. Criticism arose immediately, however, that liberals dominated this new association, and by 1902 its membership had sunk

to about 400, only a minority of which were likely journalists. A similar organization, the Allgemeiner Schriftsteller-Verein, founded in October 1900, numbered about 2,300 members in 1911, while dramatists had two or three separate organizations of their own.¹³⁹

The most important developments in the organization of the profession occurred in the mid-1890s. The special concerns of the Verein deutscher Zeitungsverleger, founded in Leipzig in May 1894, have already been discussed.¹⁴⁰ This organization increasingly represented the interests of employers, though it claimed to support all journalists. Even before 1900, building on the modest success of the Pensionsanstalt Deutscher Journalisten und Schriftsteller,¹⁴¹ a Verband Deutscher Journalisten- und Schriftstellervereine was established in Heidelberg in 1895. Led by Friedrich Spielhagen and Hans Delbrück, in 1902 this umbrella organization comprised twenty-six corporate associations with about 2,000 members. It reached its high point in 1909 when it included thirty-two corporate associations and more than 3,000 members. Although only perhaps 500 of these were active in the press, the founding of a separate organization for journalists in 1910 (see below) reduced the numerical strength and influence of this association substantially; its reorganization as the Kartell deutscher Schriftstellervereine in 1911 was not a success.¹⁴²

One favorite conservative recommendation was for the official examination and certification of anyone who wished to become a journalist. In fact the notion that the social standing of journalism could be raised through agreement on professional credentials and standards became a mania at the turn of the century. Journalism courses, programs, and schools of vastly differing scholarly rigor were established at the universities of Heidelberg, Vienna, and Zurich, at the *Technische Hochschule* in Darmstadt, at the *Handelsakademie* in Cologne, and at Richard Wrede's private institute in Berlin, all between the years 1895 and 1902.¹⁴³ Beginning in 1896–97, Professor Adolf Koch offered (unpaid) lectures and seminars on journalism in Heidelberg each semester. His lectures regularly attracted 200 listeners, his seminars sixty to seventy participants; of these, many followed Koch on field trips to the editorial offices of local newspapers. Koch's efforts elicited a positive echo in a wide range of academic publications, including the *Hochschul-Nachrichten*, and by 1909 efforts had begun to integrate journalistic studies into an interdisciplinary program in Heidelberg and elsewhere. Around the same time, historians, political economists, and members of the emerging field of sociology also began to emphasize the importance of the press in modern culture and politics, returning, for example, to statistical analyses of social issues through newspaper research.¹⁴⁴ Characteristically, the scholars most interested in these developments were themselves outsiders: Hans Delbrück, Hermann Oncken, Adolf Grabowsky, Otto Hoetzsch, Martin Spahn, Karl Lamprecht, and Alfred Weber. That the notion of *Zeitungswissenschaft* remained contested through World War I was

demonstrated by Karl Bücher's avoidance of the term when he established his *Institut für Zeitungskunde* at the University of Leipzig in November 1916. The aim of this institute was not only to emphasize the role of the German (and international) press as a *Kulturträger*, but also to determine means to reform the German press and to educate journalists in practical matters.¹⁴⁵

Meanwhile, by 1910 the splintering of interest groups representing journalists had accelerated, in part along party-political lines and in part hierarchically. A Verein Deutscher Redakteure was founded in February 1902: initially numbering just 100 members, it rose to over 500 members in 1906-07 and then declined again to half that number by mid-1908.¹⁴⁶ In early 1909, conservative editors led by Justus Hermes of the *Kreuzzeitung* founded a rival organization, the Bund Deutscher Redakteure,¹⁴⁷ which promised to lobby on behalf of editors, not "just" journalists. Membership in this group appears to have numbered somewhere between 250 and 500.¹⁴⁸ As political animosity between conservatives and liberals rose to new heights after 1909, the Bund Deutscher Redakteure fused in November 1910 with those members of the Verband Deutscher Journalisten- und Schriftstellervereine who held permanent positions in the field. Together they formed the Reichsverband der deutschen Presse,¹⁴⁹ in which conservative editors appear to have found a congenial home. Although it is difficult to gauge how many journalists joined this organization before the war, by 1929 — after it had revised its statutes in 1918 to lobby more effectively against publishers — it numbered about 3,700 members.

It has been observed that the German professions emerged as self-evidently male preserves.¹⁵⁰ That this should also be true of journalism is revealing but ironic, for two reasons. First, women played such an important role in literary movements of the nineteenth century that one would expect their interests and talents to have inclined them toward a field where distinctions between *Schriftsteller* and *Publizist* remained obscure (and where anonymity was easily preserved). Second, the noninstitutionalized character of journalism and the trend toward less formal academic training might have provided an opportunity for women who were barred from other pursuits by association laws and restricted access to higher education.¹⁵¹

Yet the role of women in political journalism remained extremely circumscribed until at least World War I, and many believe it still is today.¹⁵² In the German census of 1895, only 410 women were listed as "journalists, writers, and private scholars." Of all Germans employed in this category, only 7 percent were women. Ten years later, according to one study, the number of women journalists had grown significantly in both absolute and relative terms.¹⁵³ Nonetheless, as for much of the previous century, only a tiny fraction of women writers were actually journalists, and of these, extremely few were associated with the "political" aspects of journalism — according to one undefined sample published in 1905, only 3.5 percent. Instead women journalists

tended to contribute to, work in, or occasionally even oversee, newspaper departments dealing with nonpolitical affairs such as art criticism or pedagogy.¹⁵⁴ Of the newspaper publishers surveyed in 1905, 60 percent claimed to have women as coworkers (*Mitarbeiter*), but of these only 43 percent appear to have employed women in permanent positions. And of all the women journalists surveyed, only 18 percent held editorial posts with daily newspapers.¹⁵⁵ Most of these women complained that they received the same *Schundhonorare* as their male colleagues, although the sources do not reveal whether they were markedly worse paid because of their gender.

Other impediments to the advancement of women journalists were probably more significant. By some reports, in the first five years of Adolf Koch's lectures in Heidelberg, only four women attended: exactly why, we cannot know, as Koch's undertaking was inaugurated at exactly the time that women were permitted to attend lectures in other universities. Moreover, whereas women joined some journalists' organizations, they were barred from membership in the Verein Berliner Presse and other elitist clubs. One woman writer was particularly outraged not only by this male "clubbishness" but also because it was "extraordinarily important" for women journalists to be able to find "a quiet place in the middle of the city where, after tours, interviews, lectures, concerts, and the theater, they can write up their impressions and reports as quickly as possible, where they can read newspapers in peace, have a small meal, and solicit advice from male and female colleagues."¹⁵⁶ Lastly, one cannot ignore the broader cultural environment that made women journalists seem just as threatening as women doctors and women lawyers. In a pamphlet entitled *Die weibliche Gefahr auf literarischem Gebiete*, one prominent conservative editor noted that women had historically contributed to "flagellistic, masochistic, sadistic, and other perverse literature" in Germany, and then in the same breath went on to label women as "competitors" in the post-1900 "over-production" of scholars. "Floods," this critic noted, "are always caused by water, never by fine wine."¹⁵⁷

