Introduction

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What makes a person call a particular place ‘home’? Does this ascription, this attachment, follow simply from being born there? Is it the result of a language shared with neighbours, or of a sense of rootedness in a particular landscape – the hills and valleys of your homeland, say? Why does a piece of music or a work of art or a journey abroad evoke emotions that capture the essence of home? And what about the feelings of belonging that are forged by political attachments, by civic rituals, by people celebrating familiar holidays or wearing familiar uniforms? Each of these stimuli can be a marker of identity when people think about the place they call home. But all are ambiguous too. Language can be vexed if you or your children speak more than one tongue, especially when state authorities or nationalists insist that you opt for only one. Your place of birth acquires a different meaning if, like a growing number of people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, you have moved on and now live somewhere else. The music and the landscape and the ‘feeling’ of home then take on different, more elusive, meanings. As for politics, no one doubts that civil rituals and uniforms have the power to command emotional allegiance. But both rituals and uniforms can change. Indeed, they can change more than once in a lifetime. Nowhere is that more true than in German-speaking Central Europe between the 1860s and the 1930s.

This is a book about the German nation state and the German-speaking lands beyond it during roughly eight decades of tumultuous social, cultural, and political change. The essays that follow are concerned with a variety of subjects: music and art, elections and political festivities, the celebration of landscape and nature conservation, tourism, and language struggles in the family and the school. What all of them have
in common is a concern with the ambiguities of German identity in the age of the nation state. These essays do not assume the primacy of national allegiance. Nor do they portray as a story of failure the detours and deadends of identity-construction in smaller realms. Instead, they examine the impact of local attachments, landscapes, ways of thinking, and institutions on a sense of Germanness that was neither self-evident nor unchanging. By considering history at different levels of scale, the authors open up historical trajectories and perspectives that may have fallen from view because they did not become part of what we take to be ‘modern Germany,’ but which seemed crucial at the time. As these essays demonstrate, contemporary Germans used a variety of strategies both to experience their emotional home as a place on a map and to imagine their chosen place as a natural home. In assessing these experiences and imaginings, the intention is not just to complicate the way we think about national history, but to use the sense of place – especially its kaleidoscopic, protean qualities – as a prism that allows us to view German identity in new ways.

Historians of Germany know very well that the country they study is hard to pin down. ‘Germany’ has taken on many shapes during the modern era. In the eighteenth century it was both a nation of many states (the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation) and a state of many nations (the polyglot Habsburg lands). As Goethe and Schiller asked in the 1790s: ‘Germany? But where is it? I don’t know how to find such a country.’ Over the following two hundred years the political entity called Germany was so protean that German-speaking Europe seemed almost to serve as a laboratory for testing out different forms of state: Holy Roman Empire, German Confederation, Second Empire, Weimar Republic, Third Reich, Federal and Democratic Republics. Over that same period, the borders of Germany moved in and out like a concertina. Divided, united, divided again, united again, no European nation state has been more chameleon-like.

The ‘Lesser Germany’ (Kleindeutschland) created in 1871, with which most of the chapters in this book are concerned, gave one kind of answer to the question posed by Goethe and Schiller. The German Empire was now a nation state within clear boundaries. It had an emperor (Kaiser) at its head and a nationally elected parliament, the Reichstag. Other German-wide institutions followed: the Audit Office, Statistical Office, Railway Office, Post Office, new Supreme Court in Leipzig, and the German Navy. The new German nation state also had a new capital city,
Berlin. This particular novelty should not be passed over as too obvious to mention, for the 1848 revolution had produced a dozen different proposals as to where to locate the national capital, and Frankfurt, home of Germany’s first national parliament in 1848–9, remained the seat of the loose German Confederation that continued in existence until Lesser Germany was created. By the 1870s, aspiring Goethes and Schillers would have known where to look to find Germany. It was also in that first decade after the process we call ‘unification’ that Goethe and Schiller themselves were unequivocally enshrined in the canon of German national literature, for that was when the first professor of German literature was appointed to a university chair.

Imperial Germany was a nation state in ways the German Confederation it replaced was not. But it also bore the signs of its violent origins. The decisive foundational moment of the new Germany came at bayonet point: the Prussian defeat of Austria and most of the other medium-sized German states in 1866 led to the establishment of the North German Confederation, forerunner of the German Empire. The inclusion of southern states such as Bavaria and Württemberg within the empire in 1871 followed in the wake of another military conflict, the Franco-German War. What we call unification therefore began with an act of secession by Prussia and ended with the reluctant accession of states that had been defeated by Prussia on the battlefield just five years earlier. Should we therefore speak of the Wars of Unification in the 1860s at all, or did this decade see the last of many German civil wars? Whatever the answer, Germany was ‘made’ in 1871 by excluding the German speakers of Austria – a group that figures prominently in the last section of this book – while including within its borders significant minorities of people whose first language was Polish, Danish, or French. The way the German Empire came about meant that it bore a heavy Prussian imprint. Historians have argued for generations over whether the empire warrants the hyphenated appellation Prussia-Germany or whether (as we believe) the connection between the whole and the parts was more complicated than that.

The kingdoms, grand duchies, and other territorial states that made up the German Empire continued to exist after 1871; their kings, grand dukes, and other territorial rulers remained in place. The largest of these federal states continued to exchange ambassadors with each other right down to the dissolution of the empire in 1918. Throughout those nearly fifty years, the shifting balance of power between empire and states, between institutions that were ‘national’ and those that were
‘federal,’ constituted the backdrop against which German politics was played out. An older, rather metaphysical approach to modern German history liked to view Germany as a ‘latecomer’ and a perennially ‘unfinished’ nation. More down-to-earth appraisals acknowledge that the German Empire created in 1871 was no more than an outline plan for a new political structure. It left many questions about how the political system would actually work unanswered and many paths of institutional growth open-ended.

What we have sketched so far is a description of the formal, ‘external’ reality of the German Empire – its boundaries, institutions, and constituent parts. This says nothing, of course, about the attitudes, assumptions, and expectations of those who lived within the borders of the new nation state. To what extent did they identify, or come to identify, with this work-in-progress called Germany? Did they (at least those who were German speakers) feel themselves to be German rather than something else, such as Catholic, or socialist, or Saxon? Another way to pose the question, recognizing that few people consider themselves to be wholly one thing or another, would be to ask how the various possible forms of collective identification – national, regional, religious, ethnic, political – were combined in the minds of individuals. Were they overlapping or cross-cutting, intertwined or antagonistic? And how did they evolve between the mid-nineteenth century and the 1930s?