When the Reichsverband der deutschen Presse revised its statutes in the summer of 1913, it stated categorically that journalism was now "a free profession [*freier Beruf*] and presupposes its own professional abilities [*Berufsbegabung*]."¹⁵⁸ Even at that point, however, the issue remained contentious. This was demonstrated, for example, by the persistence of debates about whether the ideal journalist was "born" or "made" and whether a general humanistic education was preferable to specialized training in the field. In rebuttal to calls at the Reichsverband's 1913 meeting for the establishment of theoretical training requirements for journalists, J. Kastan of the *Berliner Tageblatt* declared: "Give up the idea of laying down any compulsion in any direction for the only free profession . . . Give up the attempt to advance the training of journalists through institutes and seminar-like establishments. . . . Leave buried once and for all the question of preparatory

training [*Vorbildung*]; take my well-meant advice, let this wild, unregulated situation remain as it is.”¹⁵⁹ Certainly the issue was not clarified when the Heidelberg program self-destructed in the wake of Koch’s bitter personal quarrel with Max Weber; when Richard Wrede’s *Journalisten-Hochschule* began to draw more scorn than admiration; and when Karl Bücher drew scathing attacks from patriotic writers during World War I because he included German newspapers in his attacks on the modern press. The German *Kulturpresse*, Bücher believed, had fallen prey to the *Geschäftspresse*: “The age in which the newspaper . . . [only contributes to] the enlightenment and influencing of public opinion lies far in the past,” he wrote, “and this alone explains why the majority of those who are active in the press are deceiving themselves about their own profession.”¹⁶⁰

And so as the Weimar Republic loomed, political, social, and cultural cleavages within the profession still rendered journalists free to serve no master unequivocally: neither the masses nor the good cause. Freedom meant the liberty to quarrel with one’s own colleagues, to suffer neglect from one’s own patrons, to see one’s political idealism evaporate — and perhaps still to starve. Journalists still normally required some level of higher education to succeed, though far less than in the early nineteenth century. Yet the image (and the self-image) of journalists had never been consolidated by a successful campaign to convince others (or themselves) that entry into the field was a commitment freely made: not as a last resort for those who were socially adrift and without alternatives, but as a first choice for those who recognized a higher calling.

In contrast to most professional members of the *Bildungsbürgertum*, moreover, journalists still had little influence over their own fate. What publisher would permit employees to set their own standards, review and censure their own colleagues, establish uniform pay scales, or restrict the available pool of labor? Usually serving a single employer, and increasingly contending with a state that sought to mediate the flow of information, journalists’ rhetoric was still based on the assumption that these roles were compatible with their duties as the moral conscience of the people and the guardians of culture. But this made only more bitter their treatment as a mere “commodity” — a commodity, as one of them put it, like “herring and cheese.”¹⁶¹ Nor could journalists any longer share the status of the literary artist. Whereas the public continued to value writers who revealed their soul and perhaps even reveled in their own *Weltschmerz*, the journalist was thought to hide behind a cloak of anonymity that masked sloth and ignorance. To be sure, few Germans in the twentieth century regarded journalists as politically impotent. Like other gray eminences, they had influence and power. But they left no shadow, and therefore they were both feared and abused; claiming to improve the world, they allegedly made it worse. Little wonder, then, that on the threshold of Germany’s great democratic experiment of the 1920s, journalists

believed that professionalization had brought them few tangible rewards. They were free to act as advocates for all groups and interests in society — except their own.¹⁶²

VI

Bolz. We will fight our way together through the world. What do you say to a barrel organ, Bellmaus? We will go around to the fairs and sing your songs, I'll grind, and you will sing.

Gustav Freytag, *Die Journalisten*, act 4, scene 2

The main themes of this essay should require little further elaboration. The social status of the German journalist from the late Enlightenment onward was intimately bound up with contemporary understandings of intellectual talent, political engagement, professionalism, and the transformation of the public sphere. No consensus about the limits of public discourse ever welded together journalists of different ranks, styles, and political affiliations — though it is wrong to expect such a consensus to emerge as a logical or necessary consequence of modernization. By 1920, journalism was a vocation that had some but not all of the hallmarks of a free profession. But just as in the age of the French Revolution, journalists' efforts to develop a corporate ethos were undermined by a profound ambivalence about their own calling — no matter, it seemed, whether newspapers were “about” or “in” politics and whether journalists lived “for” or “from” politics. Thus Max Weber in 1919 was correct to note the irony in the fact that German journalism, despite its technical sophistication and its influence, continued to be judged by the standard of its *least* ethical representatives.

If politics played a central role in all this, that role can be properly understood only if we enlarge our conception of how political history should be written. Eve Rosenhaft has recently suggested how this might be done by arguing for a broader cultural analysis of mass politics. Drawing attention to fears about “excessive” movie going (*Kinosucht*) in Germany of the 1920s, Rosenhaft has observed that the lower classes, youth, and women were believed to be particularly susceptible to forms of mass communication that embraced the genres of sensationalism and melodrama: by promising revelations every night of the week, movies seemed to be both theatrical and demagogic.¹⁶³ Here Rosenhaft suggests how we might rethink the study of journalists and their alleged preference for exaggeration and grumbling (*Nörgelsucht*) on a daily basis in the context of a wider set of contemporary fears. Those fears were similar to eighteenth-century concerns about *Lesesucht*, certainly, but they were also fears about industrial capitalism, national identity, gender conflict, cultural decline, social dislocation, and political change.

This essay has tried to sketch how political factors in particular may have determined the images and self-images of the journalist in German society. But much more work is needed on a variety of fronts. Although in the future it may prove helpful to retain the long chronological perspective provided here, it will be even more necessary to supplement this with a comparative approach. For many of the dilemmas that confronted German journalists also vexed their colleagues in other nations — and not only in the nineteenth century.

[†]This essay brings together in a preliminary way ideas that will receive more comprehensive treatment in my planned study, "Political Journalism and Propaganda in Germany, 1770-1920: The Right-Wing Struggle against Rationalism, Revolution, and the Jews." I am grateful for critical comments offered upon presentation of very different drafts in 1988 and 1989 at the German Studies Association annual meeting in Philadelphia; at the German History Society's general meeting in London; and at the Institut für Journalistik, University of Dortmund. I have also received extremely helpful criticism from Brett Fairbairn, Kurt Koszyk, Jürgen Schmädke, and Gary Stark. For research assistance I am indebted to Greg Smith and Marven Krug; for generous financial support, to the SSHRC of Canada, the DAAD, and the University of Toronto.

¹Gustav Freytag, *Die Journalisten. Lustspiel in vier Akten* (1854). This and the following citations are from the German edition (New York: Holt, 1889), translated with reference to the English edition, *The Journalists* (Cambridge, Mass.: Sever, 1888).

²Including Frederik Ohles, *Germany's Rude Awakening: Censorship in the Land of the Brothers Grimm* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1992); Daniel Moran, *Toward the Century of Words. Johann Cotta and the Politics of the Public Realm in Germany, 1795-1832* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); and a battery of articles heralding Gary Stark's forthcoming study of censorship in Imperial Germany. See also Walter Hömberg, *Zeitgeist und Ideenschmuggel. Die Kommunikationsstrategie des Jungen Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1975); and Franz Schneider, "Presse, Pressefreiheit, Zensur," in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, 6 vols. to date (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972-90), 4:899-927.

³Werner Conze, "Beruf," in Brunner, et al., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 1:490-507; Dietrich Rüschemeyer, "Professionalisierung. Theoretische Probleme für die vergleichende Geschichtsforschung," 311-25, and other contributions to *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 6, no. 3 (1980), special issue, "Professionalisierung in historischer Perspektive," ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler; Robert Dingwall and Philip Lewis, eds., *The Sociology of the Professions* (London: Macmillan, 1983); Werner Conze and Jürgen Kocka, "Einleitung," 9-26, and Charles McClelland, "Zur Professionalisierung der akademischen Berufe in Deutschland," 233-47, in Conze and Kocka, eds., *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, Teil 1, *Bildungssystem und Professionalisierung in internationalen Vergleichen* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985); Jürgen Kocka, ed., *Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987); idem, ed., *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*:

Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich, 3 vols. (Munich: dtv, 1988); Hannes Siegrist, ed., *Bürgerliche Berufe* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Deutsches Bildungsbürgertum in vergleichender Perspektive — Elemente eines 'Sonderwegs'?" 215-37, and other essays in Jürgen Kocka, ed., *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, Teil 4, *Politischer Einfluß und gesellschaftliche Formation* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1989); Geoffrey Cocks and Konrad Jarausch, eds., *German Professions 1800-1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Konrad Jarausch, *The Unfree Professions, 1900-1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Michael Burrage and Rolf Torstendahl, eds., *Professions in Theory and History* (London: Sage, 1990); Charles McClelland, *The German Experience of Professionalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Blackbourn and Richard J. Evans, eds., *The German Bourgeoisie* (London: Routledge, 1991).

⁴Remark from November 1862, cited in Richard Jacobi, *Der Journalist* (= *Das Buch der Berufe. Ein Führer und Berater bei der Berufswahl*, vol. 8) (Hanover: Jänecke, 1902), 168.

⁵See also Kurt Koszyk, "Probleme einer Sozialgeschichte der öffentlichen Kommunikation," 25-34, and other essays in Elger Blühm, ed., *Presse und Geschichte. Beiträge zur historischen Kommunikationsforschung* (Munich: Dokumentation, 1977); Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, eds., *Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). I have deliberately excluded consideration of attacks on Jewish journalists and their alleged domination of the German press, in order to address this question in a separate essay.

⁶Konrad Jarausch, "The German Professions in History and Theory," in Cocks and Jarausch, *German Professions*, 17. As a rare case, journalists are included in the analysis in: Jarausch, "Die Not der geistigen Arbeiter: Akademiker in der Berufskrise, 1918-1933," in Werner Abelshausen, ed., *Die Weimarer Republik als Wohlfahrtsstaat* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987), 280-99.

⁷See esp. the pioneering works by Otto Groth, *Die unerkannte Kulturmacht. Grundlegung der Zeitungswissenschaft*, 7 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960-72); Rolf Engelsing, *Massenpublikum und Journalistentum im 19. Jahrhundert in Nordwest Deutschland* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1966); Kurt Koszyk, *Deutsche Presse im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Colloquium, 1966); Elger Blühm and Rolf Engelsing, eds., *Die Zeitung. Deutsche Urteile und Dokumente von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Bremen: Schünemann, 1967).

⁸Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right. Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 212.

⁹Gary D. Stark, "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Literatur für die Geschichtswissenschaft: A Historian's View," *German Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (1990), 26.

¹⁰Anthony J. La Vopa, *Grace, Talent, and Merit. Poor Students, Clerical Careers, and Professional Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 15.

¹¹Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989); Moran, *Century of Words*, is particularly suggestive here but limited to the period before 1832; see also Lucian Hölscher, "Öffentlichkeit," in Brunner et al., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 4:413-67.

¹²Magali Sarfatti Larson used this term in *The Rise of Professionalism. A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), albeit with a negative bias.

¹³Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 1, *Vom Feudalismus des Alten Reiches bis zur Defensiven Modernisierung der Reformära 1700-1815* (Munich: Beck, 1987), 320. See also Kurt Koszyk, *Vorläufer der Massenpresse* (Munich: Goldmann, 1972); Margot Lindemann, *Deutsche Presse bis 1815* (Berlin: Colloquium, 1969); Georg Jäger and Jörg Schönert, eds., *Die Leihbibliothek als Institution des literarischen Lebens im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert: Organisationsformen, Bestände und Publikum* (Hamburg: Hauswedell, 1980); and Irene Jentsch, "Zur Geschichte des Zeitungslesens in Deutschland am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts" (Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 1937).

¹⁴Moran, *Century of Words*, 4; Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866*, 2d ed. (Munich: Beck, 1984), 587.

¹⁵Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 1, 306-10. Of such journals, probably fewer than 20 percent were overtly "political." See *ibid.*, vol. 2, *Von der Reformära bis zur industriellen und politischen "Deutschen Doppelrevolution," 1815-1845/49* (Munich: Beck, 1987), 529; cf. Hans Erich Bödeker, "Journals and Public Opinion. The Politicization of the German Enlightenment in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century," in Eckhart Hellmuth, ed., *The Transformation of Political Culture. England and Germany in the Late Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 423-45, esp. 428-35; more conservative estimates are found in Martin Welke, "Zeitung und Öffentlichkeit im 18. Jahrhundert: Betrachtungen zur Reichweite und Funktion der periodischen deutschen Tagespublizistik," in Blühm, *Presse und Geschichte*, 71-99.

¹⁶Rudolf Schenda, *Volk ohne Buch. Studien zur Sozialgeschichte der populären Lesestoffe 1770-1910* (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1970); *ibid.*, *Die Lesestoffe der kleinen Leute: Studien zur populären Literatur im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Beck, 1976); Rolf Engelsing, *Analphabetentum und Lektüre. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Lesens in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1973); *ibid.*, *Der Bürger als Leser. Lesergeschichte in Deutschland 1500-1800* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1974); *ibid.*, *Massenpublikum*.

¹⁷Klemens von Metternich to Philipp Stadion, 23 June 1808, cited in Moran, *Century of Words*, 1.

¹⁸To this can be added an estimated 688 journals; Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 2:528-29.

¹⁹Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918*, vol. 1, *Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist*, 2d ed. (Munich: Beck, 1991), 798-811, for this and selected other statistics. Cf. Robert Goldstein, *Political Censorship of the Arts and the Press in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 56.

²⁰Gerhard Muser, *Statistische Untersuchung über die Zeitungen Deutschlands 1815-1914* (Leipzig: Reinicke, 1918), 58-63 and *passim*.

²¹During the conflict, the number of newspapers sank by over 50 percent, from over 4,000 to about 1,850, while the number of books produced annually dropped from 38,000 in 1913 to under 14,700 in 1918. Between 1918 and the end of 1920, however, the number of newspapers rose again by almost 100 percent, to about 3,500, and the number of journals rose from about 4,500 to about 6,000. Bruno Rauecker, "Die Fachvereine des freien deutschen Schriftstellertums," in Ludwig Sinzheimer, ed., *Die geistigen Arbeiter*, Teil 1, *Freies Schriftstellertum und Literaturverlag* (= *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, Bd. 152, Teil 1) (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1922), 157-98,

here 182; Muser, *Statistische Untersuchung*, "Nachtrag," 165; Kurt Koszyk, *Deutsche Pressepolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1968); and Hartwig Gebhardt, "Zeitungsgründungen in Deutschland zwischen Vormärz und Weimarer Republik," in Gerd Kopper, ed., *Marktzutritt bei Tageszeitungen — zur Sicherung von Meinungsvielfalt durch Wettbewerb* (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1984), 35-52.