In some ways, these are questions that historians have pursued for a long time. It is, for example, a commonplace that Catholics were reluctant participants in the new Germany that was two-thirds Protestant. The persecution Catholics then faced during the Kulturkampf (cultural struggle) of the 1870s drove them to adopt a kind of siege mentality, which dissipated only slowly and incompletely in subsequent decades. While many Protestant Germans celebrated Sedan Day, the national holiday, Catholics remained ostentatiously aloof. Any number of official and everyday slights to Catholic self-esteem kept alive a sense of being second-class citizens, and with it the continued cultivation of a prickly, defensive Catholic subculture of self-sufficiency. Yet parallel with this sentiment, which was nurtured by a dense Catholic associational network, another one grew in strength, especially among the educated and economically successful: the feeling that Catholics should ‘come out of the tower,’ cast off their own sense of inferiority, and assert themselves as adherents of Rome who were also good Germans. A similar development characterizes the history of the Social Democratic labour movement. Its members were persecuted in the
early decades of the German Empire, and thereafter they were fre-
quently treated as pariahs or ‘rogues without a fatherland.’ But from
this self-consciously sealed-off society within a society, too, assertions
of thwarted patriotism were voiced – by trade unionists and by Social
Democrats sitting in municipal, federal, and national parliaments. So-
cial Democrats were good Germans, ran the refrain, if only an
authoritarian ruling elite would let them show it. The Jewish mini-
ority of Imperial Germany offers a third example. Jews were formally eman-
cipated after 1869, yet they were discriminated against when it came to
civil service and university appointments or army commissions.
Assimilated yet accused by antisemites of being an ‘alien’ presence on
German soil, Jews formed a self-defence organization with the telling
name League of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith. Rates of conver-
sion and marriage outside the faith remained low, but that was not
inconsistent with a powerful sense of identification with Germany,
which the father of sociologist Norbert Elias and others proudly dis-
played by sporting an upturned Kaiser Wilhelm moustache.9
All three examples offer a vantage point on the circumstances faced
by tens of millions of people in Imperial Germany – and, as we shall
see, in other parts of German-speaking Europe – who found themselves
juggling more than one identity. Historians writing in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s often presented these cases as examples of the strains pro-
duced by an illiberal society – the poisoned fruit of a ruling elite that
deliberately used ‘friend-foe’ divisions as an instrument of policy.
There is truth in this, but it is an argument that focuses too narrowly on
the ‘aberrant’ character of Imperial Germany, as though strained or
divided loyalties arise only where ‘normal’ patterns of modern social
and political development have been derailed. In the last fifteen
years or so, historians have been more likely to start from the assumption that
multiple or hybrid identities are the norm – that nation, religion, and
class are only starting points. Historians have learned that they need to
bring the histories of in-groups and out-groups under the same inter-
pretative lens – for example, by studying Jewish history not as some-
thing ‘apart’ but rather as integral to German history, or by examining
the socio-political divide between socialist and non-socialist Ger-
mans.10 It is now clear, moreover, that we can only view Catholic, Jew-
ish, or Social Democratic Germany (not to mention Protestant, gentile,
and bourgeois Germany) through a glass darkly if we do not consider
gender – the places occupied by men and women, the role of the family,
and how specific notions of the ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ infused
these milieus. The same might be said of age, the generational variable, and of ethnicity. What difference did it make to be German and Catholic in an area such as Silesia or the Ruhr where there were also Polish Catholics? The same question might be asked of German Catholics and Jews in Alsace, or of German workers in localities and regions inhabited by large numbers of non-German immigrant workers such as Dutch, Italians, or Slavs.

Class, religion, ethnicity, gender, generation – all have a place in the essays that follow, all are interwoven with each other and with notions of Germanness. But the primary focus of this book falls elsewhere. We are interested above all in the question of scale. What happens when you place a national history, defined as what takes place within the borders of the nation state, within a constellation of histories conceived on a different scale?

If we widen the lens by putting Germany in a European or even global frame, new and interesting connections immediately become apparent. After all, Imperial Germany not only acquired colonies and aspired to pursue *Weltpolitik* (world policy); it was also linked to a larger world through markets, railway, steamship, and telegraphic communications, emigration and immigration, international organizations and agreements, tourism, ethnographic discoveries, and a wide variety of other cultural exports and borrowings. These ties connecting Germany to the world beyond its borders inevitably had their effects on everyday life within those borders. They influenced what Germans ate (and how much it cost), the clothes they wore, where they travelled, the music they listened to, the paintings they bought, the languages they studied, the discussion evenings they attended, and much more besides. In fact, it is difficult to think of many German experiences, hopes, and fantasies that were *not* influenced by extra-territorial connections such as those just listed. Exploring their historical impact provides the promise of German history in the transnational mode, as it has recently begun to be practised.\(^{11}\)

In this book, though, we want to alter the scale in exactly the opposite way. Instead of widening the lens, we zoom in on German history at the subnational level. Our focus is on the numerous internal borders and divisions within the nation state and on its borderlands. Our concern is with the feelings of belonging that were found there, and with the ambiguities of place those feelings generated. For as Germany’s external borders became solidified and were given priority in nationalist dis-
course, the rich diversity that characterized life in Germany’s subnational spaces became more, not less, disturbing for contemporaries. Germans discovered that frontiers of opportunity and sovereignty had not been ‘straightened out’ quite as neatly as liberals liked to claim. We try to read these contemporary discourses against the grain, to understand how natural landscapes, political fields of force, and mental maps all eroded, and yet also persisted, in interesting and often unpredictable ways. To do so we have chosen the terms ‘localism’ and ‘the local’ deliberately, because each is elastic. Each can be applied to the considerable range of subnational units within Imperial Germany, among which at least three kinds can be identified.

First, there were broad zones within Germany roughly comparable to the ‘sections’ that loomed so large in nineteenth-century U.S. history. ‘Southern Germany,’ for example, comprised the states south of the River Main that joined Germany only in 1871 and were notable for their pronounced anti-Prussian sentiments. The area of Prussia east of the River Elbe (‘East Elbia’) was demographically, economically, and politically distinct from western areas of Germany, whether Prussian or non-Prussian. In both cases, more than a geographical designation was at issue. These were regions of Germany whose inhabitants saw themselves, and were seen by others, as having a quite distinctive character. In neither case, however, should the reputation (or self-estimation) of distinctiveness be taken at face value. Indeed, one might argue that historians have failed to consider how regions in central Germany – Thuringia, Hanover, Lower Saxony – could be equally resistant to centralizing and polarizing trends. From this perspective the Kingdom of Saxony, because it lay athwart the Elbe and had affinities with both the northern and southern sections of Greater Germany, becomes less interesting as part of a ‘Third Germany’ and more interesting insofar as it forces historians to reconsider the north-south and east-west paradigms that have constrained the writing of German history for so long. As the essays in part IV of this volume suggest, both Saxony and the Habsburg lands lying south of it lay at the heart of nationalist discourses about what it meant to be German and how ‘good Germans’ could best defend their homeland. Thus, it is possible to explore underresearched areas of Germany as frontier zones and as heartlands simultaneously.