²²For the following and for further references, see Habermas, *Structural Transformation*; Bödeker, "Journals"; Hans Jürgen Haferkorn, "Der freie Schriftsteller. Eine literatursoziologische Studie über seine Entstehung und Lage in Deutschland zwischen 1750 und 1800," *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens* (hereafter *AGB*) 5 (1962-64): 523-711; Jeremy Popkin, "Buchhandel und Presse im napoleonischen Deutschland," *AGB* 26 (1986), 285-96; Rolf Engelsing, "Zeitung und Zeitschrift in Nordwestdeutschland 1800-1850: Leser und Journalisten," *AGB* 5 (1962-64): 850-955; Fritz Hodeige, "Die Stellung von Dichter und Buch in der Gesellschaft: eine literar-soziologische Untersuchung," *AGB* 1 (1956-58): 141-70; Martin Welke, "Die Legende vom 'unpolitischen Deutschen': Zeitungslesen im 18. Jahrhundert als Spiegel des politischen Interesses," *Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen* 25 (1981): 161ff.; and Hans Erich Bödeker and Ulrich Herrmann, eds., *Aufklärung als Politisierung — Politisierung der Aufklärung* (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1987). Still useful among older studies are Heinrich Wuttke, *Die deutschen Zeitschriften und die Entstehung der öffentlichen Meinung*, 3d ed. (Leipzig: Krüger, 1875); Dieter P. Baumert, *Die Entstehung des deutschen Journalismus* (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1922); Joachim Kirchner, *Das deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen*, 2 pts. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1958-62); and Wilmont Haacke, "Geistesgeschichte der politischen Zeitschrift," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 21 (1969): 115-51.

²³One might begin with Lenore O'Boyle, "The Image of the Journalist in France, Germany, and England, 1815-1848," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10 (1967-68): 290-317; and A. Aspinall, "The Social Status of Journalists at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century," *Review of English Studies* 21 (1945): 216-32.

²⁴Habermas, *Structural Transformation*, 181.

²⁵See Hans Erich Bödeker, "Die 'gebildeten Stände' im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert: Zugehörigkeit und Abgrenzungen. Mentalitäten und Handlungspotentiale," in Kocka, *Bildungsbürgertum*, Teil 4, 25-26. Bödeker distinguishes between "freie Berufe" and "freie Intelligenz," including journalists among the latter.

²⁶Konrad Jarausch, "Towards a Social History of Experience: Postmodern Predicaments in Theory and Interdisciplinarity," *Central European History* 22, nos. 3/4 (1989): 427-43.

²⁷Cited in Katherine Roper, *German Encounters with Modernity: Novels of Imperial Berlin* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities, 1991), 91.

²⁸La Vopa, *Grace, Talent, and Merit*, 288.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 12.

³⁰Cited in Moran, *Century of Words*, 33.

³¹"People do not gladly take instructions from a government bureau on what they should or should not read," wrote Grimm. "There are good books in every lending library, but they are unprofitable." Ohles, *Germany's Rude Awakening*, 72.

³²Cited in Carolyn R. Henderson, "Heinrich Leo. A Study in German Conservatism" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1977), 111; the king also observed that the "spread of seductive errors and corrupt theories" was facilitated by appeals to "a class of the population for which this form is more appealing, and newspapers more accessible, than the products of serious examination and thorough scholarship." Goldstein, *Censorship*, 43.

³³Moran, *Century of Words*; Karl Biedermann, *Mein Leben und ein Stück Zeitgeschichte*, 2 vols. (Breslau: Schottlaender, 1886), 2:192-243.

³⁴Cited in Bödeker, "Journals," 426.

³⁵See R. Steven Turner, "The *Bildungsbürgertum* and the Learned Professions in Prussia, 1770-1830: The Origins of a Class," *Social History* 13, no. 25 (1980): 105-35; Wolfgang Martens, "Die Geburt des Journalisten in der Aufklärung," *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung* 1 (1974): 84-98; Lenore O'Boyle, "Klassische Bildung und soziale Struktur in Deutschland zwischen 1800 und 1848," *Historische Zeitschrift* 207 (1968): 584-608; Bödeker, "Die 'gebildeten Stände'"; and Wehler, "Deutsches Bildungsbürgertum," 219-22.

³⁶Moritz, "Ideal einer vollkommenen Zeitung" (1784), excerpted in Blühm and Engelsing, *Die Zeitung*, 124-31; Martens, "Geburt," 88 and passim.

³⁷Martens, "Geburt," 90-92.

³⁸Bödeker, "Journals," 437.

³⁹A. L. Schlözer, *Theorie der Statistik* (Göttingen, 1804), 54, cited in *ibid.*

⁴⁰Moran, *Century of Words*, 18.

⁴¹Cited in Roper, *German Encounters*, 74.

⁴²James J. Sheehan, *German History 1770-1866* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 215.

⁴³Turner, "Bildungsbürgertum," 124-25.

⁴⁴Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg (1980), cited in Moran, *Century of Words*, 6.

⁴⁵Cited in Sheehan, *German History*, 167.

⁴⁶Moran, *Century of Words*, 11; emphasis added.

⁴⁷Koszyk, *Vorläufer*, esp. 83; Sinzheimer, *Die geistigen Arbeiter*, 9ff.

⁴⁸Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918*, 1:805.

⁴⁹Kurt Brunöhler, "Die Redakteure der mittleren und grösseren Zeitungen im heutigen Reichsgebiet von 1800 bis 1848" (Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 1933). Brunöhler's sample is not entirely representative, but his conclusions are illuminating. For later periods see Engelsing, *Massenpublikum*, 160ff.; Koszyk, *Deutsche Presse*, ch. 13; Wuttke, *Deutsche Zeitungen*, "Die Lage der Schriftsteller"; and Rudolf Oebser-Röder, "Untersuchungen über den Bildungsstand der deutschen Journalisten" (Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 1936), chs. 1-3.

⁵⁰W. Kahmann, "Die Lage der Redakteure im Kölner Wirtschaftsbezirk" (Ph.D. diss., University of Cologne, 1922), discussed in Engelsing, *Massenpublikum*, 57; cf. Paul Stoklossa, "Der Arbeitsmarkt der Redakteure. Eine statistische Untersuchung," *Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung* 35, no. 2 (1911): 293-307; and K. Thiess, "Soziale Bestrebungen der deutschen Journalisten und Schriftsteller," *Soziale Praxis. Zentralblatt für Sozialpolitik* 14, no. 8 (November 1904): 188-91; Martin Wenck, "Zur sozialen Lage der Redakteure und Journalisten," *Patria! Jahrbuch der "Hilfe"* 8 (1908): 139-44; and Wilmont Haacke, *Publizistik und Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart: Koehler, 1970), 438.

⁵¹Cited in Cecilia von Studnitz, *Kritik des Journalisten. Ein Berufsbild in Fiktion und Realität* (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1983), 76.

⁵²Koszyk, *Deutsche Presse*, 220; cf. McClelland, "Professionalisierung," 237.

⁵³The *Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel* 1- (1834-) is still one of the most useful sources on the history of the German press.

⁵⁴After 1846 renamed the Schriftstellerverein; see Rauecker, "Fachvereine," 160; Borcherdt, "Schriftstellertum," 25; *Die politische Tagespresse Sachsens* (Grimma: Verlags-Comptoir, 1844).

⁵⁵In 1839 one observer complained about new forms of journalistic "production" where "factory workers" were engaged by publishers directly: just as Hans Sachs had once elevated literature from a craft into a liberal art, this practice devalued it again into a "profession" where everything was cut from the same cloth. Cited in Conze and Kocka, "Einleitung," in idem, *Bildungsbürgertum*, 17, note 18.

⁵⁶Cited in Rauecker, "Fachvereine," 161.