The second and most easily defined group of subnational entities within Imperial Germany consisted of the individual federal states that together made up the empire. They ranged from substantial kingdoms,
11. Map of the German Empire, 1871–1918 © James Retallack
such as Prussia and Bavaria, through mid-sized grand duchies like Baden in the southwest and Oldenburg in the northwest, to small principalities like Schwarzbürg-Sondershausen and Reuss (divided between younger and older lines) and to the Free Hanse Cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck. Unlike southern Germany or East Elbia, these were political units with long histories and all the trappings of independent statehood: ruling dynasties or senates, capital cities laid out as princely residences, local nobilities, courts, armies, even representative assemblies. Thus, Württemberg boasted a state parliament, or Landtag, dating back to the middle of the fifteenth century. These states, which both pre-dated and survived the creation of a unified nation state, asserted their rights within the federal constitution of Imperial Germany. But we should beware making an absolute distinction between venerable, historically rooted states on the one hand and a new Germany on the other. The tremendous territorial flux in German-speaking Europe during the century preceding Bismarckian unification meant that many 'historic' states were in fact quite novel. Wartime gains and losses, dynastic marriages, and the exchange or purchase of territory created states with substantially different boundaries and populations in 1871 than had been in place three or four generations earlier. The period of Napoleonic dominance in Germany produced especially dramatic effects, reducing the size of certain states (such as Saxony), making others (such as Baden) much larger, and in some cases doing both in turn, as in the case of Prussia. For almost every German territorial state, the period after 1815 was one of purposive state-building, as rulers and their bureaucrats came to terms with a new world and often with new subjects. Far from subsiding after the shock of revolution in 1848–9 or as liberal advocates of national unity became more vocal and better organized (for example, in the National Association, founded in 1859), these processes of consolidating subnational dynasties actually gained strength in the immediate pre-unification era. Yet they also perpetuated old anxieties, and generated new ones, about whether the German Empire and its builders were really up to the task of consolidating unity on terms acceptable to nationalists themselves. Forging a German empire out of sovereign states, in other words, was not a matter of dynamic historical forces shaping inert (subnational) materials in (nationally) inexorable ways; rather, it was the interaction of two sets of dynamic forces that preceded unification, shaped unification, and continued long after unification. As the chapters in this volume suggest, the results of this interaction contributed to the willingness of certain
groups within unified Germany to distance themselves from minority groups defined as lying ‘beyond the pale.’ That they thereby also diminished themselves was not lost on contemporaries: quite the contrary, it constituted one aspect of the ambiguities of place.

The third group of subnational entities is by far the most numerous and the hardest to define. It consists of regions that took their identity from some combination of geography, topography, history, religion, dialect, and economics. Some of these regions were the provinces or administrative units of large states – East Prussia, for example, or Upper Swabia, the Catholic area of predominantly Protestant Württemberg that lay south of the River Danube. As it happens, both East Prussia and Upper Swabia were considerably larger than some German states such as the tiny principalities of Waldeck, Lippe, and Schaumburg-Lippe. Other regions cut across the political borders of the state, such as the Allgäu and the Black Forest in the southwest, or the Vogtland, which spanned the border between Bavaria and Saxony. Some regions were defined by a river, such as the Upper Rhine, or by the unifying characteristic of a hilly or mountainous terrain, as in the case of the Eifel and the Sauerland in western Germany and the Erzgebirge (Ore Mountains) between Saxony and Bohemia. Sometimes the marks of regional identity seemed to include a curious grab bag of factors: everything from topography, settlement patterns, and trade, to famous forebears, gastronomy, and folklore. In other cases – the coalfields of the Ruhr and Saarland come to mind – it was a locally dominant form of production and the way of life it created that provided the primary marker of region.

At this point the reader may ask: is this book not concerned with localities rather than regions? The answer is that it is concerned with both, and also with the nation. We see little profit in drawing a strict line between large localities and small regions. Nor can questions about nature and the environment be neatly categorized into discrete groups, with one bundle of questions centring rigorously on exclusively local concerns (for example, tree-planting on an individual estate or the famous Green Hill that Richard Wagner chose for his Bayreuth stage) and a second bundle considering only larger regions defined principally by topography, including the Erzgebirge or the flatlands (Börde) near Magdeburg. We also feel that historical scholarship on nationalism in Germany has made such impressive strides in recent decades that localism now deserves its due, not principally to make up lost ground – though the metaphor seems appropriate – but because
localism promises to generate new scholarly questions or to recast ones that have been addressed tangentially, if at all, from national perspectives. For all these reasons, this book asks, Why did localism become a theme of public concern at particular moments in time, in specific places, and as part of larger discourses that also turned on the meanings of the regional and the national? Why, at these times and places, did Germans embrace particular definitions of the local and not others?

We are also interested in the ambiguities of place, which both frustrated and invigorated Germans between 1871 and 1918. Such ambiguities gave rise to personal dilemmas that cannot be reduced to simple or ‘objective’ questions of scale: using callipers and yardsticks is not the best way to slip between their horns. They can be better analysed by considering the complicated, subjective ways in which contemporary Germans thought about where they lived, about how they came to live there, and about why they stayed put or moved on. Thus, the focus of these chapters falls on groups of people ‘living betwixt and between,’ in two senses. The first sense establishes the minor key of this study: the slowness of change, the feeling of embeddedness, the preference for one’s homeland. The major key, however, is one of movement: movement by people who felt unmoored, adrift, at sea, and movement by people whose principal identity did not remain constant from birth to death but grafted with others to create something new – which in turn was reseeded, cultivated, and uprooted all over again.

The dynamic, malleable aspects of identity have generated metaphors whose physicality demands that we locate people in places. Three might be highlighted. The first is the metaphor of hybridity. If hybridity becomes a comfortable skin to wear for many of the Germans in these chapters, it is a skin that changes in outward appearance as its bearers cross cultural frontiers. What face will I put on today? Against what opponent will this particular face give me an advantage? The second metaphor is diffusion. If identity is an attribute that is misread in certain geographical settings, we need to remember that such misreadings occur when cultures come in contact or, as Salman Rushdie has put it, ‘bleed into each other.’ This issue of diffusion can hardly be overemphasized, because it also helps determine how relatively uniform cultures, business networks, even families intermix and become hybrid. As one historian has recently posed the question: ‘How far afield does it make sense to cultivate continuous contacts? What degree of proximity enables a density of communication that may tie particular and lasting memories to a specific ‘there’: the distance one can travel...
in a single day, perhaps? 17 Third, if the German nation can be read from subnational Germany, then we are not likely to get at it by peeling back the layers of something to find its essence or core. A better strategy is to take apart the pieces of a well (or not-so-well) integrated whole so that we can see how they came together (or didn’t). 18 In the Second Empire, Germans were able to embrace what Benedict Anderson has termed ‘long-distance nationalism.’ Nevertheless, these chapters emphasize the hybrid identities, displacements, and cross-cutting processes of national aggregation that also forced Germans to imagine home in unfamiliar ways. 19 After 1871 Germans learned the art of verifying the new nation as though gazing back at the home they left while at the same time groping to find a way forward. Their engagement with the ambiguities of place thus pried open the national paradigm without abandoning it altogether.

While the changing face of the local is an essential component of our analysis, the stories told in these chapters do not flow smoothly and evenly, like the irresistible current of a broad river. But they do not slow down and silt up either: they never stand still long enough for us to say we are ‘remapping’ Imperial Germany. Rather, both dynamic and fixed elements constitute the story of how German histories flowed within and across internal borders. Spatially, our leap beyond Germany’s borders is most often inward, even though the last three chapters demonstrate the merits of moving beyond a kleindeutsch perspective. But methodologically it involves an attempt to move beyond conventional ways of thinking about German identities to recover other symbolic spaces in which Germany’s historical dramas unfolded. To understand how Germany’s borders seemed artificial to contemporaries at certain times and natural at others, we want to examine the ambiguities of place by embracing the ‘play of scales’ (jeu d’échelles) that was practised by Germans living in the Second Empire and today inspires historians of other nations. 20 All scales need some kind of calibration, and we believe that ‘localism’ and ‘the local’ are the most appropriate keywords to use: they bind these essays together and link them to aspects of German history that merit reconsideration.

Two dangers await historians interested in localism and local identity. One is to assume that what happens in localities and regions is necessarily more small-minded and cramped in spirit than what takes place on a larger and airier national stage. This was the mantra of nineteenth-century nationalists, especially liberal nationalists, who praised the
nation state, which they regarded as modern and dynamic, because they thought it transcended the pettiness of smaller states and regions. The inhabitants of such subnational regions, liberals believed, were resistant to change and obsessed with parochial navel-gazing. Liberals described this obsession with varying amounts of venom as cultural backwardness, political particularism, or insufficient national pride. Firmly believing that history was on their side, they aspired to bring the unenlightened regions up to the mark.

A trace of this nationalist view can still be found, although much challenged in recent decades, in historical accounts that make the nation state seem like the obvious culmination of a long process of modernization. According to this view of things, the local, the regional, and the national represent horizons of experience and action, arranged in a hierarchy from the small to the large, from the least important to the most grand. The creation of true nations happens when communication and transportation networks, or schools, or conscription drag even the smallest of local worlds, kicking and screaming, into the larger world of nationhood. From this perspective, localism becomes nothing more than a stage of development along a preordained path or a residual category – either something that is overcome or a piece of grit in the machine. This perspective was adopted quite as easily by late-twentieth-century historians as by liberal nationalists living in the age of Bismarck and Wilhelm II.21

The problem with this point of view is that its adherents assume that all of the dynamism comes from the centre and from the top. In fact, as noted already, there was vigorous state-building going on in nineteenth-century Germany even before a nation state was created, and it did not stop in 1871. One might go further and argue that in spheres ranging from political protest to welfare reform, it was Germany’s federal states and municipalities that proved to be the real laboratories for trying out new ideas. There is no reason to assume automatically that the larger the geographical area, the wider the horizons. People living in the nineteenth-century Palatinate – reluctantly Bavarians since Napoleon made them so – were more susceptible to the German national cause precisely because they were unhappy to view themselves as Bavarian. The city state of Hamburg was in many ways closed in on itself when it came to German affairs; its populace did not want to join the German Customs Union even in the 1880s. But Hamburg was also very self-conscious about its position as a German window on the Atlantic world, proud of the networks that linked its citizens to Britain
and the United States of America. Local pride and cosmopolitanism were not opposed: they could productively join hands.

None of this means that Kleinstaaterei – the fetish of small-statehood – or local resentment about a changing world were myths. Whether they should be seen simply as residues of an earlier age is another matter. It could equally be argued that waving the Bavarian or Saxon flag took on a new quality under conditions of national unification. So, too, in the case of localism-as-resentment. When German-speaking Europe was still organized in several dozen separate states and most people lived in the countryside or small towns, the term ‘provincial’ had a pejorative connotation only for Germany’s movers and shakers; millions of other Germans would gladly have accepted the label as a badge of honour, a guarantor of solidity, a marker of genuine Germanness. With unification and the flight from rural areas to large cities, these connotations and the relationship between these two groups of Germans changed. In the late nineteenth century, ‘provincial’ started to become a term of derision, used by those who were convinced that they were part of a dynamic, modern Germany to describe others who were somehow ‘missing out’ or ‘falling behind.’ And so the other group’s outlook changed too: increasingly they wore the label ‘provincial’ resentfully, as a negative badge of identity. We can choose to see this resentfulness as the lingering spasm of a world that was on its way out; or, more plausibly, we can view it as a step in the process of adaptation whereby Germans fashioned identities for themselves that were distinctive – perhaps ill-fitting, but conspicuously new.

That brings us to the second snare that awaits historians of localism. The inverse of the first, it might be called the myth of authenticity, and this one, too, has a long provenance. From Justus Mös er in the late eighteenth century, to the ethnologist Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl in the mid-nineteenth century, to the practitioners of a saccharine Heimat literature around 1900, writers praised the local diversity of German-speaking Central Europe. According to these observers, it was the sheer unending variety of landscapes and farmhouse types and social customs and dialects that constituted the true strength of Germany. For them, the local constituted a miniature nation, a summary and an endorsement of its diversity. Level local differences in the name of uniformity or progress, they argued, and you destroy the authentic fabric of Germanness, place by place. Still shared widely at the beginning of the twentieth century, arguments like these had much in common with the views expressed by the con-
temporary French conservative Maurice Barrès, who distinguished between the *pays réel* and the *pays légal*: the ‘true,’ ‘authentic’ France of the provinces and the purely legal-political France of the Third Republic. Love for one’s homeland – the kernel of the *Heimat* concept – was tainted under National Socialism and its ‘blood and soil’ ideology, but quickly resurfaced after 1945, at least in western parts of Germany and among the millions of German émigrés from the east. Even more striking is the fact that, beginning in the 1980s, Germans with impeccably progressive credentials sought to rehabilitate the idea of *Heimat* and dress the idea of an ‘authentic’ local Germany in new political clothes. For some practitioners of a new kind of regional history, which was theorized as a less stuffy variation on territorial history, as well as for those who flew the banner of the history of everyday life (*Alltagsgeschichte*), it was only by getting down to the local level, where the small-scale was threatened by corporate power and bureaucratic uniformity, that ‘real life’ was to be found.

To make that argument, however, is simply to repeat the old shibboleth about the narrowness of local horizons and to cast it as a virtue rather than a vice. It is misleading in either version. We have no doubt about the value of the microhistorical level of enquiry; but the idea that the pursuit of history on this scale reveals something more ‘authentic’ or ‘real’ is illusory. As the essays in this volume suggest, localities and regions are mental constructs no less than nations are. If the nation is an ‘imagined community,’ the same is true of the subnational spaces discussed in this book.