⁵⁷*Grenzboten*, no. 2 (1845): 278ff., cited in *ibid.*, 163.

⁵⁸Albert Ward, *Book Production, Fiction and the German Reading Public 1740-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 25-28; Haferkorn, "Der freie Schriftsteller," section 4; Koszyk, *Vorläufer*, 80-107.

⁵⁹See Rolf Engelsing, *Der literarische Arbeiter*, vol. 1, *Arbeit, Zeit und Werk im literarischen Beruf* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), 403-9.

⁶⁰Schiller to Ferdinand Huber, 29 July 1788, cited in *ibid.*, 407.

⁶¹Mommsen to Henzen, 5 April 1848, cited in *ibid.*, 408.

⁶²Cited in *ibid.*, 408.

⁶³Freytag, *Die Journalisten*, act 4, scene 1.

⁶⁴Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, Nachlaß Hans Delbrück, Abt. III, Fasz. 30, Nrn. 3-5, "Honorar-Bestimmungen der 'Preußischen Jahrbüchern.'"

⁶⁵Cited in O'Boyle, "Image," 305.

⁶⁶Cited (n.d.) in Rauecker, "Fachvereine," 166.

⁶⁷For this and the following, see *inter alia* Engelsing, *Arbeit*, 404; Koszyk, *Deutsche Presse*, 227-28.

⁶⁸Heinrich Mann, *Man of Straw* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 108-9.

⁶⁹Johannes Frizenschaf, *Die Praxis des Journalisten* (Leipzig: Fiedler, n.d. [1901]), 20.

⁷⁰For example, Heinrich Keiter, *Praktische Winke für Schriftsteller, Journalisten und Zeitungs-Korrespondenten*, 8th ed. (Essen: Fredebeul & Koenen, 1911), 55.

⁷¹See Willy Fentsch, "Journalismus und Journalisten im Drama vor Gustav Freytag (1757-1848)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Münster, 1922). Among the dramas discussed are: anon., *Die Zeytungen* (1761); anon., *Der Parnass* (1776); Schroeder, *Die Heurath durchs Wochenblatt* (1790); anon., *Die Patrioten* (1795); Courths, *Der Streit der Literaturzeitungen* (1804); Schuetze, *Die Journalisten* (1806); Baeuerle, *Die falsche Catalani* (1820); Bauernfeld, *Der Literarische Salon* (1835); Oettinger, *Journalist* (1835); Holm, *Die Zeitungsbart* (1838); Ploetz, *Der Ruf oder die Journalisten* (1840); and Nestroy, *Die Freiheit in Kraehwinkel* (1848).

⁷²Robert Darnton, "The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature," in idem, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 1-40, esp. 17-20.

⁷³Cited in Blühm and Engelsing, *Die Zeitung*, 181.

⁷⁴Blühm and Engelsing, *Die Zeitung*.

⁷⁵Cited in *ibid.*, 168; cf. Koszyk, *Vorläufer*, 83.

⁷⁶Cited in Engelsing, *Massenpublikum*, 156.

⁷⁷Cited in Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866*, 594.

⁷⁸From Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, *Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Sozialpolitik* (1851), 2:312, 315, 329ff., cited in Engelsing, *Massenpublikum*, 52-53; for the following, see Blühm and Engelsing, *Die Zeitung*, *passim*.

⁷⁹Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf" (October 1919), in *idem*, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, ed. Johannes Winckelmann, 3d rev. ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1971), 505-60, esp. 525-28; *idem*, "Der Journalist," *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 610 (11 December 1919): 2.

⁸⁰Leo Wörl (1881) and others, cited in Oebsger-Röder, "Untersuchungen," 33.

⁸¹See also Heinz Schulze, *Die Presse im Urteil Bismarcks* (Leipzig: Reinicke, 1931).

⁸²Laube, cited in O'Boyle, "Image," 303.

⁸³Ferdinand Lassalle, *Die Feste, die Presse und der Frankfurter Abgeordnetentag. Drei Symptome des öffentlichen Geistes*, 3d ed. (Leipzig: Allgemeiner deutscher Arbeiter-Verein, 1871).

⁸⁴Cited *inter alia* in Frizenschaf, *Praxis*, 57.

⁸⁵Studnitz examined 110 works of fiction, stretching over 200 years, in which a journalist numbered among the main or subordinate protagonists (Helden). Since more than one journalistic protagonist appeared in some works, she worked with 183 "cases," of which 62 percent were found in novels, 24 percent were found in dramas, and 71 percent were found in works classed as having either a "high" or "unusually high" readership. Thirty cases were drawn from works published in the period 1789-1870, while 55 were from the period of the Second Reich. The authors of these works were themselves active either primarily or secondarily as journalists in 53 percent of the cases.

⁸⁶Except for the section on "professional motivation," the cases represented in this table were drawn almost exclusively from the period 1789-1900.

⁸⁷In *Rembrandt als Erzieher* (1890), Julius Langbehn wrote: "The journalist should be a priest of public opinion; often, however, he is only its shaveling." Cited in Oebsger-Röder, "Untersuchungen," 36-37.

⁸⁸Weber, "Politik als Beruf," 519.

⁸⁹Maximilian Harden, "Die Journalisten," *Die Zukunft* 38 (March 1902): 382-85; the parallels between this excerpt and Weber's 1919 address are striking.

⁹⁰Vitally important on early conservative Publizistik is Lothar Dittmer's recent study, *Beamtenkonservatismus und Modernisierung. Untersuchungen zur Vorgeschichte der Konservativen Partei in Preußen 1810-1848/49* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992), esp. ch. 3.

⁹¹See Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks, eds., *Journalism and Popular Culture* (London: Sage, 1992).

⁹²Jaraus, "German Professions," 19; cf. Wehler, "Deutsches Bildungsbürgertum," 230; Conze and Kocka, "Einleitung," 25.

⁹³La Vopa, *Grace, Talent, and Merit*, 5.

⁹⁴David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

⁹⁵Gustav Freytag, *Die Journalisten*, act 2, scene 1.

⁹⁶See, for example, Theodor Barth, "Die Journalistik als Gewerbe und als Kunst," *Die Nation* 5, no. 45 (August 1888): 627-28.

⁹⁷See Haacke, *Publizistik*, 444-45.

⁹⁸The following account is drawn from Fritz Valjavec, "Die Anfänge des österreichischen Konservatismus: L. A. Hoffmann," in idem, *Ausgewählte Aufsätze* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1963), 331-42; idem, *Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland 1770-1815*, 2d ed. (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1978), 312-27 (also the Nachwort by Jörn Garber, 543-92); Friedrich Sommer, "Die Wiener Zeitschrift (1792-93): Die Geschichte eines antirevolutionären Journals" (Ph.D. diss., University of Bonn, 1932); Gerda Lettner, *Das Rückzuggefecht der Aufklärung in Wien 1790-1792* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1988); and Klaus Epstein, *The Genesis of German Conservatism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 485-594.

⁹⁹Haacke, "Geistesgeschichte," 131, 135.

¹⁰⁰*Wiener Zeitschrift* 1 (1792): 2-6; Sommer, "Wiener Zeitschrift," 16-90.

¹⁰¹*Wiener Zeitschrift* 1 (1792): 73; Epstein, *Genesis*, 531.

¹⁰²"Geistes-Despotismus"; see Sommer, "Wiener Zeitschrift," 91ff.; Epstein, *Genesis*, 529-31.

¹⁰³Cited in Johannes Bachmann, *Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg*, 3 vols. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1876-92), 1:175.