Few historians today accept the account presented by so many nationalists that nations ‘grew’ or ‘evolved’ – biological metaphors suggesting that they were natural things possessing organic qualities. There is no good reason to accept that such a view is any more plausible for a region like the Rhineland or the Erzgebirge either. It is therefore not enough to note that the local is both embedded in the nation and distinct from it. Germany was constructed in and through the local, via processes that resulted in the transformation of both. Nor is it sufficient to accept uncritically other metaphors that abound in the literature: for example, the local is a building block of the national edifice; the local is a ‘natural junction’ that leads towards ‘the heart of the nation,’ on the local is a source of affection for a community that flows into ‘true national love.’ Metaphors like these mask two important points. The first is that the local, like the nation, is open to multiple uses, which helps explain its appeal to contemporaries and historians alike. The sec-
ond point is that we should not overemphasize the degree to which nineteenth-century Germans accepted the binary divide that pits a modernizing centre against a traditionalist periphery. Instead, we should recognize that promise and innovation were inscribed as clearly on one side of modernization’s Janus face as were resentment and tradi-

tion on the other. When contemporary Germans were forced to con-
sider the ambiguities of place, they realized that a concern with the local was not a lost cause; quite the contrary, it often created an expertise or a niche that had not existed before. Thus, they found that they could claim local memories as markers of erudition or as inspiration for commercial entrepreneurship, even as they also shared in national memories (or hopes) of grandeur.28 Keeping such successes in view allows us to sidestep untenable teleologies; it also helps us map specific opportunities for identity-building among Germans onto the general openness of history itself.

This book is centrally concerned with culture. But where is culture? Homi Bhabha has suggested that we seek ‘the location of culture’ by studying how people have scattered and gathered in times and places that figure in larger stories of how nation states come about.29 In this book we examine subnational and transnational gatherings – of Ger-
mans who felt perfectly at home but also of real or potential émigrés, exiles, and refugees who found themselves on the edge of what others defined as German culture. Consistent with our belief that local history can bring together stories about a sense of place and a sense of time,30 we want to suggest that studying Germans’ local experience of culture can reveal new facets of identities that were neither fixed nor stable. It is no accident that many of these chapters deal with what Bhabha termed ‘the uncanny fluency of another’s language.’

Historians have been examining German collectivities for a long time now by unearthing the myths and reworking the memories that have constituted German national identities.31 But this work too often leaves us confronting ‘space without places, time without duration,’ as Louis Althusser once put it. The traces of Germany’s ‘shattered past’ that have received most attention are the shards of Germany’s built environments: crumbled monuments, ruined shrines, breached walls.32 Historians have turned their gaze less often on German natural landscapes, even though German forests are beginning to yield their secrets and German waterways offer new points of departure. But natural landscapes are never quite what they seem. The Germans who appear in the
following chapters were actively traversing zones of control and resistance, trying to balance dependence and exclusivity on the one hand with contingency and marginality on the other.

In this volume, our study of the ambiguities of place does not dwell on autonomist or separatist movements. Instead, we ask how nature, environment, and physical boundaries interacted with ethnic diversity, social conflict, and political borders. In this exercise, referring to centre-periphery conflicts seems both insufficient and potentially misleading. For one thing, it inadequately reflects the lived experience of in-and out-migrants to a locality, a region, or the nation.33 Second, overemphasizing people’s geographical marginality to some real or imagined centre makes us think that people are wholly trapped or wholly liberated by their spatial circumstances. But this is no zero-sum game: in fact, ‘a sense of place’ usually constrained and liberated Germans at the same time. Keeping this in mind helps us resist seeing ‘peripheral’ communities always in a passive relationship with a controlling centre. Third, by focusing on people’s historical reactions to the ambiguities of place we are better equipped to understand how individuals and groups were able to adjust to a variety of challenges simultaneously. In this volume we encounter many Germans who, like Bismarck, turned Germany’s territorial diversity to their advantage: like him, they could ‘sniff among the odours of adversity the perfume of opportunity.’34 Whereas adversity might at one moment favour integration – for example by highlighting local landscapes as ‘symbols of national longevity’35 – at another moment it might reinforce differentiation. By studying the nature of such choices and Germans’ ambivalent responses to them, we can recover what Celia Applegate has termed contemporaries’ ‘intriguingly performative commentary on their own times.’36

The chapters in part IV of this volume take the reader to German-Austrian borderlands in south-eastern Europe.37 These regions, which can alternatively be construed as heartlands of the Habsburg Empire, barely fell within the conceptual horizons of many German nationalists. But they were regions with stark ethnic and linguistic divisions that left little doubt in the minds of Germans actually living there – or so it seemed – about where the frontier stood between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Here we encounter children, families, voluntary organizations, administrative networks, and ethnic groupings that defied any unmediated definition of what it meant to be German. Here, regions spanned political frontiers, urban and rural spaces penetrated each other, linguistic
...and ethnic communities intermixed in people’s quotidian experiences – every day and everywhere.

In these chapters, Germans often reach but then move beyond what are called ‘frontier posts of life.’ They move in and out of cultural contact zones; they seek consensus or provoke conflict according to their own material and social needs; and they regard borders as blighted or benign according to ever-changing circumstances. These portrayals of scattered and gathered groups also remind us that artificially cultivated images of some German ‘essence’ were usually precisely that – images, not reality. Claims about a uniform German identity begin to look very different once the fine details of local identity (schooling, work, religious observance, military service, for example) are examined. How do people react when the speed or direction of such change seems to be too slow or getting out of hand? In each of these chapters, we find local inhabitants motivated by visions of their present and future communities. Some of those visions are defined by inclusion and transparency; others are predicated on exclusion and opacity. But they all draw on strategies for survival that have been created by specific locations of culture.

In Pieter Judson’s chapter, a kind of historic Germany of the south – the only place where Germans could experience the sun and light more characteristic of the Adriatic – is seen to be slowly and tragically receding in the face of Slovene encroachment. Judson’s Germans in the south are convinced that only they know how to read the benefits of productive labour in the lay of the land. Only they can truly cultivate – bring culture to – a barren land. Judson’s corner of Greater Germany shares features also recognizable in Caitlin Murdock’s: in each case, the inhabitants’ main worry is that while ‘northern’ Germans will visit the southern Heimat they revere, they will do so in ways that fail to appreciate its true significance (though tourist spending will help). Whereas Tara Zahra analyses struggles to appropriate children’s lives, and tongues, in linguistically mixed regions, in Judson’s study we find that the colonization programs and propaganda of the Südmark association provide a rallying point for larger campaigns to defend or import a particular variant of Deutschttum in German-Austrian lands. The outcome of such struggles, in both cases, becomes uncertain when family preferences, the law, and nationalist pressures pull local inhabitants in different directions.

Zahra uses physiological metaphors to suggest how the national struggle manifested itself in the lives of individual Germans, while
Murdock analyses a different kind of national struggle erupting in the folded mountains and valleys of the Erzgebirge region. Zahra wants us to see for ourselves what effects that struggle had for children, families, and communities. As she observes, local inhabitants could blithely ignore nationalists who insisted that they remain loyal to one, and only one, national community. In Murdock’s chapter we also encounter ‘marginal’ Germans with surprising stores of will and initiative. To be sure, Saxons’ enthusiasm for the beauty of their homeland and their hopes for its future prosperity waxed and waned as tourism and other forms of commercialization made headway or slowed to a crawl. To a remarkable degree, a sense of Saxonness was inscribed in consumer goods and services that were subject to the vagaries of economic development and dislocation. But as Murdock demonstrates, it was not just Saxons’ hopes for the future that underwent these transformations: the landscape itself and its symbolic meaning for Saxons were each ‘pulled between nature and industry, leisure and work, national importance and isolation.’ Because the region was itself fractured and also cut across a hardening border, it created cultural spaces where common identities and mentalities prove to be as revealing as the divisions between groups.

The chapters in part III remind us that Germany’s ‘natural’ landscapes, like its linguistic and ethnic landscapes, were not as natural or unchanging as they seemed. In the nineteenth century, Germans discovered their rivers, scaled their mountains, and traversed their plains in ways that reinforced relations of subordination and domination found in other spheres of life, and those practices of discovery and reflection were anything but static. In a second sense, too, these ‘natural’ landscapes were not natural at all. They were created – ‘willed’ into and out of existence – by botanists, geologists, and engineers, by steamship entrepreneurs, hiking clubs, and cross-border merchants, and by armies.

David Blackbourn’s Germans are not trying to recover some ‘lost innocence’ or to embark on a journey into the unknown – at least not for the sake of the journey itself. For Thomas Lekan’s Germans, belief in the power of landscape to shape the German homeland spurs early attempts at environmental reform; but few are willing to stop there. In Blackbourn’s chapter the key that unlocks the secure image of an unchanging east is the mystique, and then the brutal reality, of German colonization. When Blackbourn’s pioneers speak of an untamed ‘wilderness’ and ‘empty spaces’ in the east, they have already begun to remove the indigenous inhabitants mentally from the landscape – a pre-
lude to removing them in fact, for reasons that Murdock’s, Zahra’s, and Judson’s Germans would have understood well. In Lekan’s study, though, this polarity is consciously blunted. As Lekan suggests in clear contrast to Blackbourn’s wilderness/garden metaphor, environmental protectionists articulated ‘a less dichotomous view of nature and culture,’ a ‘middle ground that provided a more effective language’ for understanding, protecting, and actively shaping the landscapes of modernity.

The larger point found in both Blackbourn’s and Lekan’s analysis is that the architects of the nation state – so familiar from the work of Benedict Anderson, Eugen Weber, and others – were usually hard at work locally too. These were the schoolteachers, Heimat writers, military recruiters, devotees of antiquarian territorial history (Landesgeschichte), town councillors, and newspaper editors who helped to stitch together a sense of belonging among people who had no direct contact with each other. These nation builders had little need or inclination to deal directly with dynasts and administrators in faraway capital cities, with national political leaders, or with speakers of uninflected High German. Did they also contribute to a new, identifiably national sense of belonging? No doubt. But precisely because such people did not endorse the new nation unequivocally, they proved able to preserve the reality of the local while enriching the symbolic power of the national.

This relationship between localism and nationalism has been addressed from many perspectives in the past fifteen years. Celia Applegate was in the vanguard conceptually with her ‘nation of provincials,’ and Alon Confino contributed the idea of the nation as a local metaphor. It is not incidental that both authors chose regions – the Bavarian Palatinate and Württemberg, respectively – as a base camp from which to launch their expedition towards the heart of national sentiment. But Applegate has argued that local and regional politics are constitutive, not imitative, of the politics of the nation state. Thus, to say that national politics had a local face to it or that it gazed at its reflection in the regional mirror is ultimately not to say much at all. James Brophy has made a similar point about German politics: When we try to connect feelings of socio-cultural differentness to their articulation in a national forum like the Reichstag, our goal is not to search only for loyalties that lie like sedimentary layers in the bedrock of nationalism.

The local, regional, and national are ... not a nest of discrete bowls, nor are they accurately rendered as a stratified hierarchy of an ascending scale of political visions and needs. The term hybridity initially seems apt, but one
must not assume that regional and national elements are so discretely dif-
ferent as to constitute cross-breeding. Rather, the local and national rein-
force one another insidiously; they are the warp and weft of the same
political cloth, whose threads are so interwoven that prying apart the web
of this fabric is virtually impossible.42

the two chapters in part II of this volume test theories about this
interpenetration of political cultures in Imperial Germany. Eric
Kurlander’s chapter suggests that German politics was subject to a
kind of re-regionalization in this era. Thomas Kühne goes further, dis-
covering a marked localization of politics in Imperial Germany even as
‘politics in a new key’ (Carl Schorske) and as a ‘political mass market’
(Hans Rosenberg) emerged after introduction of universal manhood
suffrage in 1867. Both authors address questions that are found
throughout this book. What is the local? Who wants whom to represent
it, and why? In what contexts and circumstances do people invoke the
local, and to what ends? But both authors situate questions about iden-
tity and agency within histories of Imperial Germany’s political parties.

Kurlander and Kühne extend the findings of previous scholars
whose interest in party politics has grown since Thomas Nipperdey in
1961 stressed the continuing influence of local notables well into the
age of ‘mass’ politics.43 Yet each adopts a novel perspective, bypassing
legitimately mainstream issues about a national German electorate to
fish more deeply in the well-stocked waters of local and regional iden-
tities.44 What these authors pull out is open to multiple interpretations.
We learn from Kurlander that the political complexion of liberalism in
Schleswig-Holstein had as much to do with pan-European racial-
ethnic discourses as it did with any identifiably ‘particularist’ identity
among inhabitants of the provinces themselves. In Kühne’s chapter we
discover that a Reichstag deputy’s ‘duty’ to secure a local railroad con-
nection for his constituents involved double labour. It demanded local
pork-barrel politics, but it had wider significance. While Reichstag de-
puties served distinctive local needs, they also participated in debates
about the national economy and integrated local ‘peculiarities’ into the
administrative and political structures of the new nation state.45 The
same double labour was undertaken by veterans associations and other
nationalist organizations, as they organized local communities of senti-
ment and interests but also directed their adherents’ gaze towards Ger-
many’s national and imperial goals. Thus, Kühne argues that the ‘face’
of local politics on the one hand, and the policies or institutions that
bore the imprint of local preferences on the other, allowed Germans to practise democracy but constrained them at the same time. In suggesting that democratic practices could go either way after 1918 – in the direction of liberal democracy or towards ‘totalitarian democracy’ – Kühne concludes that local politics and symbolic politics do not occupy separate worlds.