¹⁰⁴*Foreign Quarterly Review* 33, no. 66 (1844): 372-74, cited in O'Boyle, "Image," 302.

¹⁰⁵Cf. contributions by Christopher Clark, Hermann Beck, Wolfgang Schwentker, and David Barclay, in Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, eds., *Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945* (Oxford and Providence, R.I.: Berg, 1993).

¹⁰⁶Letter of 18 November 1842, in Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Handschriftenabteilung, Nachlaß E. Hengstenberg, Nr. 4 (Leopold von Gerlach), Bl. 3. On 12 March 1860, Heinrich Leo wrote to Ludwig von Gerlach that many conservative publicists "have no idea what they are talking about." Their vague slogans, Leo thought, were nothing less than a "language disorder," indicating a "thought disorder." Cited in Henderson, "Leo," 232-33.

¹⁰⁷*Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland* 5, no. 1 (1840): 152-69, discussed in Michael Schmolke, *Die schlechte Presse. Katholiken und Publizistik zwischen "Katholik" und "Publik" 1821-1968* (Münster: Verlag Regensburg, 1971), 57ff.

¹⁰⁸Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, "Ein vormärzlicher Redakteur," in idem, *Kulturgeschichtliche Charakterköpfe*, 3d ed. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1899), 75-98; an excerpt is reprinted in Blühm and Engelsing, *Die Zeitung*, 177-80. A study from the Nazi era made the same distinction between an organic and a (pre-1933) "chaotic" press; Oebsger-Röder, "Untersuchungen" (1936), 20.

¹⁰⁹See *inter alia* Hans Herz, "Zur Finanzierung konservativer Vereine durch die Bismarck-Regierung 1863," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 33, no. 12 (1985): 1097-110; Robert Keyserlingk, *Media Manipulation. A Study of the Press and Bismarck in Imperial Germany* (Montreal: International, 1977); Eberhard Naujoks, "Bismarck und die Organisation der Regierungspresse," *Historische Zeitschrift* 205, no. 1 (1967): 46-80; Irene Fischer-Frauendienst, *Bismarcks Pressepolitik* (Münster: Fahle, 1963); Robert

Noell von der Nahmer, *Bismarcks Reptilienfonds* (Mainz: Hase & Koeler, 1968); and Manfred Overesch, *Presse zwischen Lenkung und Freiheit (1848 bis 1871/72)* (Pullach: Dokumentation, 1974).

¹¹⁰All of these complaints, and more, were registered in *Die konservative Presse*, von einem konservativen Journalisten (Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1885).

¹¹¹Theodor Fontane, *Autobiographische Werke. Von Zwanzig bis Dreißig* (Berlin, 1961), 627, cited in Engelsing, *Massenpublikum*, 157.

¹¹²Rudolf Stratz, *Reisen und Reifen. Lebenserinnerungen* (Berlin: Scherl, 1926), 9.

¹¹³*Süddeutsche Conservative Correspondenz*, 14 July 1914; original emphasis.

¹¹⁴See also James Retallack, *Notables of the Right: The Conservative Party and Political Mobilization in Germany, 1876-1918* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 184-87.

¹¹⁵See Wolfgang Schwentker, *Konservative Vereine und Revolution in Preussen 1848/49* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1988), 175-81; Christian Gehring, "Die Entwicklung des politischen Witzblattes in Deutschland" (Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 1927).

¹¹⁶Cited [n.d.] approvingly in Frizenschaf, *Praxis*, 64.

¹¹⁷Barth, "Journalistik," 628.

¹¹⁸See, for example, "Revolverjournalismus," *Der Zeitungs-Verlag* 10, no. 41 (15 October 1909): 771-72; "Revolverpresse," in Oskar Webel, ed., *Hand-Lexikon der deutschen Presse* (Leipzig: Abel & Born, 1905), 749; Studnitz, *Kritik des Journalisten*, 49. Cf. the comments of Dietrich von Oertzen, coeditor of the *Konservative Monatschrift*, cited in James Retallack, "Anti-Semitism, Conservative Propaganda, and Regional Politics in Late Nineteenth-Century Germany," *German Studies Review* 11 (1988): 389-92.

¹¹⁹Frizenschaf, *Praxis*, 68-75; Frizenschaf and others believed that the cloak of anonymity favored young entrants to the profession and preserved journalists' objectivity in the face of "the terrorism of the public." Cf. "Über die Anonymität im modernen Zeitungswesen," *Die Redaktion* 5, nos. 21/22 (1 November 1906): 84-85.

¹²⁰*Der Tag* (1908), cited in Groth, *Kulturmacht*, 4:666; *Wie können die Schäden unserer periodischen Presse dauernd geheilt werden?* (Barmen: Klein, 1880), 14; Frizenschaf, *Praxis*, 69.

¹²¹The best study is Hans-Wolfgang Wolter, *Generalanzeiger — das pragmatische Prinzip* (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1981); cf. Koszyk, *Deutsche Presse*, ch. 16; and Winfried Lerg and Michael Schmolke, *Massenpresse und Volkszeitung* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1968).

¹²²*Der Zeitungs-Verlag* 8, no. 25 (20 June 1907): 749-50, reviewing a book by one of the leaders of the Evangelischer Preßverband: Stanislaus Swierczewski, *Wider Schmutz und Schwindel im Inseratenwesen*, 3d rev. ed. (Leipzig: "Deutscher Kampf"-Verlag, 1907). The reviewer agreed with Swierczewski's attacks on advertising "filth" ("rubber products," "maseuses," and "discreet affairs") and "swindle" ("moonlighting, loans, advantageous marriage, Galician butter, etc., quackery, [and] secret sciences").

¹²³See *Die farblose Presse. Eine religiöse, politische u. soziale Pest* (Crefeld: Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland, n.d. [1894]); O. Arendt, "Der Amerikanismus in der Fach- und Tagespresse," *Die Redaktion* 3, nos. 38/39 (25 September 1904): 298-99; Johannes Frizenschaf, *Die Wahrheit über die farblose Presse* (Bochum: Potthoff, n.d. [1912]); and W. Hammer, *Die Generalanzeigerpresse, ein Herd der Korruption* (Leipzig, 1911), reviewed in *Zeitungs-Verlag* 12, no. 39 (29 September 1911): 851.

¹²⁴See "Verein zur Verbreitung konservativer Zeitschriften" (founded 1883), in *Berliner Tageblatt*, 30 September 1892; "Berliner Zentralvereinigung der rechtsgerichteten Presse Deutschlands," in *Freisinnige Zeitung*, 18 June 1912; and the voluminous clippings in Bundesarchiv Potsdam, 61 Re 1 (Reichslandbund Pressearchiv), Nr. 2274, "Konservative Presse 1908-1930."

¹²⁵The Central-Auskunftsstelle and its *Apologetische Mitteilungen* are discussed in Schmolke, *Die schlechte Presse*, 206-11.

¹²⁶See Karl Mühlhäußer, *Christentum und Presse* (= Zeitfragen des Christlichen Volkslebens, 1, no. 1) (Frankfurt a.M.: Zimmer, 1876); "Konferenz von Herausgebern und Mitarbeitern christlicher Blätter," *Neue Westfälische Volkszeitung*, 8 September 1877, Beilage; "Das Gewissen der Presse," *Deutsche Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* 5, no. 43 (24 October 1891): 469.