As these chapters demonstrate, a dizzying array of variables contributes to the political ambiguities of place. These include the shifting definitions and significance of regional party bastions; differences of historical experience, of ethnic composition, and of religious faith within the territories under consideration; and the greater or lesser degree of authority exercised by party leaders in local, regional, and national contexts. And lest readers draw the conclusion that only the ethnic and linguistic diversity of regions examined in parts II and IV of this book produced strange political bedfellows, one has only to glance at recent work on other ‘in-between spaces’ of Europe – Catalonia provides a good example – to recognize the extent to which ‘place’ is always available for politicians trying to meet the challenge of rapidly expanding political participation. Place serves as a touchstone of identity and as a space for managing the mobilization of new political forces and as a stronghold for specific stakeholders (local constituents, lobbyists, party functionaries) determined to claim political power for themselves.

The first three chapters of this book take us from the abandoned halls of Harvard in post-Civil War America, to the small colony of painters at Worpswede after 1890, to the grandiosity of Richard Wagner’s vision to inscribe a new national myth on small-town Germany in the 1870s. In each case the local serves to fire the imagination of artists who travel, observe, and compare. When James Retallack follows Nathaniel Hawthorne’s son Julian from Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the Saxon capital of Dresden, he explores how national stereotypes were acted out and questioned at the same time. Retallack is not principally concerned with local and national identities as such. Like other contributors to part I, he finds cross-fertilizations to be more interesting, as they grow into hybrid identities and seed new artistic genres. Also, like the other essays in part I, Retallack’s chapter takes the time to follow a protagonist who is constantly on the move, trying to portray local beauty or grubbiness from new perspectives. Julian Hawthorne fancies himself as a passionate pilgrim. But as he tries to acquire self-knowledge and develop a distinctive artistic style, he receives both accolades and affronts.
In Jennifer Jenkins’s chapter we learn that Heimat art (Heimatkunst) was experimental, too, and hybrid. It spanned urban and less urban themes and genres, and it privileged modern over traditional styles; but that made it no less local. When Jenkins writes that Heinrich Vogeler’s art was located, grounded, and rooted in the life he chose to live at Worpswede, her focus on culture complements Kühne’s argument about the local roots of modern politics. Jenkins observes that Heimat art and early modernism both ‘focused on the detailed renderings of everyday life and the individuality of places.’ Thus, the local provided a theme and a style as well as a structure to the artists’ colony at Worpswede.

Celia Applegate’s soundings also reveal subterranean movements in the world of German high culture. Applegate’s ‘side-stories’ are about musicians on the move, no less than Jenkins’s and Retallack’s peripatetic protagonists and other contributors’ movers and shakers. In all these cases, side-switchers and shape-shifters are as protean as the idea of Germany itself. Applegate’s chosen subject is not the passive, static music that historians have chained to ‘this or that country or city or court,’ but rather the music that received new meaning in each new place. The Bayreuth story embedded in Applegate’s chapter reminds us (as does Judson’s contribution) that by looking at actual places it becomes possible to separate the ‘German’ experience that Wagner (or German nationalists in South Styria) hoped to achieve from the one that was actually built, and lived, and can still be recovered by historians. In Wagner’s case, the choice of Bayreuth was a choice against provincialism and internationalism. It was also a reaction against the capital cities in which Wagner had experienced an oversupply of revolutionary fervour and an undersupply of rich patrons. Wagner’s selection and subsequent transformation of Bayreuth for his new music held within it the same bold pronouncements, but also the same ambivalence, found elsewhere: this place was to be close but separate; a heartland but isolated; one modest locale where Germans could experience one big thing – Wagner’s art. But Bayreuth makes sense only within the larger context of an emerging German identity: institutionally disparate and geographically dispersed, modern and functional and already obsessed with the next big thing, but retaining ‘provincialism of the highest order’ nevertheless.

Applegate’s artists, like Vogeler and Hawthorne, were constantly seeking new vantage points, new cultural clay to mould into shapes that would reveal the contours of real people’s experiences of small-town and rural Germany. For these artists, geographic mobility and cultural
independence brought with them an incommensurability of genre and
marginality. Even the towering figures among this group – Franz Liszt
and Johannes Brahms – learned to live ‘situational’ lives, not national or
naturalized ones. And yet itinerancy was double-edged: here, artistic
sensibility and genius might be sharpened by isolation; there, it might
be dulled by the feeling of being too comfortably ‘at home.’ As Applege-
tate demonstrates, to be creatively satisfied, famous, or adequately
remunerated, German musicians generally had to explore and cross the
borders that serve as markers of identity, thereby undermining the
efforts of Wagner and others bent on canon formation. But this does not
negate the delight these artists found in discovering new locales, unfa-
miliar light, or previously unimagined tonal qualities. If Wagner had
been composing, Hawthorne observing, and Vogeler painting some-
where else, their visions of Germany and Germanness would have been
different – not necessarily larger or smaller, but different.

Applegate sets the stage and attunes us to the thematic development
of this volume when she concludes her tour d’horizon by returning to a
particular site of memory – one built in granite, and one that reverber-
ates for Americans particularly, but not only for them. ‘With or without
a Mount Rushmore of great composers,’ Applegate observes, music
itself was inscribed on the landscapes of German-speaking Europe. In
part IV we find inscriptions of blood, language, ethnicity, and con-
sumer cultures. In part III the marks on the land could hardly be more
tangible: they cut deeply. In part II the local not only inscribes but
refuses to let go of national politics. In part I, pointillisme is not really the
point: daubs of local colour never disappear on a larger canvas, and
local variations on a national theme sound long after Wagner’s bom-
bastic chords have faded to silence. No contributor to this book would
argue that Germany is easy to sound, to sketch, to pin down. Neverthe-
less, considered together, these chapters suggest that, unlike Goethe
and Schiller, Germans living in Central European lands were able to
find such a country after all – and often it was less far from home than
historians have imagined.

NOTES

1 Xenien und Votivtafeln (1797), in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Werke.
I, 5.1: 218.
2 Between April and June 1866 Prussia challenged the legitimacy of the German Confederation so fundamentally in the Frankfurt Diet that Austria, together with its allies among the German states, felt compelled to declare war on Prussia in mid-June to prevent it from seceding from the Confederation.

3 After the decisive French defeat at the Battle of Sedan on 1–2 September 1870, it required all of Bismarck’s negotiating skills, including the outright bribery of Bavaria’s King Ludwig II, to bring the southern German states into the unified empire proclaimed in the Versailles Hall of Mirrors on 18 January 1871.

4 This question will be examined in Robert Beachy and James Retallack, German Civil Wars: Nation Building and Historical Memory, 1756–1914 (Oxford and New York, forthcoming).