¹²⁷See *Saat und Segen. Fünfzig Jahre Christlicher Zeitschriftenverein* (Berlin: Christlicher Zeitschriftenverein, 1930); *Mitteilungen des Vereins zur Verbreitung Christlicher Zeitschriften* (Berlin), nos. 5-75 (1881-93); *Mitteilungen des Christlichen Zeitschriftenvereins* (Berlin), nos. 77-163 (1894-1914); *Bericht des Christlichen Zeitschriftenvereins* (Berlin, 1901-13); and *Mitteilungen des Vereins zur Verbreitung guter volkstümlicher Schriften* (Berlin) 1-7 (1917-27).

¹²⁸See *inter alia* Vaterlands-Verein, ed., *Die socialdemokratische Presse* (= Zeitfragen, no. 1) (Berlin: Vaterlands-Verein, 1896); "Sozialdemokratische Presse," in Reichsverband gegen die Sozialdemokratie, ed., *Handbuch für nichtsozialdemokratische Wähler*, 3d ed. (Berlin: Reichsverbandverlag, 1911), 582-90. Studies of German attempts to combat *Schundliteratur* have so far tended to concentrate on books rather than periodicals; see Georg Jäger, "Der Kampf gegen Schmutz und Schund. Die Reaktion der Gebildeten auf die Unterhaltungsindustrie," *AGB* 31 (1988): 163-91.

¹²⁹Cf. Gustav Spiethoff, *Die Großmacht Presse und das deutsche Schriftsteller-Elend* (Düsseldorf: F. Bagel, 1883); J. Publicus, *Die moderne Schandpresse*, 2d ed. (Warnsdorf: Opitz, n.d. [1899]); Eugen Buchholz, *Aus der Praxis eines Redakteurs und Schriftstellers. Aus der Praxis — Für die Praxis* (Danzig: Brüning, 1907); Werner Müller, *Das Elend unserer politischen Presse und seine Heilung* (Greiz: Henning, n.d. [1913]).

¹³⁰J. H. Wehle, *Die Zeitung. Ihre Organisation und Technik*, 2d ed. (Vienna, Pest, Leipzig: Hartleben, 1883), 146-49; cf. Andreas Niedermeyer, *Die katholische Presse Deutschlands* (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1861); W. Drabitus, *Ueber den Klatsch und Quatsch in unseren Zeitungen. Eine Mahnung an die liberale Presse* (Berlin: Selbstverlag, 1885).

¹³¹See the previous and following notes for specific titles.

¹³²Most of the following were consulted in the Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, or the Library of Congress, Washington D.C.: *Allgemeiner / Kürschners Deutscher Literaturkalender*, 1879-1914; *Deutsche Schriftsteller-Zeitung. Organ des Deutschen Schriftsteller-Bundes* (Stuttgart, Berlin) 1-3 (1885-87); *Deutsche Schriftstellerwelt. Centralanzeiger für Schriftsteller, Redacteurs, Zeitungsverleger, Verlagsbuchhändler, Bühnenvorstände u.s.w. Amtliches Organ des Deutschen Schriftstellerbundes* (Berlin) 1-3 (1888-90); *Deutsche Presse. Organ des Deutschen Schriftstellerverbandes* (Berlin) 1-5 (1888-92); *Das Recht der Feder. Halbmonatsschrift für die Berufsinteressen der Deutschen Schriftsteller und Journalisten* (Berlin) 3- (1893-94-); *Die Feder. Organ für alle deutschen Schriftsteller und Journalisten* (Berlin) 1-36 (1898-1934); *Der Schriftsteller. Zeitschrift des Schutzverbandes Deutscher Schriftsteller* (Berlin) 3-21 (1912-33); *Der Zeitungs-Verlag.*

Fachblatt für das gesamte Zeitungswesen (Hanover, later Berlin) 1- (October 1900-); *Die Redaktion. Fachzeitschrift für Redakteure, Journalisten, Schriftsteller und Verleger. Offizielles Organ des Vereins Deutscher Redakteure* (Berlin) 3- (1904-); *Deutsche Presse. Organ des Reichsverbands der Deutschen Presse. Zeitschrift für die gesamten Interessen des Zeitungswesens* (Berlin) 1- (October 1913-); cf. *Die litterarische Praxis* (Berlin); *Geistiges Eigentum* (Berlin); *Der Journalist* (Berlin).

¹³³Jacobi, *Journalist*, 178.

¹³⁴Compare the growing number of journalists' associations listed under "Litterarische Vereine und Stiftungen" and "Lokale-" or "Örtliche Vereinigungen" in Joseph Kürschner, ed., *Deutscher Literatur-Kalender auf das Jahr 1885*, 7th ed. (Berlin and Stuttgart: Spemann, 1885); *ibid.*, 22d ed. (1900); and Heinrich Klenz, ed., *Kürschners Deutscher Literatur-Kalender auf das Jahr 1914*, 36th ed. (Berlin and Leipzig: Göschen, 1914).

¹³⁵Karl Biedermann, *Bericht über den ersten deutschen Journalistentag zu Eisenach am 22. Mai 1864* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1864). Further congresses were held in 1865 (Leipzig), 1867 (Berlin), 1871 (Breslau), 1872 (Munich), 1873 (Hamburg), 1875 (Bremen), 1876 (Würzburg), 1877 (Dresden), 1878 (Graz), and 1881 (Frankfurt a.M.).

¹³⁶Robert Keyserlingk, "Bismarck and Freedom of the Press in Germany 1866-1890," *Canadian Journal of History* 11, no. 1 (1976): 31-33; Eberhard Naujoks, *Die parlamentarische Entstehung des Reichspressegesetzes in der Bismarckzeit (1848/74)* (Droste: Düsseldorf, 1975); Hans-Wolfgang Wetzel, *Presseinnenpolitik im Bismarckreich (1874-1890)* (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 1975).

¹³⁷Peter Eppel, "Concordia soll ihr Name sein ..." *125 Jahre Journalisten- und Schriftstellerverein* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1984); Gustav Dahms, ed., *Das Litterarische Berlin* (Berlin: Taendler, n.d. [1895]); Paul Schlenther, *Der Verein Berliner Presse und seine Mitglieder 1862-1912* (Berlin: Bondi, 1912).

¹³⁸This and following figures for 1911 are drawn from Joseph Kürschner, *Deutscher Literatur-Kalender* (Berlin: Göschen, 1911). Cf. Klemens Löffler, *Geschichte der katholischen Presse Deutschlands* (München-Gladbach: Volksvereins-Verlag, 1924); Wilhelm Kisky, *Der Augustinus-Verein zur Pflege der katholischen Presse von 1878-1928* (Düsseldorf: Augustinus-Verein, 1928); and *Augustinus-Blatt* 1- (1897-).

¹³⁹Friedhelm Kron, *Schriftsteller und Schriftstellerverbände: Schriftstellerberuf und Interessenpolitik 1842-1973* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1976), 32-39 and *passim*.

¹⁴⁰*Zeitung als Aufgabe. 60 Jahre Verein Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, 1894-1954* (Wiesbaden: Verein Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, 1954).

¹⁴¹Founded under the sponsorship of Bavaria's prince regent in Munich in July 1893, and numbering 620 members in 1902.