5 The classic text is Helmuth Plessner, Die verspätete Nation. Über die politische Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes, 4th ed. (Stuttgart, 1966).


8 Many non-Prussian and working-class Protestants, too, preferred to celebrate dynastic birthdays, May Day, or local traditions instead of the new and unfamiliar national holiday. On the resonance of this contentious issue in Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, and for recent literature, see Siegfried Weichlein, Nation und Region. Integrationsprozesse im Bismarckreich (Düsseldorf, 2004), 350–70; Erwin D. Fink, ‘Region and Nation in Early Imperial Germany: Transformations of Popular Allegiances and Political


10 In Imperial Germany, a second meaning of *bürgerlich*, besides bourgeois, was non-socialist (or even anti-socialist). Thus, all political parties except the SPD were commonly referred to as ‘the bürgerliche parties.’


12 On ‘histories in place,’ ‘geographies in time,’ and disciplinary hybridity as a source of intellectual diversity and strength, see the thoughtful arguments in Alan R.H. Baker, *Geography and History: Bridging the Divide* (Cambridge, 2003).


See Raymond Williams, *Keywords* (London, 1983), 264–6, ‘Regional’: ‘There is an evident tension within the word, as between a distinct area and a definite part. Each sense has survived, but it is the latter which carries an important history. Everything depends, in the latter sense, on the term of relation: a part of what?’


and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia (Ithaca, 2001), esp. 8–12; Allan Pred, Place, Practice, and Structure: Social and Spatial Transformation in Southern Sweden, 1750–1850 (Cambridge, 1986); and John Dickie, Darkest Italy: The Nation and Stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno, 1860–1900 (London, 1999), chaps. 2 and 3. On the Habsburg Empire, see works cited by Murdock, Zahra, and Judson in this volume. On Europe see Anthony D. Smith, ‘Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations,’ and other essays in Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford and New York, 1999), 163–86 and passim; Oliver Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, 1890–1940 (Basingstoke, 2003); and Zimmer and Len Scales, eds., Power and the Nation in European History (Cambridge, 2005).

21 A salutary corrective is provided in Weichlein, Nation. Of course this problem is found not only in Germany; see Gerson, ‘Une France locale,’ 539–40.


23 The complementarity of localism and cosmopolitanism has come to the fore in recent studies of German anthropology and colonialism; for a sense of the range of such studies, see inter alia H. Glenn Penny and Matti Bunzl, eds., Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire (Ann Arbor, 2003); Penny, ‘Fashioning Local Identities in an Age of Nation-Building: Museums, Cosmopolitan Visions, and Intra-German Competition,’ and other essays in Saxon Signposts, ed. James Retallack (special issue of German History 17, no. 4 [1999]: 489–505 and passim); Andrew Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago, 2001); Nancy Reagin, ‘The Imagined Hausfrau: National Identity, Domesticity, and Colonialism in Imperial Germany,’ Journal of Modern History 73 (2001): 54–86; papers presented at the conference ‘Cosmopolitanism and Colonialism’ at the University of Toronto, 17 Dec. 2004; and the symposium report by Deborah Neill and Lisa M. Todd, ‘Local History as Total History,’ German History 20, no. 3 (2002): 373–8.

24 See Jonathan B. Knudsen, Justus Möser and the German Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1986); Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, The Natural History of the German People, ed., trans., and intro. David J. Diephouse (Lewiston, NY, 1990); and
32 David Blackbourn and James Retallack


25 See the pioneering study by Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley, 1990); also Confino, Nation; and Elizabeth Boa and Rachel Palfreyman, Heimat – A German Dream: Regional Loyalties and National Identity in German Culture, 1890–1990 (Oxford, 2000).


27 It is less easy to subscribe uncritically to the assertion that nations and national traditions are ‘invented’ tout court – as suggested by a German publisher’s decision to give Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (London, 1983) the translated title Die Erfindung der Nation (Frankfurt a.M., 1988). On all the national and subnational traditions that were not invented in 1866–71, see Dieter Langewiesche, ‘Was heißt ‘Erfindung der Nation’? Nationalgeschichte als Artefakt – oder Geschichtsdeutung als Machtkampf,’ Historische Zeitschrift 277 (2003): 593–617. See also Ronald Speirs and John Breuilly, eds., Germany’s Two Unifications: Anticipations, Experiences, Responses (Basingstoke and New York, 2005).

28 The preceding observations draw on parallel developments in France, as outlined in Gerson, ‘Une France locale,’ esp. 544–9, and Gerson, Pride, esp. 3–15 and chap. 2.

29 Homi Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,’ in Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London and New York, 1994), 139–70, here 140.


33 Thus, we hope to avoid the criticism levelled against Pierre Nora’s ‘sites of memory’ project, namely, that it neglects the experience of French immigres when it falls back on ‘the narrow Hexagonal confines of traditional French nationalism.’ Suzanne Citron, cited in Steven Englund’s review essay, ‘The Ghost of Nation Past,’ *Journal of Modern History* 64 (1992): 299–320, here 315n43. Compare the introductions to the two groups of essays on the themes of ‘Reich’ and ‘Zerrissenheit’ in *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, ed. Étienne François and Hagen Schulze, 3 vols. (Munich, 2001), 1:25–6, 469–70.


37 It is impossible to convey the richness of even that part of the literature on German-speaking Austria that speaks directly to the themes of this volume; among the most important English-language works, see Pieter Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848–1914* (Ann Arbor, 1996); Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit, eds., *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (New York and Oxford, 2005); Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948* (Princeton, 2002); Scott Spector, *Prague Territories: National Conflict and Cultural Innovation in Kafka’s Fin de
Each author in part IV has a forthcoming monograph that will add to this literature.

Emerging ‘national’ narratives are examined with subtlety in Brent O. Peterson, *History, Fiction, and Germany: Writing the Nineteenth-Century Nation* (Detroit, 2005). Three sessions were devoted to ‘Visualizing Space and Place in German Literature’ at the annual meeting of the Modern Languages Association in Philadelphia, 27–30 Dec. 2006.

Three recent works are cited: Jan Palmowski, ‘Mediating the Nation: Liberalism and the Polity in Nineteenth-Century Germany,’ *German History* 18, no. 4 (2001): 573–98; and Confino, ‘Localness,’ 18. Although written from a different perspective, Rudy Koshar’s *Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg, 1880–1935* (Chapel Hill, 1986) illuminated ‘organizational ecology’ and the ‘dance of local power relationships’ (1–2). It did so by traversing the subdisciplinary boundaries of social, cultural, and political history and by stretching the analysis to include neighbourhood and nation within a single frame.

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45 See also Mergel, ‘Mapping,’ 78: ‘The relationship between regional socialization and the formation of national milieus [is] a strained relationship, not one in which a ‘before’ evolves into an ‘after.’”

46 This and the following remarks draw on Applegate, ‘Histories,’ esp. 261–5.