¹⁴²Jacobi, *Journalist*, 178; Koszyk, *Deutsche Presse*, 223; Kürschner, *Deutscher Literatur-Kalender* (1911); Kron, *Schriftsteller*, 38. On the professional undertakings of other German writers, see Eva Wolf, *Der Schriftsteller im Querschnitt: Außenseiter der Gesellschaft um 1900?* (Munich: Minerva, 1978); Jere Hudson Link, "Guardians of Culture: the Deutsche Schillerstiftung and German Writers, 1859-1917" (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1988), esp. 207ff., "Professionals without a Profession. Publishing Conditions and Organized Writers"; and Kron, *Schriftsteller*. In 1909 the German Writers' Defence Association (Schutzverband deutscher Schriftsteller) had been formed; in 1911 it had 250 members and its own organ, *Der Schriftsteller*; by 1919 it emerged as the most influential interest group for writers.

¹⁴³Richard Wrede, *Was heißt und wie werde ich Journalist? Ein Wegweiser* (Berlin: Wrede, n.d. [1902]); and idem, *Handbuch der Journalistik*, 2d rev. ed. (Berlin: Wrede, 1906); discussed in Keiter, *Praktische Winke*, 55-58; and Frizenschaf, *Praxis*, 58 and 64ff.; Wrede and Keiter both offer sample lists of courses for these schools. As well as other handbooks listed elsewhere in these notes, see Ernst Posse, "Journalistische Vorbildung und journalistische Fortbildung," *Deutsche Presse* 1, no. 3 (18 October 1913): 1-4; *Der Journalist und Redakteur* (= *Mein künftiger Beruf. Praktische Anleitung zur Berufswahl*, vol. 58), 2d ed. (Leipzig: Beyer, n.d. [1902]); Friedrich Streißler, *Der Schriftsteller und Journalist* (= *Violets Berufswahlführer*) (Stuttgart: Violet, n.d. [1912]); Alfons Steiger, "Der Journalist," ch. 11 in *Die akademische Berufe*, vol. 5, *Der Jurist und der Volkswirt*, ed. Deutsche Zentralstelle für Berufsberatung der Akademiker in Berlin (Berlin: Furche, 1920), 279-313; and a special issue of *Deutsche Presse* 16, nos. 50-51 (24 December 1926), "Zeitungskunde und journalistische Berufsbildung." Among the few studies that address this body of literature, see Oebinger-Röder, "Untersuchungen," ch. 4; Rauecker, "Fachvereine"; and, for much of the following, Rüdiger vom Bruch, "Zeitungswissenschaft zwischen Historie und Nationalökonomie. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der Publizistik als Wissenschaft im späten deutschen Kaiserreich," *Publizistik* 25 (1980): 579-607.

¹⁴⁴In 1910 Max Weber called for a sociological study of the press; he also noted that newspapers were a unique cultural product because they served two distinct groups of clients: subscribers and advertisers.

¹⁴⁵When Bücher's seminar was founded in 1916, it was a Studienfach; it became a Prüfungsfach only in 1926.

¹⁴⁶"Was kann der Verein Deutscher Redakteure bieten?" in *Die Redaktion* 5, nos. 17-18 (1 September 1907): 65-66.

¹⁴⁷For appraisals pro and con, see "Bund deutscher Redakteure," *Der Zeitungs-Verlag* 10, no. 3 (22 January 1909): 40-41; and Richard Wrede, "Eine Faschingsgründung," *Die Redaktion* 7, no. 2 (1 February 1909): 9-10.

¹⁴⁸Richard Wrede continued to attack this group until 1914.

¹⁴⁹"Reichsverband der deutschen Presse," *Zeitungs-Verlag* 11, no. 49 (9 December 1910): 958-60; Marie Matthies, *Journalisten in eigener Sache. Zur Geschichte des Reichsverbandes der deutschen Presse* (Berlin: Journalisten-Verband, 1969).

¹⁵⁰Jarusch, "German Professions," 17.

¹⁵¹See Roger Chickering, "Casting their Gaze More Broadly: Women's Patriotic Activism in Imperial Germany," *Past and Present* 118 (1988): 156-85; and James Albisetti, "Women and the Professions in Imperial Germany," in Ruth Ellen B. Joeres and Mary Jo Maynes, eds., *German Women in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 94-109.

¹⁵²Studnitz, *Kritik des Journalisten*, 42. The first female protagonist Studnitz discovered in her sample appeared in a work published in 1901; in 1971 women held only about 15 percent of all editorial jobs with German newspapers; more recently, in a sample (N=294) of openings advertised in the *journalist*, 73 percent were directed exclusively toward male applicants, 23 percent toward both genders, and 4 percent exclusively toward women.

¹⁵³Eliza Ichenhäuser, *Die Journalistik als Frauenberuf* (Berlin and Leipzig: Verlag der Frauen-Rundschau, n.d. [1905]), 7ff. and passim for the following. According to this author, about 600 female journalists were active in England at this time, and over 2,000 in America (4).

¹⁵⁴Specifically: the applied arts (1.5 percent), travel literature (4 percent), home economics (4.5 percent), literary-historical topics (5 percent), fashion (7.5 percent), the world of learning (8.5 percent), art and art criticism (10 percent), pedagogy (10 percent), social policy (18.5 percent), and literature (27 percent). *Ibid.*, 7-8.

¹⁵⁵Most were affiliated instead with women's and fashion journals, with those belonging to the women's movement (including, presumably, a number of SPD organs), and with other periodicals of a literary or pedagogical nature. *Ibid.*, 8-9.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁵⁷Theodor Wahl (co-editor of the conservative pamphlet series *Zeitfragen des christlichen Volkslebens*), *Die weibliche Gefahr auf literarischem Gebiete* (Stuttgart: Belsler, 1906), 20-21; cf. Philipp von Nathusius-Ludom (editor of the *Kreuzzeitung*), *Zur "Frauenfrage"* (Halle: Mühlmann, 1871); Josefine Trampler-Steiner, *Die Frau als Publizistin und Leserin. Deutsche Zeitschriften von und für Frauen* (Freiburg i. Br.: Berger, 1938), 65ff.; Anna-E. Freier, "*Dem Reich der Freiheit sollst Du Kinder gebären*": *der Antifeminismus der proletarischen Frauenbewegung im Spiegel der "Gleichheit," 1891-1917* (Frankfurt a.M.: Haag + Herchen, 1981); Ruth-Esther Geiger und Sigrid Weigel, eds., *Sind das noch Damen? Vom gelehrten Frauenzimmer-Journal zum feministischen Journalismus* (Munich: Frauenbuchverlag, 1981).

¹⁵⁸Cited in Haacke, *Publizistik*, 437. At a meeting of the Schutzverband deutscher Schriftsteller in the same year, a leading member, Robert Breuer, declared that the German writer, "in the same way as the doctor, the clergyman, [and] the officer, wants to be regarded with greater respect than all other people who only earn a living [nur verdienen]." Cited in Kron, *Schriftsteller*, 267.

¹⁵⁹Cited in vom Bruch, "Zeitungswissenschaft," 590.

¹⁶⁰Karl Bücher, "Die deutsche Tagespresse und die Kritik" (1915, first published 1917), cited in *ibid.*, 592-93. For later developments, see Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz, *Journalismus im Dritten Reich* (Munich: Beck, 1989); Reinhart Stalman, *Über die Professionalisierungstendenzen bei den Pressejournalisten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Zurich: Juris, 1974); and Verena Blaum, *Ideologie und Fachkompetenz. Das journalistische Berufsbild in der DDR* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985).

¹⁶¹Wenck, "Soziale Lage," 223-25.

¹⁶²See Engelsing, *Massenpublikum*, 60.

¹⁶³Eve Rosenhaft, "Women, Gender, and the Limits of Political History in the Age of 'Mass' Politics," in Jones and Retallack, *Elections*, 163-69.